



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20 (cont'd) that the approach of the DCIs to the strategic NIEs has been inconsistent. Some DCIs have emphasized some roles, while others neglected them. These differences are summarized in the final chapter according to a DCI's individual background and concepts of his job, and in light of historical events. The author also examines potential conflicts between roles exercised by DCIs, addressing the question of whether a DCI can be effectively both "manager and prophet" for the strategic intelligence estimates.

This examination is based on four principal sources. The first is government reports, primarily unclassified, examining aspects of the strategic estimative process. These include reorganization commission reports, recent work of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and internal CIA studies. Second are scholarly studies and journalistic accounts of the strategic NIEs themselves. These are used as a means by which to document historically the competing positions of different agencies in critical intelligence debates, such as the famous "missile gap" debate from 1957 to 1961. The third source is unclassified NIEs, mainly non-strategic.

Since these sources rarely focused on the activities of the DCIs, the major portion of this study relies on over 50 interviews conducted by the author in 1978 and 1979. Interviewees include past and present CIA officials, two former DCIs, Pentagon intelligence officials, and NSC and Congressional staff. Interviewees are listed at the close of the study. Current CIA officials are not cited by name within the footnotes.

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THE DCI'S ROLE IN PRODUCING
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

By
VICTORIA S. PRICE
January, 1980

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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

I. OVERVIEW

Since the position of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was created in 1946 and the CIA in 1947, a major responsibility has been to produce coordinated estimates of the likely future capabilities and intentions of foreign countries. The most polished and prestigious of the CIA's finished intelligence evaluations are the National Intelligence Estimates, called NIEs. The NIEs have existed in their present form since 1950 when the CIA's Office of National Estimates and Board of Estimates were created. Drafted mainly by CIA staff, the NIEs include the input, judgements and dissents of intelligence officials from other agencies, primarily the Defense and State Departments.

After coordinative meetings at the CIA with representatives from these agencies to discuss drafts, the NIEs are reviewed by the DCI and presented to the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), renamed the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) in 1977. Chaired by the DCI, NFIB consists of the heads of other intelligence agencies, and has broad responsibilities for coordinating the activities of the intelligence community.* After joint discussion, the NIEs are approved by the DCI and issued, in his name, to the President.

*NFIB was called USIB from 1958 to 1977, and before that the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC). Chaired by the DCI, NFIB consists of the Deputy Director of CIA (representing the CIA), directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence Research (INR), and the heads of the intelligence sections of the FBI, Treasury Department, and the former AEC. Since 1961, the heads of Army, Air Force and Naval Intelligence have not been official members, but attend meetings, debate and may dissent from the NIEs.

The NIEs are intended to inform the President, National Security Council and other top-level officials about upcoming foreign events, both short and long term, of national importance. For example, some NIEs predict political-economic trends in various trouble spots around the world. These are meant to lead to timely estimates, which may be termed "crisis prediction" NIEs, predicting major crises affecting US foreign policy, such as the outbreak of war, political coups or sudden oil shortages in foreign countries. Then, NIEs termed "operation evaluation" NIEs keep abreast of military and political events during conflict situations, such as during the Korean and Vietnam wars.¹ Special National Intelligence Estimates, called SNIEs, are produced to respond to specific, short-term questions posed by the White House, such as during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

Another group of NIEs is what this author terms the "strategic NIEs." These are annually produced evaluations of Soviet, and now Chinese, military strength.* Strategic NIEs primarily address questions of military force structure, technology and new weapons for an upcoming five year period, of which analysis of strategic policy and intentions is an integral part. From a single, broad estimate on Soviet military capabilities and intentions in 1950, a series of separate estimates on Soviet military strength grew up in the late 1950s. Designated by the number "11", the Soviet

*The author uses the term "strategic" for both intercontinental and intracontinental arms.

NIE series has consisted of individual estimates on conventional arms, offensive nuclear weapons, defensive weapons, nuclear technology, strategic doctrine and other subjects. Presently, the most important Soviet strategic NIE is numbered 11-3-8, combining considerations of intercontinental offensive and defensive weaponry. The Soviet strategic NIEs are the focus of this study.

Controversy About the Soviet Strategic NIEs.

From the beginning, the Soviet strategic NIEs have been the object of considerable controversy within and outside the intelligence community. The debate has been heated, protracted and inter-departmental. In producing these NIEs, the CIA often has been pitted against the Defense Department's intelligence agencies, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) created in 1961 and Army, Air Force and Naval Intelligence. The CIA is supposed to include these agencies in all phases of drafting and, compared to other NIEs except during wartime, the Pentagon's involvement has been heavy. Ultimately, the DCI is responsible for ensuring that the strategic NIEs represent a coordinated view, i.e., that all intelligence is considered and all opinions voiced, before formal approval at NFIB.

More than other NIEs, the debate about the strategic NIEs revolves around the process of coordinated production, aspects of which various participants claim have caused major, predictive inaccuracies. For example, controversy has existed over the large role of the CIA in collecting and analyzing purely military

intelligence, and its domination over the drafting process. Questions are raised about how to involve the Pentagon agencies more in the early stages of drafting, and whether their dissents have been adequately heard and reflected in the final NIEs. Accusations abound as to the biases involved in institutional judgements. For example, the three military services often have been charged with basing excessive estimates of Soviet weaponry on their own budgetary priorities, a concern expressed by both Presidents Truman and Eisenhower about the NIEs.² Beginning with the Nixon Administration, CIA analysts have been criticized for a "liberal bias" which caused them to systematically underestimate Soviet strategic goals.³ As one participant observed:

The truth is that the DCI, since his authority over the intelligence process is at least ambiguous, has an uphill struggle to make a sophisticated appreciation of a certain range of issue prevail in the national intelligence product over against the parochial views and interests of departments....⁴

In the early 1970s, such criticism led to a demand for review of the strategic NIEs by outside experts, culminating in the A-B Team experiment in competitive analysis in 1976, described later.

The central purpose of this study is to provide better understanding of one element in the production of coordinated strategic intelligence estimates, namely, the role of the Director of Central Intelligence. How has the role of the DCI in producing the strategic NIEs historically evolved? How have different DCIs observed their functions? What involvement have DCIs had in drafting the

strategic estimates, encouraging interdepartmental competition, and resolving debate at USIB or NFIB? Can a feasible and appropriate role for the DCI be prescribed for the future?

Complexity in Defining the DCI's Role

The difficulty in defining the role of the DCI in producing the strategic NIEs is inherent to the nature of this country's intelligence apparatus. As the Murphy Commission concluded in 1975:

The United States set up what might be termed a 'mixed' system in an attempt to combine the best features of decentralization and centralization while avoiding the obvious weaknesses of each. The compromises involved in the establishment of a 'mixed' system have given rise to difficulties over the years.⁵

Our intelligence system is decentralized in the sense that the CIA was never intended to have (and never achieved) a monopoly over intelligence collection and analysis. Other agencies, primarily those of the Defense Department for strategic estimating, are supposed to make intelligence and evaluative inputs to the NIEs as well. The advantages of decentralization are considered to be efficiency and improved analysis, if each agency specializes in collecting and analyzing intelligence within its own area of expertise, and multiple advocacy and competition in estimating.⁶

The system is centralized in the position of the DCI, who has three broad roles to play. He manages the CIA, including its covert activities; he acts as chief intelligence advisor to the President; and he coordinates the activities of the intelligence community. Over the years, the DCI's authorization

for coordinative tasks has expanded steadily. In addition to approving the NIEs, he is responsible for focusing the entire community on issues critical to the White House, efficiently dividing and overseeing collection tasks, and since 1971, reviewing and presenting a consolidated intelligence program budget to Congress. To help him, the DCI may devise whatever coordinative bodies he wishes within the CIA. However, the central coordinating institution of the intelligence community has been USIB and its subcommittees, and now NFIB.

If intelligence coordination is represented in the person of the DCI and institutionally by USIB,* the NIEs are its substantive embodiment. The NIEs are meant to be the DCI's document. However, no other intelligence product so readily exemplifies the potential conflicts between the DCI's three jobs. For example, as manager of the CIA, is it not natural for the DCI to expand its intelligence collection and analytical functions, even though such steps might duplicate or weaken the programs of other agencies? As the man responsible for CIA morale and most familiar with its work, should the DCI let the intelligence professionals work out their differences or mainly promote the CIA's position within the final NIEs? As chief intelligence advisor to the President, should the DCI represent his own opinions in the draft or final NIEs, identify himself with a minority or, after encouraging dissent, resolve the debate by making intelligence judgements. What happens if the DCI does not have the technical background to

*Since NFIB was called USIB for almost 20 years, the author uses the acronym USIB throughout most of this study, unless under a specific DCI it was called something else.

understand the strategic issues at hand? As coordinator of the intelligence community, how should the DCI resolve what the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has identified as "the persistent conceptual dilemma...of consensus versus competition."⁷ In the interest of presenting a timely, concise document to the President, how far should the DCI promote competition within the NIEs?

Research Design and Methods

This author contends that such questions historically have not been subject to Presidential direction. Few Presidents have addressed the judgemental issues facing the DCI in producing the NIEs. In contrast, more Presidential attention has focused on the DCI's role in coordinating intelligence collection and, now, budgets. In an attempt to explore intelligence production issues, in the following pages the actual roles assumed by successive DCIs for the strategic NIEs are described in depth.

In Chapter II the evolution of the strategic NIE process under DCIs Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter (1947-1950), General Walter Bedell Smith (1950-1952) and Allen W. Dulles (1953-1961) is traced. The author concludes that the role of the DCI and CIA in the strategic estimative process was originally ill-defined and unrealistic, and that DCI's Smith and Dulles took the initiative in strengthening the DCI's personal role and the CIA's internal strategic work. Then, trends since 1957 increasing the decision-making burden on the DCI are described.

In Chapters III, IV, V and VI, the attitudes and behavior of six DCIs in producing the strategic NIEs are compared systematically. The DCIs selected by the author for study are: Allen W. Dulles (1953-1961); John A. McCone (1961-1965); Richard Helms (1966-1972); James R. Schlesinger (1973); William E. Colby (1973-1975); and Admiral Stansfield Turner (1977-present). Two DCIs not examined here are Admiral William Raborn (mid-1965 to mid-1966) and George Bush (1976), primarily because of their short tenures.* Although James Schlesinger remained in office barely five months, he is included because most interviewees reported that his influence on the strategic estimative process was large.

In these chapters, seven possible roles of the DCI are examined. Two pertain to the mechanisms of the NIE drafting process: management direction to CIA production, and management attention to coordination with the Department of Defense intelligence agencies. Another involves the DCI's personal, substantive input to the draft NIEs. Three roles focus on a DCI's leadership posture during USIB deliberations: support of the CIA's position; encouragement of competitive debate; and final adjudication of views. The last is the role DCIs played in promoting independent, outside review of the strategic NIEs. The reader should bear in mind that the purpose of these chapters is descriptive not evaluative.

The author concludes that the approach of DCIs to the strategic NIEs has been inconsistent. Some DCIs have emphasized some roles, while others neglected them. In Chapter VII, these differences

*DCI George Bush's important role in the 1976 A-B Team experiment in competitive analysis is raised briefly in Chapter VI.

are summarized according to a DCI's individual background and concepts of his job, and in light of historical events. The author also examines potential conflicts between roles exercised by DCIs, addressing the question of whether a DCI can be effectively both "manager and prophet" for the strategic intelligence estimates.⁸

This study is based on four principal sources. The first is governmental reports, primarily unclassified, examining aspects of the strategic estimative process. These include reorganization commission reports, recent work of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and internal CIA studies. Second are scholarly studies and journalistic accounts of the strategic NIEs themselves. These are used as a means by which to document historically the competing positions of different agencies in critical intelligence debates, such as the famous "missile gap" debate from 1957-1961. The third source is unclassified NIEs, mainly non-strategic.

Since these sources rarely focused on the activities of DCIs, the major portion of this study relies on over 50 interviews conducted by this author in 1978 and 1979. Interviewees include past and present CIA officials, two former DCIs, Pentagon intelligence officials, and NSC and Congressional staff. Interviewees are listed at the close of the study. Current CIA officials are not cited by name within the footnotes.

II. EVOLUTION OF THE STRATEGIC ESTIMATIVE PROCESS: 1947 - 1957

The National Security Act of 1947 creating the CIA directed it "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and to provide for its appropriate dissemination."¹ In his memoirs, President Truman wrote that he desired a national intelligence organization which had access to all information, headed by a Director who could speak authoritatively for the whole community.² He wanted to reduce the separate, sometimes conflicting and seemingly biased intelligence reports reaching his desk, and asked the DCI to produce one analytical, predictive document combining these.³ Also created in 1947 was the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), the predecessor of USIB and NFIB. Chaired by the DCI and consisting of all intelligence agency heads, IAC was meant to serve as a coordinating body for the entire intelligence community.

A. Deficiencies in the Original Concept of Coordinating NIEs

The task of producing coordinated estimates fell to Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, a former head of Naval Intelligence who served as DCI from 1947 to mid-1950, and the CIA's new Office of Research and Evaluation (ORE). In retrospect, the original concept of how they were to do this was highly unrealistic, in assigning a subordinate role to the Pentagon and prescribing a dominant role to the fledgling and ill-equipped CIA.

In theory, the 1947 Act said that the "departments and other agencies of Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence," to which

the CIA was intended to have complete access.⁴ Then, it became the task of a small team within ORE to examine this work, both raw intelligence and finished reports, and generate new predictions if necessary. Its analysis was summarized in special estimates called ORES, to which the concurrence or dissent of Defense Department agencies was sought. The CIA was authorized to carry out research and analysis "not presently performed" by other departments, but this was not considered one of its primary estimative functions.⁵

In short, the CIA was not designed to duplicate or supersede the Pentagon's military intelligence collection, research and analytical functions. Rather, as Sherman Kent then wrote: "Its job is what might be called policing the professional competence of the departmental outfits and continually pushing departmental frailties back into departmental laps."⁶ In 1949, Kent did not believe that the CIA even should do its own descriptive and evaluative studies of purely military subjects, since he argued that it could not compete effectively with the Pentagon. In fact, he worried that if attempted, the Pentagon soon would dominate the CIA.⁷

Immediately, the CIA's effort to produce coordinated judgments was undercut by several factors. First, as the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence later noted, the Army, Navy, Air Force and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)* refused to provide the new agency with much raw intelligence since they feared encroachment on their traditional estimative role.⁸ Second, the CIA had

*The Joint Chiefs of Staff's intelligence arm was called the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) or sometimes J-2. Its head was a member of IAC, and then USIB, until DIA was created in 1961.

little independent capability to analyze military data even if forthcoming. For example, the small estimative team within ORE were generalists and the CIA had only one scientist to examine Soviet technical developments.⁹ Thus, it often analyzed only finished reports from the Pentagon. For example, in 1948 the CIA evaluated an Air Force estimate discussing Soviet troop movements in Germany, which suggested that the Soviets were prepared to go to war at any time. The CIA went over the document line by line, and reportedly labeled the estimate "mistaken."¹⁰ The CIA said that it had evaluated the information differently.

Third, the Pentagon intelligence agencies often refused to cooperate in drafting and reviewing the OREs, and sometimes withheld their final concurrence. The first estimate of Soviet military objectives and capabilities, intended to be an annual affair, took two years to complete in March, 1948, and ORE considered it mainly a CIA document.¹¹ A sampling of the estimates prepared in the late 1940s indicates that some never were issued formally, since the Pentagon refused to concur.¹² Further, IAC reportedly spent most time reviewing collection programs and intelligence requirements, rather than acting as a high-level deliberative and approval body for the estimates.¹³ In 1949, one study group concluded: "The principle of the authoritative NIE does not yet have established acceptance in the government. Each department still depends more or less on its intelligence estimates and establishes its plans and policies accordingly."¹⁴ By 1950, it was asserted that "ORE did little more than produce its own analyses"¹⁵ and "90% of its work" was current, non-predictive intelligence.¹⁶

Finally, the CIA's intended authority over the strategic estimative process was not advanced, or aggressively defined, by DCI Hillenkoetter. In theory, the DCI's only formal responsibility for the coordinated estimates was to approve and issue them. Thus, he had considerable latitude to establish an active, personal role. However, although Admiral Hillenkoetter daily briefed President Truman, he did not have sufficient rank or stature within the military intelligence community to elicit their full cooperation.¹⁷ For example, a CIA memorandum in 1950 stated that "the Intelligence Advisory Committee had assumed an advisory role to the NSC and functioned as a supervisory body for the DCI--contrary to the initial intention."¹⁸

DCI Hillenkoetter also seems to have been uncertain about how far the CIA should go in making firm predictions of foreign military intentions. For example, in the aftermath of the North Korean attack on South Korea of June 10, 1950, Hillenkoetter staunchly defended the CIA by asserting that top-level officials were in possession of the pertinent data before the invasion, and the CIA subsequently was exonerated in this respect.¹⁹ However, he reportedly argued that the CIA could not be responsible for the "evaluation" of enemy intent.²⁰ A year later, he told Congress that the CIA similarly predicted the location and capabilities of Chinese troops in Manchuria before their December 1950 invasion, but that "to predict the intentions of the enemy, real or potential, you would need a crystal ball."²¹ In contrast, Hillenkoetter

was accused in the press for "empire-building" in current intelligence matters,²² and he frequently sent President Truman personal memos summarizing "raw" CIA agents reports.²³

B. Definition of the DCI's and CIA's Role by General W. Bedell Smith

By 1950, five separate studies called for a greater "centralization of authority" in the DCI's hands for long-term, predictive estimates.²⁴ General Bedell Smith arrived as DCI in the late 1950s determined to assert his prerogative for this.²⁵ As a four-star general, formerly General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff and Ambassador to Russia, he was well-equipped to do so. DCI Smith took four steps. First, he created the Office of National Estimates (ONE) and Board of Estimates in CIA in 1950, whose sole purpose was to produce speculative-evaluative NIEs. Second, he launched the CIA on the path of acquiring an independent capability for analysis of military data. Third, he forcefully elicited the cooperation of the Pentagon in preparing NIEs on military subjects. Fourth, he considered the NIEs his estimates, which should reflect a clear-cut, hopefully unified opinion for the President, and his own views when they existed. For this purpose, he turned IAC into a body in which he supervised formal deliberations on the NIEs.

The ONE was designed as an analytical unit to draft NIEs. To do this, General Smith asked historian William Langer, ONE's first director, to recruit the best talent available. The ONE deliberately was kept small, ranging over the years from 30-75 professionals. Its role was to write the NIEs, relying entirely

on the work generated by other CIA components and other agencies to do so. The Board of Estimates was created to review the draft NIEs, and consider the comments and criticisms of other agencies before submitting them to the DCI and IAC for final approval. The Board always consisted of about a dozen men, including retired military officers. The first nine included five historians, one lawyer, and three former military officers, of whom one formerly was Eisenhower's G-3. An outside panel of experts, known as the Princeton Consultants, was established to assist the Board and DCI in reviewing the NIEs.

General Smith initially believed that the three military services should collect and review all military and strategic data, which ONE then should coordinate and evaluate as a basis for drafting the NIEs. If inadequate, "his reaction was not to do it yourself, but to get others to do it."²⁶ In practice, a shortage of hard intelligence on Soviet troops, bombers, airfields and military plans resulted in the Pentagon making large demands on the CIA's clandestine division, the Directorate for Plans (DDP). As a former DDP Soviet specialist writes, from 1949-1954, the DDP "operated almost solely as an instrument of the Department of Defense and its theater commands. Their need was great."²⁷ Further, it soon became evident that for ONE to draft NIEs predicting the capabilities of Russian heavy bombers, nuclear production, and eventually missiles and warheads, the CIA had to have its own capability for scientific, technical and economic analysis.

Primarily, this was because General Smith became convinced that the CIA could not rely on the Pentagon to generate and submit such intelligence analyses to it.²⁸

Smith thus waged a bureaucratic battle to establish the CIA's independence in military and eventually strategic research. For example, in an agreement with the State Department in 1951, the CIA's newly formed Office of Research and Reports (ORR) was granted exclusive responsibility for economic research on the Soviet bloc.²⁹ The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) established in 1949 moved slowly into weapons technology research, although an August 1952 agreement with the Defense Department restricted it to basic scientific research and pilot projects. The Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) created in 1951 first specialized in political intelligence, but soon had a military division. In early 1952, these three units (ORR, OSI and OCI) were grouped together along with ONE in the CIA's Intelligence Directorate (DDI).

Through the strength of his professional rank and personality, General Smith induced the military services and JCS to contribute written, draft material to ONE for consideration. After the role of the Pentagon was established as one of regular, formal input to the draft NIEs, a second problem was to encourage officers of sufficient rank and knowledgeability to participate in the deliberations at CIA and, third, to encourage them to elaborate their positions.³⁰ General Smith believed that considerations of Soviet military hardware should be accompanied by predictions of Soviet military strategy. "Almost immediately, the military challenged ONE on the nature of the estimates, demanding that

they be factual and descriptive."³¹ General Smith prevailed, and in so doing hoped to reduce the Pentagon's tendency to overestimate Soviet weapons based on individual service budgetary priorities.³²

General Smith played a strong role in deciding what military issues should be the subjects of NIEs. In theory, NIEs were produced following a specific request from the NSC, and the NSC was also supposed to have a hand in deciding the "terms of reference" of an NIE (i.e., the specific questions posed by an NIE). However, from the beginning, General Smith and the CIA often took the initiative. During Smith's tenure, the military-oriented NIEs on ongoing operations in the Korean war and Soviet military actions in Eastern Europe took precedence over what this author has termed the Soviet strategic NIEs. Smith was keenly interested in the former, for which he posed specific questions and wanted "quick and authoritative" answers.³³ It was typical for Smith to phone his colleagues at the Pentagon and say something like: "'I want you to get over here and decide whether Russia is going to invade Poland.'"³⁴ Prior to submitting the NIEs to IAC, he read them thoroughly and voiced any personal disagreements privately to ONE or Pentagon officials.³⁵ Then, the NIEs might be edited by ONE to more clearly reflect these.

General Smith's "extensive contacts at the senior military level and his pervasive prestige" enabled him to turn IAC into a deliberative body over which he firmly presided.³⁶ In 1950, the CIA's General Counsel had told Smith that:

IAC's inflated role had diminished the DCI's ability to demand departmental cooperation for the CIA's national estimates responsibility. Houston advised that the DCI would have to exert more specific direction over the departmental agencies, if coordinated national intelligence production was to be achieved. Smith acted on Houston's advice and informed the members of IAC that he would not submit to their direction.³⁷

Smith believed that by encouraging competitive discussion of the NIEs at IAC, the Pentagon's intelligence heads would take a more active interest in them. He directed the debate along lines of thinking he saw as most productive. No formal vote was taken on the NIEs, and it was up to him to open or close discussion as he so chose. His approval of the NIEs was meant to be final. After IAC, "he insured that they were presented to Truman without contrary briefings being given him by other agencies as so often had happened before."³⁸

Almost immediately, General Smith addressed the issue of how much and what kind of military dissent to permit, for example, in the NIEs on the Korean war. In theory the right to dissent from the main text of an NIE in a brief footnote existed from the beginning. The NIE was supposed to provide an "exposure of information and judgements, reflecting both the consensus and the differences within the intelligence community."³⁹ In practice, this did not pertain to the CIA, since the Board of Estimates worked to reach a unified position and a dissenting faction within the CIA was never permitted a footnote. Further, Smith was intolerant of military dissent which appeared to him poorly reasoned or biased. Thus, one of his major aims before and during IAC

meetings was to encourage the Pentagon to state their dissents clearly and precisely and, failing that, to overrule them.⁴⁰ In this sense, Smith played a role which this author later terms as "adjudicatory." He decided whether a dissent reflected a real predictive uncertainty, or was discrete and well-reasoned enough, to be represented in a final NIE.

C. Allen Dulles and the Modern Strategic NIEs

When Allen Dulles became the first civilian DCI in early 1953 under President Eisenhower, the DCI had the license to shape the NIEs as he saw fit. Regarded as his document, he might influence what the NIEs examined, represent his personal opinion in them, or seek a consensus-oriented NIE or one reflecting dissenting views. As chairman of IAC, he could act as leader of debate on NIEs, expanding or limiting discussion as he inclined. Final decisions at IAC were meant to be authoritative and binding.

However, compared to other NIEs, the Soviet strategic NIEs were primitive and the DCI's role in this process had not taken shape. Primarily, this was because the DCI as yet did not have to preside over intense, intricate conflicts between the CIA and Pentagon reflected in the strategic estimates. Further, the drafting process was still evolving. In the first half of the 1950s, the Pentagon dominated estimating on Soviet strategic weapons, since the CIA's capability for independent work was fledgling.

By 1953, the CIA issued annually two major NIEs related to Soviet strategic strength. One NIE, numbered 11-2,* assessed the Soviet's "gross capability" to attack the US and focused on Soviet nuclear development. What was to become the more controversial estimate was NIE 11-4, a comprehensive "soup to nuts" document addressing Soviet political, economic and military capabilities to pursue its goals throughout the world. NIE 11-4 included a military chapter, sometimes chapters, on Soviet conventional arms and manpower, and medium and long-range delivery vehicles. In the late 1950s, separate NIEs were initiated to cover these and other topics.

In drafting the military portions of NIE 11-4, ONE is said to have relied chiefly on the Pentagon's written input and judgments on Soviet hardware. That is, until late 1956, the Army, Navy and Air Force were asked to draft individual, uncoordinated estimates pertaining to their special expertise, e.g., the Air Force for Soviet bombers and missiles. Then, ONE reviewed, edited and polished these into a standard NIE form. Because the CIA's independent research and analytic work was limited, ONE did not draft the strategic estimates from scratch, as it did for other NIEs. In preparing these, one CIA analyst asserts: "The ONE

*Henceforth in this study, specific NIEs for specific years will be referred to by number, with the last two digits referring to the year of production, for example, NIE 11-4-58.

**For example, around 1955 a separate NIE, numbered 11-3, was initiated to address Soviet air defense systems. In 1958, NIE 11-8 was created to cover Soviet strategic attack forces, and it is this NIE which became one of the most significant and controversial. NIE 11-4 evolved into an estimate discussing Soviet strategic doctrine, NIE 11-5 focused on Soviet missile capacities and NIE 11-15 addressed Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional forces. In 1974, NIEs 11-3 and 11-8 were combined. There never has been a complete NIE 11-1 to 11-15 series produced for any given year. Rather, the number assigned to each topic persists, and some NIEs in the series are produced only occasionally.

accepted fairly uncritically the inputs made by the Pentagon.⁴¹ An Army intelligence official reports: "The CIA generally took the Pentagon's views in NIE 11-4."⁴²

The ONE analysts did not favor this procedure. In the early 1950s, ONE had experimented in writing its own first draft statement of Soviet strategic aims.⁴³ In 1955, ONE's chief urged the staff to write an entire first draft of the relevant military sections.⁴⁴ Further, not all ONE staff and Board members agreed with the Pentagon's figures. Differences existed, but have been described as "similar cleavages...to those existing throughout the defense establishment" as opposed to a unified, independent CIA position.⁴⁵ Nonetheless, the first half of the 1950s was characterized by a slowly evolving CIA role in drafting, in which it could not match the resources and skill of the three military services.

This story is best illustrated by the now famous "bomber gap" overestimates of Soviet long-range manned bombers, presented in NIE 11-4 from the spring of 1955 to the fall of 1956. Basically, these predictions represented an Air Force judgement, unchallenged and thus supported by the CIA, and sharply contested by the Army and Navy. The "bomber gap" predictions were contained in the main text of the NIEs, not in footnotes. As one author writes, the NIEs of 1955 and 1956 "provided a range of possible production curves, the choice among them being largely a matter of institutional commitment and interest."⁴⁶ For example, in NIE 11-4-55

the CIA and Air Force predicted a range of 30-80 Bison bombers in place, and 500-800 Bisons by mid-1960.⁴⁷ The Army and Navy objected, and their estimate later proved the most accurate. By 1961, the Russians had built only 180 long-range bombers, the majority of which were Bears, not Bisons.⁴⁸

Allen Dulles upheld the "bomber gap" estimates in 1955 and 1956, even though "the input of strategic intelligence into the defense debate in 1955-1957 was extremely damaging to the Administration" whose stated goal was to hold the defense budget constant.⁴⁹

As Dulles later wrote:

In 1954...there was evidence that the Soviet Union was producing long-range intercontinental heavy bombers comparable to our B-52s. At first, every indication...pointed to the conclusion that the Russians were adopting this weapon as a major element of their offense and planned to produce heavy bombers as fast as their economy and technology permitted.⁵⁰

In comparison to Soviet bomber estimates, in January 1956 the USAF Strategic Air Command had only 41 B-52s in place, although 57 had been completed.⁵¹ In response to the "gap" predictions, President Eisenhower authorized acceleration of the B-52 production rate to 12 a month in the spring of 1955, and in May 1956 the rates were accelerated twice again, first to 17 a month and then 20 a month.⁵²

In predicting Soviet bombers and subsequently ICBMs, the Air Force did not dominate the NIEs for long. By the end of 1956, the CIA emerged as a rival to Pentagon intelligence and engaged in its first, heated debate with the Air Force over the bomber gap. When Dulles presented his annual testimony

to Congress on the Soviet strategic threat, the comments offered by the Air Force officer, who traditionally accompanied the DCI to answer technical questions, were challenged by the CIA. Changes that CIA analysts wished to make in editing the officer's testimony were presented to Dulles, who was receptive.⁵³ The CIA's position was reflected in its first independent draft of NIE 11-4 in the spring of 1956, in which its estimates of Soviet bombers began to slide. In response, President Eisenhower reduced the B-52 production rate to 15 a month.⁵⁴ Taking the August 1956 NIE as the baseline for estimates of Soviet heavy bomber development, the CIA reduced the estimates to 62.5% in the end of 1957, 25% by the end of 1958, and 19% by February 1960.⁵⁵ The Air Force dissented from the CIA's view in brief footnotes.

Thus, by 1957 the modern strategic NIE had evolved. The CIA independently drafted its institutional position as the main text, and the Pentagon participants were relegated to footnoted dissents. This form was to prevail for the next two decades. The CIA's claim to a dominant position within strategic NIEs resulted from three factors: the U-2 photo reconnaissance flights; the CIA's independent strategic research and analytic capability; and the personal decision of Allen Dulles.

First, through the DDP side, the CIA developed, funded, managed and flew the U-2 plane which took its initial photographs over Soviet territory in June 1956.⁵⁶ One of Dulles' priority projects, as DCI he controlled the complex interagency decision-making mechanisms for U-2 flights subject to final Presidential

approval.⁵⁷ The CIA developed its own photo interpretation capacity. From one specialist in 1953, a special office was created under the DDI which promptly grew to 20 persons and eventually 1,200.⁵⁸ By August 1956, Soviet factories building bombers had been located for the first time and bombers at the factories and on the airfields were counted. According to CIA analysts, these numbers did not support the "bomber gap" theory.⁵⁹

Second, on the DDI side, the CIA's economic, scientific and current military intelligence work provided ONE with independent analyses to use in drafting the strategic NIEs. The most sophisticated, novel and prestigious reportedly was the Soviet economic group called the Economic Research Area (ERA). Based on its analysis of Soviet materials and industrial capability, ERA developed new methodologies for estimating production rates, a speciality of the CIA's ever since . As the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence describes:

By introducing economic production capacities into assessments of Soviet strategic capabilities, the Agency challenged the basic premises of the military's judgements...Air Force intelligence based its estimates on knowledge of Soviet technology and laboratory research, which by 1953 were well advanced. ORR [of which ERA was a part] based its estimates of Soviet deployments on Soviet economic production capabilities, which were severely limited as a result of the war. Consequently, ORR's methodology attributed lower strategic deployments, i.e., long-range bombers and missiles, to the Russians.⁶⁰

Third, by 1957 Allen Dulles favored a document in which the CIA presented its independent view as the main text and conclusion. This decision he is said to have "agonized over" for some time after.⁶¹ An OSS hero, Dulles was eager to establish the CIA as the chief intelligence arm of government. Although Dulles had an independent base in the Administration, he was cautious about advertising the institutional growth of the CIA, lest the Pentagon become alarmed unduly. Personally, he did not like to preside over awkward jurisdictional disputes between the CIA and military. By the mid-1950s, the CIA already was engaged in a bitter battle with the Army concerning the latter's clandestine operations and counterintelligence roles, at the direction of the NSC.⁶² Dulles' preferences led to outside criticism. For example, he was accused of failing to promptly consolidate CIA's military research components "on the grounds that the services might interpret such a move as a unilateral attempt by the Agency to assume large responsibilities in their fields of primary concern."⁶³ Three times during his tenure the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and its predecessor called for the DCI to assume a stronger coordinative role for the entire intelligence community.⁶⁴

Interestingly, Dulles was not firmly convinced that "it was in the best national interest" to present competing claims to the President within the NIEs.⁶⁵ Further, he personally questioned the wisdom of allowing a civilian agency clearly to dominate

the military agencies in the final strategic estimate. President Eisenhower does not appear to have helped him resolve either uncertainty. At that time, it was Eisenhower's known preference to have disputes ironed out prior to NSC briefings. Also, he was unsympathetic with "gap" predictions, reportedly inventing the term "military industrial complex" when criticizing the Pentagon's tendency to press for growth of defense budget items.⁶⁶ Nonetheless, these indirect signals did not provide the DCI clear guidance on how to handle dissents, how far to advance uncertainty, and whether to remain passive or choose between alternative positions. Such questions became critical as the "bomber gap" grew into the "missile gap" NIEs of 1957-1961. Dulles' initial hesitancy about the CIA's dominant position with the strategic NIEs aptly reflects the controversy surrounding them ever since.

D. Trends Since 1957


Since 1957, several changes in the strategic estimative process have increased the management and decisionmaking burden on the DCI. First, the CIA's internal strategic capability has grown steadily. Ten years later, the DDI alone employed hundreds of persons involved in strategic work. Of these, 178 were engaged in strategic research primarily related to the NIEs, and in 1967 were grouped together in the Office of Strategic Research (OSR). Plus a sophisticated knowledge of advanced technology, one of OSR's specialities is to "cost out" Soviet weapons production. In 1979, OSR employed 260 persons, and also studied

Sino-Soviet strategic doctrine.⁶⁷ For the CIA's total strategic capability, this number is just the tip of the iceberg. For example, the huge Directorate of Science and Technology (DDS&T) created in 1965 is involved in complex research and technical programs contributing to the estimative process. Chart A on the following page describes the CIA's organization in 1972 for strategic programs.

At the same time, the number of CIA persons drafting and reviewing the strategic NIEs has been reduced. Whereas ONE employed a small, sometimes rotating drafting staff, when it was replaced by the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) in 1973, one person employing two assistants was responsible for drafting NIE 11-3-8. Whereas the ONE staff was assisted by the twelve-member Board of Estimates which reviewed the NIEs, when abolished in 1973, no replacement was made until recently. In 1979, a three-member Senior Review Panel was created to assume some of the Board's functions. Finally, ongoing review of the NIEs by outside experts has not been part of the official estimating process since the early 1960s.

A third change, alluded to earlier, was the emergence of a distinct institutional perspective within the CIA vis-a-vis the Pentagon. Often, the CIA assumed an adversary relationship with the military agencies, based on an assumption of biased military estimating. As described subsequently, the image was heightened following the entire community's "missile gap" overestimates from 1957 to mid-1961. To quote a former Chairman of the Board

CHART A



of Estimates: "...there is a natural thrust in military intelligence to maximize threats and oversimplify the intentions of potential adversaries."⁶⁸ For its part, the Pentagon intelligence agencies grew to distrust CIA analysts, who they argued tended to underestimate the Soviet threat. James Schlesinger summarized these views in 1976: "In fact, the [CIA's] intelligence directorate tends to make a particular type of error systematically in close harmony with the prevailing biases in the intellectual community... There was an assumption that the Soviet has the same kind of arms control objectives that they wished to ascribe or persuade American leaders to adopt."⁶⁹ Created to be free of bias, the CIA thus was accused of perpetuating one.

A fourth change was in the nature of the issues debated. The advent of improved satellite reconnaissance and other detection means in the 1960s meant that, in the words of one participant, the world was no longer "opaque."⁷⁰ However, this prevented neither mistakes nor quarrels. As Albert Wohlstetter has documented, both civilian and military estimators "underestimated" Soviet ICBM, SLBM and heavy bomber build-up in the mid and late 1960s.⁷¹ As the SALT treaties loomed large, both the DCI and CIA were drawn into a qualitative debate about overall Soviet strategic intentions. As DCI George Bush argued in 1978, perhaps prematurely:

The revolutionary developments in the technological means of intelligence in the last 10 years take care of many loopholes in terms of the precision of our projects. We don't debate about a minor missile gap now. There's no debate. We measure them, we count them, know where they're

sitting, we look at them....There is debate, however, about the things that can't show on a photograph or can't be picked up by electronics: political factions' debates behind closed doors of politburos, research laboratories, general staffs. These things can't be learned by technology.⁷²

Finally, the format of the strategic NIEs has changed markedly. From a document presenting a dominant consensus and brief footnoted dissents, the strategic NIEs in the 1960s became highly complex documents riddled with many, lengthy footnotes and appendices. In 1969, the Nixon Administration found this confusing, and subsequently asked the DCI to experiment with means of presenting alternative views "up front" in the main text of the strategic NIEs. Supported by the DCI, this experiment went through successive stages. Now, the strategic NIEs may present what are labelled "true alternatives" to the President, and the use of footnotes has been abandoned.⁷³ Thus, the current definition of a coordinated NIE is the opposite of what originally prevailed. In terms of the NIE's format, the DCI's role has changed from one of consensus-seeking to presiding over competition.

III. THE DCI'S MANAGEMENT OF STRATEGIC NIES AT THE DRAFT STAGE

In the next four chapters, the roles of six DCIs since 1957 in producing the strategic estimates are examined in depth. The focus is on the personal attitudes and leadership postures adopted by successive DCIs. These are explored within an informal context; that is, in the absence of formal legislative and Presidential direction, DCIs have had the liberty to assume or ignore any of the roles described. The author's conclusions for six DCIs and seven possible roles are summarized in Chart B on the following page. The chart is referred to in subsequent chapters.

These chapters are written from the DCI's perspective and are mainly descriptive. The author is interested in the historical pattern of behavior, establishing what six men have done, or not done, to ensure that coordinated NIEs were produced. Whether these actions resulted in improved NIEs is an evaluative question, raised later only tangentially. For example, a DCI may have initiated a reorganization which was later criticized or reversed. Or, a DCI may have inserted his personal judgement or sided with a minority view within an NIE, which in retrospect proved inaccurate. Rather than scoring a DCI on whether he was right or wrong, we seek to establish whether a DCI did anything at all. How did DCIs regard the strategic NIEs, what roles did they believe they should pursue, what tasks did they find difficult or conflicting, what steps were ignored?

CHART B

INDIVIDUAL ROLES ASSUMED BY DCIS FOR PRODUCTION OF STRATEGIC NIES

(X - Played a role; XX - viewed as major role by DCI; O - played little or no role)

| | | DCIs | | | | | |
|--|---|---------------------|------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------|
| | | DULLES (1953-61) | McCONNELL (1961-65) | HELMS (1966-72) | SCHLESINGER (1973) | COLBY (1973-75) | TURNER (1977-) |
| <u>DRAFT STAGE OF NIES</u> | 1. Management Direction to CIA Production | 0 | X | 0 | X | XX | XX |
| | 2. Management Attention to DOD Coordination | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | XX | XX |
| | 3. Personal, Substantive Input to Draft | 0 | X | 0 | XX | 0 | XX |
| <hr/> | | | | | | | |
| <u>FINAL DELIBERATIONS AT USIB OF NFIB</u> | 4. Support of CIA's position (from '57 on) | X | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 5. Encouragement of Competitive Debate | 0 | X | 0 | X | XX | 0 |
| <u>DRAFTER FINAL NIES</u> | 6. Final Adjudication of Views | 0 | X | X | ? (tenure too brief) | 0 | XX (but mainly prior to NFIB in 3.) |
| | 7. Promote Independent (Outside) Review | X | 0 | 0 | X | 0 (W.H. in '75) | 0 Bush (1976) (XX) |

*W.H. indicates DCI responsive to Presidential or White House preferences.

This chapter discusses the actions of DCIs in managing the estimative process prior to USIB consideration, at the time when the NIEs are drafted by the CIA with input from the Pentagon. It concerns the mechanics of the drafting process, for example, who wrote the NIEs, how they were written, and how the Pentagon intelligence agencies contributed.

A. Management Direction to CIA Production

The CIA's three functional Directorates have been described in this manner: "The DDI is a production outfit and can run itself, the DDS&T spends money, but the DDP always involves people problems."¹ For most years located in the DDI, the Board of Estimates and ONE did "run itself." After the policy decisions of DCIs Smith and Dulles previously described, their leaders established the traditions and operational steps for producing NIEs which persisted until 1973. Until then, DCIs remained in a supportive role.

For example, DCIs Allen Dulles, John McCone and Richard Helms did not review or initiate organizational innovations, dictate or modify drafting and review procedures, or personally select the drafting team, although they did approve Board appointments. Likewise, these DCIs did not decide when the strategic NIEs were drafted, instigate innovations in style and format, or review the theoretical underpinnings of earlier concepts. In part, this reflects their satisfaction with the estimative process as it was being run and their attention to other CIA programs. Even

John McCone who, compared to DCIs Dulles and Helms, was keenly interested in management questions, reportedly spent "90% of his time on clandestine (DDP) programs."² However, as indicated in Chart B, John McCone is given an "X" because of his role in a breakthrough relating to highly classified, US strategic planning data available to CIA estimators.

Beginning in 1973, a trend was established for a more active management of estimative work by the DCI. DCIs James Schlesinger, Williman Colby and Stansfield Turner believed that organizational and drafting innovations were needed, and that management was a prime function of the DCI. After Colby abolished the Board of Estimates and ONE in 1973, both he and Admiral Turner personally hired the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), designed new drafting techniques, and monitored the NIOs' progress by reading successive draft NIEs.

Some observers claim that it is inappropriate for the DCI to concentrate the power, resources and intellect of his office to managing a handful of men who draft the strategic NIEs. Since these persons originally were intended to be uniquely independent but, in turn, totally dependent on external staff who collect and analyze strategic intelligence, perhaps the DCI should turn his attention to the rest of the CIA's strategic work. For example, which strategic functions should be grouped together in the DDO,* DDS&T and DDI and what are the optimal means by which

*The clandestine Deputy Directorate of Plans (DDP) was renamed the Deputy Directorate of Operations (DDO) in 1973.

the three Directorates share work with one another? What is the appropriate balance between human intelligence gathering (HUMINT), electronic communications and signals intelligence collection (ELINT, COMMINT and SIGINT), and the political analysis of all three.* How much should CIA drafters rely on CIA as opposed to Pentagon work in producing the strategic NIEs?

Because of the enormity of these questions and the competing claims of different functional units, this author's research has focused primarily on the CIA's estimates staff and its coordination with the Defense Department intelligence agencies. Unless a DCI initiated organizational innovations in the CIA's strategic intelligence work primarily for the short-term impact on the NIEs in mind, such changes are not discussed in this study. Below, the DCI's management direction to CIA estimative work before and after 1973 are described separately.

1. Before 1973

The early independence of the Board of Estimates and ONE staff from the DCI is explained by the uniqueness of their functions and the aggressiveness, small number and stability over time of the individuals involved. The Board and ONE were designed to offer the DCI an independent, collective analytical judgement for his final review. Elite units of talented professionals,

*Sometimes analytical work also is referred to as HUMINT. In the past decade, the question of whether the CIA is long on technological collection programs and technical analysis, and short on political analysis, has been raised by at least three DCIs--Schlesinger, Colby and Bush. It continues to be a focus of outside criticism.

they were supposed to be isolated from the daily pressures and competing demands of other CIA units. There were only four Chairman of the Board and one, Sherman Kent, served from 1952-1967. The Board's membership of approximately twelve was meant to be well-rounded, and include one or more retired military officers. The total ONE typically was about 50 professionals, variously organized on a geographic and functional basis. The Chief of ONE handled most administrative matters for the estimates staff, in order to free the Board members for substantive work. In the mid-1960s, it became common practice for ONE staff to be elevated to Board positions.

The Board and ONE developed the format for the NIEs. For example, all NIEs consisted of an opening, brief "Summary," followed by tight paragraphs of "Conclusions" and a presentation of the background and evidence. In the 1950s Sherman Kent developed a lexicon of probabilities, which was a "system of carefully graded verbal measures of certainty."³ An executive summary was prepared according to a President's interest or request. For example, for the strategic NIEs, President Johnson requested a special one-page summary and President Carter is said to read up to 15 pages.⁴ The Soviet strategic NIEs included a carefully worded statement of overall Soviet strategic emphasis and intentions, which beginning in 1969 was included in the executive summary, and since 1974 constitutes a separate chapter of NIE 11-3-8.

In the late 1950s, separate estimates in the Soviet "11" series were initiated by ONE, reportedly in part to facilitate the input of new CIA units to the draft.⁵ In the 1960s, the strategic NIEs expanded from 30 to, by 1970, over 100 pages. Presently, NIE 11-3-8 consists of an executive summary, and two volumes of about 125 pages each. The first is a summary volume and the second a documentary volume, containing detailed supporting data, charts, graphs and tables.

As the format and timing of the strategic NIEs became routinized, there was little need for the DCI to dictate in advance when they should be written and what topics to consider.* For example, the "terms of reference" of the strategic NIEs was circulated by ONE in late winter, a first draft completed in late spring, followed by lengthy interagency coordinative meetings at the CIA, which hopefully culminated in a final draft in October for DCI and USIB approval. This schedule anticipated Presidential consideration of the NIEs in preparing his defense budget. Generally, each strategic NIE updated last year's predictions and inventoried new weapons, for the next five years. As described later, in the 1970s DCIs sometimes decided at USIB whether to include new, highly controversial subjects in the current or next year's strategic NIEs.

The Board of Estimates early established two traditions which have persisted with the DCI's support. First is to draft the NIEs from the point of view of a foreign country, with no specific

*In contrast, DCIs often have been involved in the "tasking" and terms of reference of non-strategic NIEs, such as during potential crisis situations.

reference to US policy options, military force levels, or conflict scenarios. This practice is meant to free estimators from bias that might result if they are drawn into debate on US military programs, and thereby also increase the credibility of the NIEs. Direct comparisons are considered a "Net Assessment" rather than NIE function, and have been primarily the job of the Defense Department.⁶ Reportedly, in 1962 CIA estimators were so concerned with preserving this distinction that they were reluctant to gain access to highly classified US strategic planning data, lest the NIEs then appear less independently written or unbiased.⁷

DCIs have reinforced this tradition. For example, Allen Dulles systematically avoided statements that gave the appearance that the CIA was involved in foreign policymaking. His colleagues describe how he refused to raise even the implications of NIEs for the US strategic arsenal, even when specifically asked by Congressional and NSC members.⁸ Dulles never talked publicly about "gaps." "The DCI's job was to provide the facts, period."⁹ John McCone is said to be less of a "neutralist" or "purist" in this regard.¹⁰ "Mine is not a policy job," he once said "but when asked I'll give my opinion."¹¹ In 1969, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger argued that rigid adherence to this tradition decreased the NIEs' policy relevance. However, DCI Richard Helms held his ground, and resisted the White House's initial proposal for involving CIA estimators in SALT I verification predictions.¹² The agreement subsequently established remains in effect, with a distinction drawn between predicting Soviet potential to violate the treaty and verifying a substantial violation, which Admiral Turner considers a policy matter.

However, White House interest in direct US-USSR force comparisons in the NIEs has continued. In the 1970s, the strategic NIEs included a brief numerical summary of current and predicted US force levels in an appendix, and some requests were made for US-USSR conflict scenarios. Recently, President Carter asked DCI Turner to offer so-called "red-blue" comparisons between Soviet ("red") and US ("blue") forces in the main text of the NIEs.¹³ One CIA analyst said that the issue of how to best present these "has not been resolved."¹⁴

A second practice established by the Board of Estimates is to reach a unified CIA position within draft NIEs. That is, a faction within the CIA does not have the option of taking a footnote. In effect, the Board and not the DCI monitored disputes between CIA estimators. One Board member "chaired" each NIE from the beginning, and it was up to him to see that all CIA viewpoints were aired before reaching a conclusion. Typically, this occurred before the Pentagon agencies were called in to discuss the draft.¹⁵ A unified CIA opinion is, in part, inherent in the nature of estimative work. As one author notes, there is also a bureaucratic imperative: a unified view reinforced the CIA's draft and reduced the likelihood that military dissenters would seek alliances and gain momentum.¹⁶

No DCI has reversed this practice. For example, DCIs Dulles and McCone did not sit in on Board of Estimates meetings or monitor drafts in progress to observe how differences were handled. Richard Helms told this author that this is not an appropriate function

of the DCI, since it might reduce his authority or bias his consideration of the final product.¹⁷ Even now, when the NIOs have been given the license by Admiral Turner to explore all alternatives, they consider it "logical for the CIA to pull together at some point" and CIA differences that might persist are not formally identified within the strategic NIEs.^{17a} Earlier, several observers argued that such differences occasionally were significant. For example, during the 1957-1961 missile gap estimates a few ONE staff are said to have believed that the Soviets could deploy few ICBMs by the early 1960s, as opposed to the several hundreds officially predicted in the NIEs.¹⁸ In the 1960s, one author contends that on technical issues ONE generally took the position of OSR and its predecessors, and the DDS&T. However, "on questions involving a higher...political content, agreement was less certain."¹⁹

The lack of management direction to the estimates team by DCIs Allen Dulles and John McCone reflects not only its aggressiveness and talent; it also reflects the faith these DCIs had in the original set-up. This is demonstrated and was maintained by the strong personal relationships between the DCIs and various Board members. Dulles and McCone respected the Board, invited Sherman Kent to morning staff meetings, discussed estimates individually with analysts, and sometimes proposed new Board members.²⁰ The Board and ONE enjoyed a certain institutional independence from the DDI. For example, they hired their own staff, and made personnel transfers from other DDI units without the DDI's approval.

Organizational charts show that in the mid-1960s the Board was elevated out of the DDI into a staff position to the DCI.²¹ However, Kent's stature was equal to that of any DDI and this step was significant on paper only.

John McCone initiated several functional reorganizations within CIA which were heralded as appropriate rationalizations of the CIA's growing strategic work, such as the creation of the DDS&T in 1965.* However, of more direct, short-term impact on the strategic NIEs was a breakthrough McCone precipitated in gaining CIA access to highly classified US strategic planning documents generated by the Pentagon. McCone believed that "the DCI had to be informed of US strategic capabilities in order to give adequate intelligence support to the President."²² During the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, McCone acted as a key participant in White House deliberations and the CIA estimators were asked to draft several NIEs. At that time, McCone obtained the data he requested on US force dispositions.

This was the wedge he needed. Following the crisis, with encouragement from [Defense Secretary] McNamara, he continued to make the requests. By the mid-1960s, the DDI was procuring information on US strategic planning on a regular basis. Consistent access to this data increased the Agency's information base considerably and further established the CIA's claim to strategic research.²³

*Illustrative of the continuing competition between various Directorates, in 1965 the DDI criticized the DDS&T's taking of the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) on that grounds of weakening the DDI's estimative work, and later reclaimed OSI. Photo interpretation work has moved back and forth from the DDI and DDS&T.

Actually, the CIA's access was not always "consistent" or easy. For example, the Navy remained hesitant about providing the CIA with some data. In the early 1970s, it refused to provide CIA analysts with some requests. Reportedly, Richard Helms then intervened on their behalf.²⁴

Richard Helms long tenure as DCI, from mid-1966 to early 1973, was characterized by passivity vis-a-vis the estimates team. CIA analysts report that Helms maintained his distance from the Board of Estimates, developed few personal relationships there, and was little interested in estimative mechanics.²⁵ Helms' DDIS were forceful personalities who exerted a stronger administrative influence on facets of that Directorate's work. On the other hand, Helms defended the Board and ONE's right to be left alone to do their work. "To some extent the Office was shielded by Richard Helms. During a period in which the CIA was regularly under attack, Helms found that the prestige and credibility of his analysts...were great assets...."²⁶

Unfortunately, during Helms' tenure the prestige of the CIA estimators declined. As the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reports, the charge frequently was echoed that the Board and ONE had become "insulated" and in-bred, and that Helms did not infuse it with new blood.²⁷ For example, the Board of Estimates gradually changed from a broadly-based group in which individual members had considerable stature and independent outside ties, to a place of tenure for ONE staff.²⁸ The last two Chairman previously had

been Board members and before that ONE staff. Helms reportedly made one Board appointment which was regarded as politically motivated, and by 1973 there was no military representation on the Board.²⁹ Pentagon intelligence staff privately argued that after new ONE staff were hired, including former DIA employees, they soon acquired a "CIA perspective."³⁰

Helms' role in creating the Office of Strategic Research in 1967 was minimal. Helms approved the reorganization, proposed to him by the DDI with the backing of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara.³¹ The consolidation of several strategic components in OSR meant that the NIE staff could turn to one place within the CIA for finished strategic analyses. OSR's stature was greatly enhanced by the fact that Secretary McNamara immediately began to solicit its advice, through special memoranda and reports as well as the NIEs. As one author summarized:

In the 1960s, a period of disillusionment with military estimating and one in which the civilians were ascendant in the NIE process, the NIEs were found to be useful counterweights to the excessive claims of the military. McNamara started off expecting to be able to use the DIA as his source of intelligence, but he became increasingly dissatisfied with it. As a consequence he turned more and more to the CIA for estimates on the Vietnam War and Soviet military capabilities. ONE did a number of papers at his personal request, and McNamara encouraged the formation of OSR, a CIA office designed to compete with the military on military estimates....McNamara would take the NIE judgement as final, and would refuse to speculate on any new Soviet capabilities until they had been properly discussed through the NIE process.³²

According to the same author, the CIA estimates team relied increasingly on OSR, compared to other sources, in preparing the NIEs.³³

2. After 1973

Beginning with James Schlesinger in 1973, DCIs have demonstrated more interest in managing the estimates function. During his five month tenure as DCI in early 1973, Schlesinger took several steps to revitalize the NIE process. For example, he examined options for reorganizing the estimates staff, debated these with Board members and finally determined to abolish the Board.³⁴ He argued that the strategic NIEs had become cumbersome, and urged stylistic modifications to reduce their length and complexity.^{34a} For example, he promoted the use of Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIMs), to deal in-depth with highly technical issues, such as Soviet civil defense and defense spending. The IIMs are coordinated informally with the Pentagon and do not require USIB approval. Their conclusions then may be summarized in the strategic NIEs.

To improve estimative work, Schlesinger arrived as DCI with a "mandate for change" in the rest of CIA, following his report in 1971, as Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, on intelligence community reforms. For example, in the report Schlesinger had challenged the notion that "our hypotheses about foreign intentions, capabilities, and activities have improved commensurately in scope and quality as more data comes in from modern collection methods" and was determined to upgrade analytical work within CIA.³⁵ As one colleague observed, if Schlesinger had remained as DCI "he would have taken the place apart."³⁶

William Colby accomplished the first reorganization of the estimates function within CIA in over twenty years, and then assumed direct responsibility for it. Although several of his reforms have

been criticized ever since, DCI Colby is given a "XX" in Chart B for his personal role in them. Colby replaced the Board of Estimates and ONE staff with 11 National Intelligence Officers, called NIOs. Most NIOs had geographic responsibilities, e.g., Latin America, and several had functional tasks, e.g., strategic intelligence and world economic trends.*

Colby had three rationale for this move. First, he hoped to improve the NIEs, and respond to outside criticism, by creating a drafting system which relied more heavily on the direct input of non-CIA agencies. To accomplish this, the NIOs were located as a staff function to the DCI and assigned only one staff assistant. In theory, anyone could contribute draft material to the NIO, who had both management and production responsibilities. That is, the NIO was responsible for seeing that a draft was produced but he did not necessarily have to write it himself. Rather, he "managed" the work of other persons, for example, in DIA, whom he might ask to write first drafts. Changes in drafting procedures which resulted are discussed below in Section B.

Second, DCI Colby sought to sharpen the lines of responsibility by abolishing the Board of Estimates. As Colby told this author, the Board tended "to isolate the DCI from the true believer."³⁷ He testified to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence:

I have some reservations at the ivory tower kind of problem that you get out of a board, which is too separated from the rough and tumble of the real world....I think there is a tendency to be institutionally committed to an approach and to an

*Presently, there are additional "functional" NIOs for Warning, Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control.

appraisal of a situation and to begin to interpret new events against the light of a predetermined approach toward those events...I like the idea of individual total responsibility, and then you don't get any fuzz about how there was a vote....That really is my main problem with the Board, that it diffuses responsibility....³⁸

Colby's third rationale pertained, broadly, to the CIA as a whole, the reorganization of which Colby said he had "just begun."³⁹ The NIOs were supposed to be the pinnacle of a system more geographically focused to provide better intelligence. In addition to estimating, the NIOs were meant to be the DCI's "eyes and ears on the world" to provide him with prompt, up-to-date intelligence answers and survey broad intelligence requirements.⁴⁰ To aid them, Colby became the first DCI to attempt to "force the DDO to interact with other elements of the Agency," which his new Management by Objectives system was supposed to facilitate.*⁴¹ Like Schlesinger, Colby sought to increase the CIA's capacity to analyze foreign political changes. For example, he created the first Office of Political Research (subsequently abolished) in the DDI and by firing the head of the DDO's Office of Counterintelligence, Colby sought to refocus the DDO's Soviet work on Soviet political intentions.⁴² As Colby recently said:

We used to go through a great deal of effort to discover the number of [military] divisions in Eastern Europe, but we now get this information without the use of agents or defectors. We do have to worry about political estimating, a political judgement of the forces at work in countries which are hidden behind closed doors.⁴³

*Traditionally, the contact between DDO and NIE staff was limited to rare personal visits of DDO officials to the Board of Estimates, and circulation of covert agents reports "graded" in terms of reliability by the DDO. The Board of Estimates housed these in its "all-source" reading room. Occasionally, the Board and ONE received important agents reports which some DDI units did not receive, such as those of Soviet military intelligence officer Oleg Penkovsky in 1961. Colby told this author that he once brought together a dozen CIA country specialists, in the same room, to discover that most never had met.

William Colby assumed an active relationship with his NIOs. In personally hiring each one, he sought to bring in new persons.* Of the first eleven, eight were new to the estimates process, one was from ONE, another from the Board, and a third (the NIO for Strategic Intelligence) had been with ONE in the 1950s and early 1960s. The NIOs were elevated to a staff relationship with the DCI, and directly responsible to him, although administratively supervised by a "chief" NIO. Colby met frequently with individual NIOs, read successive drafts, listened to each NIO's analytical problems, and tried to remain informed about coordinative difficulties.⁴⁴ In addition, he turned to the NIOs for their views on broad questions, for example: "Are we collecting enough? Are we processing raw data properly? Are we spending too much money on it? Are we organized right to do the job?"⁴⁵


When Admiral Stansfield Turner became DCI in early 1977, he sought to refine Colby's managerial innovations and retains a keen interest in management issues. For example, to reduce the intellectual burden on the NIOs, he assigned them only one function, to draft NIEs. To reduce the administrative responsibility of the DCI, he appointed a director and small staff to oversee the NIOs on a full-time basis. After several organizational experiments, Turner relocated the estimates function back within the DDI, which was renamed the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC). The first head of NFAC, called the Director of National Foreign Assessment (D/NFA), spent most of his time on estimative work. Chart C on the following page describes the composition of NFAC in 1979. In late

*The NIO who wrote the NIE on Soviet Bloc conventional forces was an active Admiral.

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Chart C



National Foreign Assessment Center - 1979



1979, the newly appointed head of NFAC was asked to reevaluate the NIO set-up, deciding whether further organizational innovations were needed. Reorganization now is in progress.

In early 1979, Admiral Turner reconstituted the collective NIE review function within CIA, a step advocated by several governmental study groups. For example, in 1976 the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence recommended that "the Director establish a board to include senior outside advisors to review the NIEs."⁴⁶ Turner hired a three-man Senior Review Panel, which included an eminent academic in strategic affairs, a former Ambassador, and a four-star general. The Panel serves both the DCI and the NIOs, and reviews IIMs as well as NIEs, at several stages during the drafting process. However, unlike the Board of Estimates, the Panel informally advises as opposed to collectively approving the NIEs. In 1979, questions were raised as to whether the Panel had either the prestige or authority to function effectively within CIA.⁴⁷

Admiral Turner has promoted innovations in drafting procedures. For example, each NIO has a list of expert consultants he may use in drafting. Several years ago, a consultant was hired to write the entire first draft of NIE 11-4 on Soviet strategic doctrine, and presently this NIE is drafted by the NIO for Soviet Bloc affairs. Much flexibility and diversity prevails in the drafting of non-strategic NIEs. For example, each NIO follows different and highly individualistic drafting procedures,* and may use varying formats.⁴⁸ The NIOs are encouraged to prepare NIEs when

*For example, one NIO may write a first draft himself before calling in other agencies for discussion; another may ask a CIA team and/or other agencies to draft assigned portions of an NIE, which he then edits; and a third might solicit "think" papers from outsiders which he uses in preparing an NIE himself.

they see the need to do so, as opposed to routinely addressing topics on an annual basis. This pertains to NIE 11-4 as well. In total, the number of NIEs has been reduced from about 50 a year, to 20-25 a year. Like Colby, Admiral Turner maintains an ongoing, personal relationship with his NIOs throughout the drafting process, reviewing and monitoring their work during successive stages.

B. Management Attention to Department of Defense Coordination

This section explores the DCI's role in the mechanics of coordinating the CIA draft with Department of Defense (DOD) intelligence agencies, prior to USIB consideration. The Pentagon agencies discussed are Army, Navy and Air Force Intelligence and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) created in 1961.*

As indicated in Chart B, most DCIs focused little attention on the means by which the Pentagon might best contribute to the draft strategic NIEs. After the mid-1950s, the Board of Estimates and ONE took the lead in defining the timetable and mechanisms for the Pentagon's involvement. The three military services and DIA exercised their prerogative in deciding whom to send to CIA coordinative meetings, what kind of internal work to generate parallel to the CIA's, and how far to advance disagreements in the CIA draft. Beginning in 1969, Presidents urged changes in the format of presenting military dissents in the strategic NIEs. With the DCI's support, the CIA estimates staff gradually implemented

*The input of the National Security Agency (NSA) is not discussed here. Before 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff J-2 intelligence arm participated in the drafting and had a seat on USIB. The DIA replaced it.

these changes. The exceptions to this pattern of traditional non-involvement of DCIs are William Colby and Stansfield Turner. By different means, both sought to enhance the Pentagon's direct input and improve interagency coordination in the drafting stage. Both are given a "XX" in Chart B.

1. Before 1973

As described earlier, General Bedell Smith was the first DCI to elicit the cooperation of the Pentagon in drafting NIEs. Later, Allen Dulles gave the CIA what has been termed the "power of the draft" for strategic estimates, by supporting its inclination to prepare independently a first draft.⁴⁹ However, he considered it inappropriate to prescribe optimal coordinating tactics to Defense Secretaries. Thus, the Board of Estimates and ONE adopted a pattern for coordinating the Pentagon's response which, in several respects, remains similar today.

First, early in the year ONE circulated the terms of reference of the forthcoming NIE, and invited interagency comments. Then, it continued an ongoing survey of raw intelligence and finished analyses on strategic issues from different CIA and DOD units. It often solicited additional work from CIA, DOD, consultants, and special USIB subcommittees. These subcommittees are interagency groups, often initiated by the DCI, assigned specific topics for study. For example, a USIB subcommittee important to drafting NIE 11-8 was the Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC)* created by Allen Dulles in 1956, to "track the

*This subcommittee was first called the Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee (GMIC).

rabbit to its lair."⁵⁰ The ONE had complete freedom to decide what work to collect, consider and integrate into its draft. That is, no DCI established guidelines to assist it in choosing, rejecting, or balancing different sources. ONE then completed a first draft, submitted it to the Board for approval, and circulated it within the Pentagon and other agencies for review.

The next stage of interagency coordination was, and is, difficult and protracted. Intelligence agency representatives were invited to CIA to discuss the draft. These meetings went on throughout the summer and fall, and sometimes were reconvened after DCI and USIB review. They were chaired by a Board member and later an NIO, and included CIA representatives and often more than a dozen Pentagon staff, but not the DCI. Here the draft strategic NIEs were heatedly debated, and here the CIA's "power of the draft" was keenly experienced by the DOD representatives. The purpose was to explore and redefine all areas of agreement and, failing that, to agree on how to disagree, prior to submitting the final draft to the DCI and then USIB. Since the CIA was well prepared with a completed document in hand, the Pentagon representatives were put in the position of reacting to, or effectively challenging, what already was written. Further, ONE did most subsequent redrafting. As one observer notes: "In the draft ONE would resolve...ambiguity according to its own views, using style and structure as well as argument."⁵¹

The DOD representatives often arrived at CIA for discussion ill-prepared to influence ONE or make concrete rebuttals. For example, during the late 1950s and the 1960s, they did not come with completed analyses parallel or competitive to ONE's, which could be integrated into the draft. Rather, the representatives were familiar with their own agencies intelligence studies, estimates, budgetary and posture statements, the parameters and time frames of which might differ from the CIA's draft.⁵² Thus, they relied on verbal means to influence ONE and, from time to time, called in different intelligence specialists to advance technical arguments. Traditional interservice rivalries and budget competition make it impossible for the military representatives to form stable coalitions to use as bargaining tools with ONE. For example, in the early 1960s the Army and Navy typically lined up against the Air Force in predicting Soviet ICBMs in NIE 11-8; but the Army and Navy often disagreed on Soviet SLBMs in NIE 11-8; and on Soviet ABM potential in NIE 11-3.⁵³

The creation of DIA in 1961 did not alter this seemingly random approach to the draft strategic estimates. The DIA was established, with the backing of President Kennedy, to work on strategic intelligence matters pertaining to the three services' tactical work, and speak with a unified voice for them. However, the DIA was not "functionally geared to the production of convincing estimates."⁵⁴ Earlier, Allen Dulles had written: "Two powerful and well-financed agencies such as DIA and CIA will become rivals and competitors. Some of this could be healthy; too much of it could be both expensive and dangerous."⁵⁵ Actually, in the

beginning DCI John McCone worried that DIA might exert too much pressure to conform on the three military services, and a CIA group set about reviewing its programs.⁵⁶ However, soon McCone complained to McNamara that DIA's work was "irrelevant and redundant"⁵⁷ and both men reportedly lost interest in ways to overcome what more than one observer has called DIA's "inherent bureaucratic weaknesses" in competing with the military service intelligence agencies.⁵⁸

If the CIA had the "power of the draft," the three military services had the "power of the footnote." Footnotes represented these issues for which a compromise through rewording and restructuring could not be reached, or to which the Pentagon would not acquiesce. In the late 1950s and 1960s, they typically were specific. For example, CIA and Air Force numerical predictions of Soviet ICBM deployment over the next five years might differ by a 100 or more, or the two might disagree on the characteristics of a Soviet missile such as the SS-9 versus the SS-11. Then, the Air Force had the option of taking a footnote at the bottom of the page, saying: "Air Force Intelligence disagrees....It believes...." Until 1969, footnotes were accepted as a clear-cut, useful method of registering disapproval. The CIA did not deny their use, and no DCI or other top-level official sought to alter the system.

The most clear indication of tacit acceptance of the footnote system was its pervasive use. Throughout the 1960s, the strategic NIEs were rife with numerous and complex footnotes to the main text, which was supposed to represent the consensus. For example, various Pentagon agencies disagreed with the CIA's position on a

Soviet ABM system, MIRV capability, and other aspects of new delivery vehicles and warheads. Sometimes, a majority of pages had footnotes. For example, in NIE 11-8-65, the dissents are said to have been larger than the text itself, and thus the evidence for dissents eventually was presented in appendices prepared by the Pentagon.⁵⁹ On occasion, DIA took an independent position "contrary to the views of all the service agencies."⁶⁰ For example, in the above-mentioned NIE, an upper limit of Soviet ICBMs was predicted only in a footnote supported by the three military services, but DIA dissented from the footnote.⁶¹ After reading NIE 11-8-68, Henry Kissinger asserted that the document made little sense, since the text was "bland," "inconclusive" and refuted or "taken back" in footnotes.⁶² By the early 1970s, the Pentagon began taking footnotes to less specific issues. For example, in the opening pages of the NIE, it might footnote what one participant called "the basic tone" or broad implications of the NIE.⁶³

The first effort to rationalize the footnoting system came from President Nixon. In early 1970, Dr. Kissinger requested DCI Richard Helms to experiment with new means of presenting dissent in the NIEs. Kissinger argued that a fuller sampling of alternative views and supporting evidence in the main text would be useful to the White House.⁶⁴ As in a lawyers brief, he wanted the reasons for rejecting various options officially recorded. In other words, the CIA (and by implication the DCI) was not required to reach a dominant consensus on highly controversial issues, but offer the policymaker "facts, not opinions" which he then might arbitrate.⁶⁵

Helms agreed, but left it to the Board of Estimates and ONE to implement the request. In NIE 11-8-70, a few alternative views were presented "up front" in the main text, although footnotes were still used for some time. To illustrate the stylistic difficulty in implementation, this NIE was over 100 pages, which was over twice as long as its predecessors, and one footnote was a page long analysis.⁶⁶ When James Schlesinger became DCI, he said he wanted alternative positions presented even if the estimators "had to cut the page in two."⁶⁷

The White House also offered the Pentagon a license to more systematically compete in the drafting of strategic NIEs. In 1970, a special Directorate of Estimates (DE) was created in DIA, headed by the highly qualified Army General Daniel Graham. Graham began producing estimates called DIEs, focusing on narrow but "the more contentious topics," such as Soviet MIRVing of a single missile, which were important to the NIE debate. "In some ways the DIEs have served as a dry run for the NIEs--used to create a more rigorous DIA position on controversial issues."⁶⁸ They were prepared before the NIE coordinative meetings and, importantly, sent to the White House. Henry Kissinger also stepped outside the NIE process by urging defense intelligence officials, as well as non-intelligence officials such as the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), to help draft the White House's more policy-oriented National Security Study Memorandum (NSSMs). In so doing, they could incorporate selective material from the NIEs. Soon DCI Helms found himself in debate with the DDR&E at the White House, in which NIE conclusions were reopened.⁶⁹

After 1973

William Colby was the first DCI to take the lead in altering existing patterns of DOD coordination. His 1973 NIO reorganization was meant to increase the direct input of the Pentagon to the first draft. He told his NIOs to set up procedures by which this might be accomplished. The following year, DIA was asked to prepare a first draft of one out of five chapters of the combined NIE 11-3-8, and the State Department's INR was given the chapter on Soviet strategic doctrine. In 1975, DIA drafted two chapters, including the one on Soviet doctrine, in which the Air Force assisted.⁷⁰ Reportedly, DIA officials were "delighted" with this opportunity.⁷¹ Presently, DIA still drafts at least one out of five chapters of NIE 11-3-8.

One participant described this new technique as the "bottom up" approach to coordination.⁷² DCI Colby hoped it would increase the personal stake that DIA, and the services if they participated, had in the draft, and heighten interest and skill in sustained estimative work. Further, it was meant to introduce a more "competitive element" into the drafting, by removing "a certainty that a particular agency will have a decisive say in a particular estimate."⁷³ However, the real impact of this innovation now is debated. First, observers note that the outside contributions were weak stylistically, and subsequently edited or rewritten by the NIO for Strategic Intelligence.⁷⁴ Second, the DIA's interest and service cooperation may have declined

recently.⁷⁵ Third, NIE 11-3-8 still is written mainly by one NIO, including its executive summary. The estimators themselves assert that one benefit is a common data base and shared knowledge.⁷⁶ While CIA staff have acquired specialized knowledge from the military, e.g., on how missiles systems are operated, military officials have broadened their grasp on a range of topics.

DCI Colby supported his innovations by assuming a personal, coordinative role. Primarily, he did this by listening to Pentagon representatives who came to his office to outline their grievances about the draft, and then reporting these complaints to the NIO. The then head of DIA, General Graham, argues that Colby was "highly accessible" to requests for hearings, and that coordination in the drafting improved during his tenure as DCI.⁷⁷ Colby also advanced the presentation of alternative views in the main text of the strategic NIEs, with President Ford's support. By 1976, italics were used to highlight differences. For example, one paragraph might present the majority view, followed by a paragraph in italics representing another view. Footnotes were used for less controversial, discrete, or individual dissents.

Admiral Turner plays an even stronger personal role in managing competition during the drafting. Like DCIs Schlesinger and Colby, he supports the trend of incorporating alternative positions in an NIE's main text, a policy for which President Carter indicated his agreement.⁷⁸ However, Turner has extended this concept by virtually eliminating the use of footnotes. He directed the head of the National Foreign Assessment Center and his NIOs to consider all alternative views "regardless of their origin,"

and eventually narrow them down to a few.⁷⁹ By discarding footnotes, Turner hopes that the Pentagon will explore and delineate their differences more concretely, reaching agreement on which are the most significant. The implication is that the Pentagon should weight their dissents internally, advancing and documenting those which reflect a major predictive uncertainty, and abandoning those less central to the current year's strategic arguments. Alternatives are presented in the NIEs as "parallel texts." That is, different positions are alternatively developed, paragraph by paragraph, throughout the text.

Like General Bedell Smith over 25 years earlier, Admiral Turner personally intervenes to assist CIA staff in eliciting from the Pentagon well-reasoned, agreed-upon, objections. He rigorously examines successive drafts, and then takes the initiative in raising strategic topics directly with military officials. For example, if he believes that a Pentagon option is inadequately expressed or lacks technical documentation, he calls up the Pentagon analyst involved and says so.⁸⁰ If, after further revision, Turner still has questions about the position advanced, he is likely to bring these to the attention of the relevant intelligence head, for example, the Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence. Often this occurs during regular meetings between all the intelligence heads in the DCI's office. If he still has reservations about the wording or logic of the alternative, he may call the head of the military service involved, for example, the Chief of Naval Operations, and ask his opinion. By going up the chain of command, Admiral Turner is interested in discovering whether the dissenting view is widely shared by Navy officials.

IV. SUBSTANTIVE INPUT OF DCIs TO
THE DRAFT STRATEGIC NIES

This chapter explores the role of DCIs in contributing substantively to the draft strategic NIEs. This author considers "substantive" any personal input a DCI makes, in his view, to improve the content or increase the validity of a specific NIE. Substantive inputs occur at several levels. For example, a DCI may edit successive drafts for clarity, offer his personal views to estimators, devise new ways of evaluating technical issues, eliminate spurious arguments, or represent his personal judgements in the final draft.

For strategic NIEs, the substantive input of DCIs usually has been considered a function of their technical background and interest in strategic affairs. As the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported, before 1976 "only three DCIs attempted to address their primary attention to the quality of intelligence production: Walter Bedell Smith, John McCone, and James Schlesinger."¹ This was, in part, a "function of their background." This chapter supports this conclusion. As indicated in Chart B, out of six DCIs, the three who did make substantive input--John McCone, James Schlesinger and Admiral Turner--had previous technical training and/or familiarity with strategic issues.

This chapter also examines a DCI's substantive involvement as a function of his personal attitudes and administrative style. Here, all six DCIs have behaved differently. For example, John McCone frequently interacted with the CIA estimates team, by asking questions, debating and reviewing its work. However, on occasions when he differed sharply with it, he permitted the

staff view to go forward to USIB before reaching a final decision. In contrast, Admiral Turner reads and edits successive drafts from the beginning, and at times plays a major role in determining how and which competitive ideas are expressed prior to NFIB consideration. For this reason, DCI Turner's substantive role in drafting is what the author later describes as "adjudicatory," and he is given a "XX" for this function. James Schlesinger is also given a "XX" for his unique intellectual contribution. On the following pages, the six DCIs are described in sequence and occasional differences in behavior for strategic and non-strategic NIEs are noted.

Allen Dulles

Like Bedell Smith, Allen Dulles spoke of the NIEs as "his" estimates. As chief intelligence advisor to the President, Dulles considered it his prerogative to insert personal judgements into the NIEs, a view which the Board of Estimates supported.² His attitude of possessiveness was heightened by his personal role in briefing President Eisenhower, his brother as Secretary of State, and other top officials, on the NIEs. During the Eisenhower years, all NIEs were linked formally to the NSC process. For example, NIEs appeared on the weekly agenda, and were utilized and appended to policy papers prepared by the NSC's Planning Board. Regular NSC meetings were opened by the DCI's briefing on major intelligence issues, including new NIEs, which one participant said "was never less than 15 minutes long."³ In retrospect, one Pentagon official argues that Dulles' briefings represented the "most effective and timely" means of reaching policymakers.⁴

However, in practice Dulles' substantive input to strategic and non-strategic NIEs was limited by the fact that he paid little attention to the text of the draft NIEs. Rather, Dulles relied on informal and verbal means to influence the CIA estimates team. For example, during the year estimators were kept informed of his concerns in the course of meetings not primarily devoted to the NIEs, such as the DCI's morning staff meetings and current intelligence briefings. Sometimes, Dulles called junior analysts in ONE, to offer his own view or highlight new intelligence. Then, the Board and ONE were left alone to do their work. Allen Dulles did not read successive drafts, and his first formal review of NIEs occurred when the final draft was completed.⁵ Then, he was briefed on the draft by Board members just prior to NSC or USIB meetings. At this time, Dulles focused primarily on the summary and conclusions of the NIE.

His concern here was threefold. First, his colleagues report that he was intolerant of what he considered wordy, imprecise or pedantic sentences, and might make editorial changes to enhance their concreteness.⁶ Second, he listened and queried the estimators, until he felt comfortable in presenting the NIEs to the NSC or USIB the following day. Typically, a staff member then was selected to accompany him to meetings. Third, for non-strategic NIEs, Dulles occasionally modified the conclusions to reflect new intelligence to which he was privy. Estimators report that, in several instances, they were saved from embarrassment by the DCI's intervention at the last minute.⁷ However, they reported no instances in which the content of strategic NIEs was so altered.

If Dulles influenced the estimates team by informal means, they, in turn, had to systematically convince him of the appropriateness of their strategic predictions. This took place throughout the year. One Board member argues that Allen Dulles "worried over each strategic estimate."⁸ One of ONE's directors asserts that "language describing qualifying and accurately quantifying the Soviet threat came from CIA draftsmen, and had to be fought through up to the DDI and DCI decision levels."⁹ In the late 1950s, the CIA's internal research on Soviet production capabilities was vitally important to its prediction of an ongoing Soviet ICBM build-up, since little hard data from the Soviet Union was available. For example, the press reported that the 200 U-2 flights over the USSR up to May 1960 detected only two operational ICBM launchers in Soviet territory.¹⁰

John McCone

John McCone's attitudes about the strategic NIEs were curiously mixed. Board of Estimates members say that he initially did not regard the NIEs as "his" estimates. Rather, he considered them a product of good staff work for which the DCI should adopt a "hands-off" policy.¹¹ Further, McCone was highly critical of the quality of past NIEs. When McCone arrived as DCI in late 1961, he privately rebuked both the CIA and Air Force for their roles in promoting the missile gap theory over the last four years.¹² He then witnessed the rapid explosion of this myth, following the first satellite reconnaissance evaluated in August 1961.

For example, between late 1960 and late 1961 the CIA halved its predictions of Soviet ICBMs for mid-1963, from 400 to 200 ICBMs.¹³ Actually, by mid-1963 it was estimated that the Soviets had built only 100 ICBMs.¹⁴

Nonetheless, once the drafting process was in motion, McCone found it difficult to stay on the sidelines, and Board of Estimate members contend that they consistently urged him to become more involved. As the former Chairman of the AEC, an engineer and successful corporate executive, McCone was well-equipped to do so.* As one colleague reports, he wanted the NIEs to be "right" and so utilized in policymaking.¹⁵ He had "the inquiring, skeptical turn of mind of the good intelligence officer" and found technical intelligence "endlessly fascinating."¹⁶

McCone's subsequent involvement in drafting has been described as "entrepreneurial," although he was not consistently or equally aggressive for each NIE.¹⁷ Throughout the year, McCone kept up-to-date on new intelligence, analytical problems and community-wide disagreements by demanding "instant, full briefings on anything that caught his attention."¹⁸ He frequently called up Board members to ask questions, give advice and, occasionally, argue his viewpoint. When the final draft reached his desk, he examined it thoroughly, in the words of one aide, "going over each line as if it were a corporate mortgage."¹⁹ Then, it was not surprising for him to call Sherman Kent at home, early in the morning, and say something like: "'On page 20, you say this.... Can you prove it.'"²⁰ McCone was impatient with what he considered imprecise and ambiguous statements, and sometimes edited the draft himself.

*Less remembered is the fact that McCone's own engineering firm was involved in shipbuilding and aircraft production in WWII, and after that he became Under Secretary of the Air Force.

On a few occasions, DCI McCone differed sharply with the CIA draft. He then had a choice: either let the NIE go forward to USIB, where it could be reviewed again; or change the NIE to reflect his view.* McCone found the first option most appropriate, and stopped short of inserting his view to the draft prior to USIB debate. The best example of this is his behavior during the now infamous NIE, in September 1962, on the likelihood that USSR might place offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba. Although this NIE was not part of the "11" strategic series, it partly hinged on an ongoing debate about Soviet difficulties in perfecting their ICBM guidance system.²¹ In a rare community-wide agreement, this NIE predicted that "it would be incompatible with Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles in Cuba."²²

For some time, McCone had believed otherwise. Following intelligence reports on an increased Soviet presence in Cuba over the summer of 1962, McCone warned President Kennedy in August that "something new and different" was going on.²³ Before leaving on his honeymoon trip to France in early September, McCone privately said that he was "very worried" and requested an NIE.²⁴ The first draft did not support McCone's hunch. While abroad, McCone supplied the Board with a barrage of cables pressing his claims, and asked that the draft be reconsidered. With no dissents, it again concluded that "the Soviets simply would not do anything so uncharacteristic, provocative and unrewarding," but Sherman Kent advised McCone to alter the NIE if he wished.²⁵ McCone did not, believing that the NIE's arguments were sufficiently well-reasoned to remain inviolable. A U-2 flight over Cuba on October 14 proved that McCone's prediction was correct.

*At that time, a third option later employed by William Colby and Admiral Turner, to present the DCI's opinion separately in the NIE, was not considered compatible with the NIE process.

Richard Helms

Richard Helms' concept of the DCI's role in the drafting process was well-defined. Helms told this author that the DCI should distance himself from the drafting, lest early association with different viewpoints bias him in favor of one or another.²⁶ The DCI should preserve his freedom to make final, substantive decisions just before or at USIB, by not becoming an advocate too early. Helms considered the NIEs "the Director's piece of paper" and thus the DCI "had the right to intervene or change them" if deemed necessary.²⁷

DCI Helms did not exercise this option for the draft strategic NIEs. Helms had risen up through the ranks of the DDP in CIA, and his primary interest was political intelligence. When he arrived as DCI in mid-1966, a unique technical competency was required of the DCI. For example, one controversy concerned the "mysterious footprints" of Soviet MIRVs, evidence which the entire intelligence community interpreted differently.²⁸ Some participants questioned Helms' basic interest in strategic matters, and one Pentagon official described Helms, compared to other DCIs, as "the most dilatory in terms of substance."²⁹ Helms himself has said that many of the issues at hand ultimately were "unknowable" and his instincts came into play only in "the final phase of production."³⁰

Helms did review the final drafts of the strategic NIEs, with two concerns in mind. First, he tried to keep the process moving in an orderly, timely fashion, and second, he preferred to have interagency disputes resolved prior to USIB consideration. Thus,

he reviewed drafts for internal consistency and clarity, and if he ascertained that an NIE was so deficient or that the consensus offered masked real divisions, he promptly sent it back to ONE for revision.³¹ After 1969, the Board and ONE were left alone to administer changes in the presentation of dissent in the strategic NIEs, mandated by the White House. Thereafter, the DCI experienced more difficulty in sending them to USIB on time. Sometimes, Helms had to make the decision to go forward with the NIE as it was.

The only documented instance in which Helms personally intervened in a strategic draft before USIB followed a request from Defense Secretary Melvin Laird. In NIE 11-8-69, the CIA included a summary paragraph which read "We consider it highly unlikely that they [the Soviet Union] will attempt within the period of this estimate to achieve a first strike capability..."³² Just before the scheduled USIB meeting, one of Laird's assistants asked Helms to revise the controversial statement since it "contradicted the public position of the Secretary."³³ Helms deleted the entire paragraph, although the State Department's representative on USIB reintroduced it as a footnoted dissent.

James Schlesinger

During his brief tenure as DCI in the beginning of 1973, James Schlesinger was involved intimately in drafting the strategic NIEs, primarily on substantive grounds. A highly trained economist, former strategic analyst at the RAND Corporation and former AEC Chairman, Schlesinger was qualified to address complex strategic issues. Earlier, he had criticized the CIA for possible "bias" in assessing

the Soviet threat, and as DCI appeared willing to take on CIA analysts on their own ground.³⁴ For example, the then Chairman of the Board of Estimates reports that Schlesinger frequently debated past NIEs with him, pointing out sentences and phrasings that, in the DCI's view, were misleading or inaccurate.³⁵ As the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded: "Schlesinger's overall objectives were to maximize his role as Director of Central Intelligence rather than as head of the Agency and to improve the quality of the intelligence product."³⁶

One of Schlesinger's major contributions was in strategic methodology. CIA analysts explain that he was highly creative and helpful, for example, in devising new methods by which to count Soviet MIRVs and techniques to ascertain the characteristics of new Soviet cruise missiles.³⁷ Schlesinger enjoyed reading early drafts, and then often summoned analysts to his office to draw charts or demonstrate how a problem might be approached mathematically. Describing Schlesinger, William Colby said that he was "the one DCI" who grasped the strategic debate intuitively, and would have elevated the current state of art of strategic analysis.³⁸

William Colby

William Colby also involved himself deeply in the draft process but, for the strategic NIEs, not on a substantive basis. Like Richard Helms, Colby rose up through the ranks of the CIA and had little specific expertise in strategic topics. Colby told this author that he did not have the technical knowledgeability to make

personal input to the draft.³⁹ Rather, he saw the primary role of the DCI as effectively managing the competitive process, the chief virtues of which were thoroughness, patience, and open-mindedness as opposed to intervention or arbitration. Colby presided over the strategic NIEs at a time when, in the words of one CIA analyst, the "consensus had fallen apart."⁴⁰ He hoped to improve the quality of the NIEs by increasing their representativeness.

Like McCone, DCI Colby viewed the draft as a prelude to USIB debate and endorsement. Colby read successive drafts with the hope of better grasping the strategic debate and ensuring that minority views were considered by his NIOs. As described earlier, Pentagon officials were granted individual hearings with the DCI during the drafting, after which Colby raised their complaints with the relevant NIO. For example, DIA officials argued their new estimates in his office and Air Force intelligence chief Major General George Keegan presented him with numerous, documented dissents, as outlined in the next chapter of this study. At the drafting stage, Colby was observed to be more aggressive in offering advice and editing the non-strategic, compared to strategic NIEs.⁴¹ However, when he disagreed with the draft, Colby typically waited until USIB to register his views.

Admiral Stansfield Turner

Admiral Turner systematically makes substantive input to the strategic NIEs. Like McCone and Schlesinger, his Naval training provides a technical background in strategic issues to make him

useful in critiquing NIEs. As DCI, he was "highly dissatisfied with a large number of national intelligence estimates" and exercised his mandate to play a role in improving them.⁴² This role is well-defined and highly personal. As Admiral Turner recently argued, the NIE process is ultimately a one-man system. After an estimate is prepared by the community, "the one-man system comes in, because I decide, I sign for it, I vouch for it."⁴³

Admiral Turner takes the time to stay in close touch throughout the drafting process, primarily by devoting attention to each successive draft. As one aide reports, Turner is involved in the draft strategic estimates "from beginning to end," from the first one prepared by the NIO and Pentagon to successive redrafts after interagency coordinative meetings. His "critiques occur all throughout the process" and his approach is "socratic."⁴⁴ Turner carefully examines the drafts in his office, underlines the parts he believes need improvement, and suggests ways of doing so. For example, he may ask whether a line of reasoning is relevant, outline alternative ways of handling a point of ambiguity, or state how he disagrees. The draft is sent back to the NIO and a dialogue begins. This frequently entails discussions between the DCI and junior analysts as well, and, as examined earlier, between the DCI and Pentagon officials. Turner then reads the next draft to ascertain if the changes make any difference. If he considers these inadequate, he may redraft paragraphs or entire sections himself.

Admiral Turner is given a "XX" in Chart B for another reason. This is the personal role he sometimes plays in deciding which views are advanced as major alternatives in the text, decisions which occur prior to NFIB review. The author describes these decisions as adjudicatory, and Turner is not the first DCI who has personally arbitrated between views. However, unlike other DCIs, Turner does not use NFIB as a final debating forum and discourages the use of footnotes as the ultimate recourse of dissenters. Thus, his choices at this time may determine the final content of the NIEs.

Two examples illustrate Admiral Turner's different handling of alternative views within draft NIEs. Recently, alternative positions were expressed in a draft of NIE 11-4, on how the Soviets might view US behavior in a particular conflict scenario.⁴⁵ The disagreement was explicit and intricate, based on interpretations of recent Soviet publications on strategic doctrine. Admiral Turner reviewed the evidence on both sides, and finally agreed to go forward with the CIA's view. This he slightly modified, replacing the phasing "Soviet intentions" with "Soviet expectations."

On the other hand, Admiral Turner upheld the presentation of alternative positions in a recent NIE 11-3-8. At issue was the strategic implications of the Soviet Backfire bomber. The CIA and Air Force disagreed on the potential range of the aircraft by at least 1,000 miles.⁴⁶ Both had examined the question at some length, hiring professional contractors to construct experiments

to test the aircraft's potential range. The evidence on both sides appeared adequate and, therefore, the dispute was not resolved within the NIE. Instead, the NIE went forward with the two opinions intact.

A third option employed by Admiral Turner was first used by William Colby. In cases where the DCI disagrees with both sides or strongly endorses one view, Turner may attach a covering memo to the NIE or insert a statement into the NIE, which explains this. That is, the DCI separately states his opinion in a letter or paragraph to effect that "The DCI thinks..." Turner also uses this technique to explain how decisions were reached within the NIE. The author does not regard this as adjudicatory.

V. THE DCI'S LEADERSHIP ROLES AT
USIB OR NFIB

This chapter examines the varying approaches of DCIs to the strategic NIEs during the final phase of endorsement by the USIB, or now NFIB. Here again, a DCI's posture during USIB deliberations reveals his attitudes about the NIEs, his role as CIA director versus coordinator of the intelligence community, and what kind of document best serves the President. Three possible roles are discussed; first, support or advocacy of the CIA's position; second encouragement of competitive debate and a multiplicity of views; and third, final adjudication of alternative views, i.e., personal decisions which resolve conflict or otherwise change the NIE's substantive content.

As indicated in Chart B, the author concludes that the first role was emphasized by Allen Dulles, within an historical context that excluded other roles on his part. Competitive debate at USIB was encouraged by DCIs John McCone, James Schlesinger and William Colby. Final adjudication was a role exercised occasionally by DCIs John McCone and Richard Helms. As just described, DCI Stansfield Turner also acts as an adjudicator, but primarily outside the context of NFIB.

This chapter focuses on USIB because, since IAC in General Bedell Smith's time, it was meant to be a high level forum for NIE debate and final endorsement. Composed of the heads of the intelligence agencies, USIB is intended to have the flexibility to reexamine disagreements and the decisionmaking authority to resolve them once and for all. As Chairman, the DCI is supposed to play a

community-wide coordinative role, as highlighted in the late 1960s by the appointment to USIB of the Deputy Director of CIA (the DDCI) to formally represent the CIA's views. However, the DCI and USIB members frequently have been criticized for acting only as a rubber stamp for the draft NIEs. For example, one opinion is that "most DCIs have been reluctant to engage in confrontation with members of the USIB over substantive findings."¹ Another is that USIB members lack specific expertise and "were reluctant to quibble...with the preparatory work done by its staff."²

This study's findings do not support the view that most DCIs and USIB members have been passive during USIB meetings. Historically, USIB often has been a major debating ground for the strategic NIEs. USIB discussion sometimes has been lengthy and intense, and on occasion the content of the NIEs altered as a result. Most critical to this study, some DCIs have exerted individual leadership over the process. Contrary to the opinion that "the power balance of the USIB did not vary greatly from that involved in the inter-agency review," the intervention of some DCIs upset this balance.³

A. Support of the CIA's Position

Only one DCI examined here, Allen Dulles, saw his primary role at USIB as personally supporting the CIA's position within the strategic NIEs. Dulles' role in promoting the CIA's view must be placed within the context of the missile gap debate of 1957-1961. Dulles' earlier decision to permit the CIA to draft the strategic NIEs according to its independent view was a policy decision which

subsequently elevated the CIA's role in the estimative process. It also reflected an interest in enhanced competition within the NIEs, since the CIA's view was presented in addition to what it considered exaggerated and offsetting claims of the three military services. In the late 1950s, Dulles recognized that he thereby was lending support to NIEs which offered competing claims to President Eisenhower, a concern which continued to plague him.⁴ "When asked to answer the single most important intelligence question of the period, the intelligence community provided a series of contradictory estimates and gave the impression that the Soviet ICBM programme was far more expeditious and productive than it in fact turned out to be."⁵

The missile gap estimates thus became the classic case of disunity within the intelligence community. The only point of agreement was that there might be a "gap." For example, in NIE 11-8-60 the CIA predicted that the Soviets would build 400 ICBMs by mid-1963; in footnotes, the Army and Navy predicted 200 ICBMs, and the Air Force 700 ICBMs, by mid-1963; the State Department and JCS were in-between the CIA and Air Force.⁶ To some observers, the CIA's position represented an attempt for institutional compromise rather than a logical extension of concrete analysis. As General Daniel Graham later wrote of the missile gap years: "Curiously,...the CIA position was generally--and sometimes precisely--halfway between the Army-Navy view and the Air Force view. To the military analysts this smacked of a political rather than a carefully reasoned, objective position."⁷

Nonetheless, once having decided to assert the CIA's individual perspective within the strategic NIEs, Allen Dulles' instinct was to support "his" analysts publicly. Dulles reasoned that pre-USIB debate on the draft gave sufficient hearing to all parties and, after this, the institutional independence, prestige and morale of the CIA was on the line. Personally, Dulles was disinclined to participate in prolonged debate at USIB, and he did not vigorously advocate the CIA's position during the oral discussion. Rather, he promoted the position of CIA analysts by presiding over USIB deliberations in a manner which did not permit reopening of previous decisions. Further, he personally briefed the President on the final NIEs and, in one instance, attached a memorandum to NIE 11-8 personally endorsing the CIA's position. Parenthetically, Dulles' colleagues report that as the missile gap debate intensified, the CIA drafters had to work hard to convince him of their position and that the U-2 flights were targeted to close the CIA's uncertainty.⁸

As Chairman of USIB, Allen Dulles is said to have been firmly in charge of its proceedings. While his attitude about discussion was more permissive than DCI Smith's before him, to the Pentagon participants the outcome was a foregone conclusion.⁹ By the end of 1960, one Presidential study group complained that USIB had become primarily a "deliberative body" neglecting its broader tasks of intelligence community coordination.¹⁰ Still, deliberations followed a certain format. The DCI summarized the NIE, and then each military service and the JCS representative presented their

dissents, for example, the Army argued its case for Soviet emphasis on medium-range ballistic missiles and inadequacies in ICBM transportation facilities.¹¹ Generally, individual positions were well-entrenched. For example, when the Soviets ceased ICBM testing from April 1958 to March 1959, the CIA argued that this indicated performance trouble while the Air Force maintained precisely the opposite.¹² After listening to each side, Dulles patiently restated his affirmation of the draft NIE and closed the meeting. No redrafting was done. Dulles then scheduled a meeting with President Eisenhower to brief him on the NIE. One Pentagon official said that Dulles' briefings effectively foreclosed any end-running to the White House.¹³

The missile gap predictions advanced by Allen Dulles to President Eisenhower were anything but popular with the Administration. One observer wrote that Eisenhower considered these NIEs "probably invalid" and he did not respond as promptly as he had during the bomber gap debate.¹⁴ For example, Eisenhower deferred authorization of increases in first generation Atlas and Titan missiles until the first Polaris and second generation Minuteman missiles were available and evaluated. During Kennedy's successful presidential campaign on a strategic gap platform, the DCI was repeatedly pressed by journalists to give his personal opinion. Dulles upheld the NIEs as valid intelligence projections in a case where sufficient doubt existed. When NIE 11-8-60 was presented to President-elect Kennedy, Dulles attached a personal memorandum stating his support of the CIA's position in the main

That subsequent DCIs did not see their primary role at USIB to promote the CIA's position resulted, in part, from the missile gap experience. In mid-1963, it was estimated that the Soviets had constructed only 100 ICBMs, proving that the entire intelligence community earlier had been wrong. However, by this time the CIA's position within the strategic NIEs was no longer on the ascendant, but was dominant. Moreover, a distinct institutional perspective vis-a-vis the Pentagon had emerged following the missile gap overestimates. As General Graham later wrote: "To put it bluntly, there is a considerable body of opinion...which regard threat estimates prepared by the military as being self-serving, budget-oriented and generally inflated....It stemmed from a series of bad overestimates [which] have hung like albatrosses around the necks of military intelligence officers ever since."¹⁶ Since the DCI did not have to throw his weight consistently on the side of the CIA in order to protect its institutional view and independence, he has been free to assume other roles at USIB.

B. Encouragement of Competitive Debate

Of the five subsequent DCIs examined here, three--DCIs John McCone, James Schlesinger and William Colby--actively promoted competitive debate on the final draft of the strategic NIEs. All three considered USIB as an appropriate, higher-level sounding board or second stage for the presentation of new ideas and a reopening of old dissents. They personally participated in debate and acted as a court of last resort for intelligence officials

dissatisfied with the draft. Under McCone and Colby, USIB meetings were lengthy and intense. Both DCIs reserved their judgement and were willing to alter the strategic NIEs as a result. Although Schlesinger's tenure was brief, interviewees describe his attitudes as being similar to McCone's. For his philosophy of supporting consistent debate at USIB, Colby is given an "XX" in Chart B. In comparison, the inclination of DCIs Richard Helms and Stansfield Turner has been not to use USIB (or NFIB in Turner's case) as a forum for debate. As documented earlier, Admiral Turner encourages competition within the final NIEs chiefly by efforts to improve coordination at the draft stage. Below, these five DCIs are described in sequence.

John McCone

In response to criticism about Allen Dulles' inattention to community-wide coordination, President Eisenhower once said: "I'd rather have Allen as my chief intelligence officer with his limitations than anyone else I know."¹⁷ In contrast, President Kennedy explicitly directed John McCone to strongly assert his role as intelligence community coordinator.¹⁸ McCone accomplished this, in part, through USIB.

DCI McCone believed that USIB should serve as a prominent debating field in which the full multiplicity of views could be expressed, within the context of seeking his approval of the NIEs. One of the first battles McCone waged to support this view was with Defense Secretary McNamara, over the composition of USIB after 1961. As one observer noted: "The intention of the Administration

had been to charge the DIA with the resolution of conflicting service estimates and to make its presentation to the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) stand as the final judgement of the Pentagon.¹⁹ After DIA was created, McNamara proposed that it replace not only the JCS representative but also the heads of Army, Air Force and Naval Intelligence on USIB. They, and the DCI complained. John McCone reportedly argued with McNamara that this step might weaken the DCI's ability to hear multiple, conflicting views, and lead to "watered down" estimates.²⁰ Thus, a compromise was arranged whereby the three military service intelligence chiefs were invited to USIB meetings. While they lost their official membership or "vote," they retained an equal right to argue and dissent. In effect, each service had a "right to appeal past the DIA" to USIB and its Chairman.²¹

McCone demonstrated an interest in listening to these appeals, if well-reasoned and thoughtfully presented. Significantly, McCone became the first modern DCI to be willing to support a service position over that of the CIA's. As one author wrote: "McCone showed that he could be convinced by good arguments, and gained a reputation for objectivity by being ready to overrule the CIA on the United States Intelligence Board."²² According to CIA estimators, this happened in the case of several NIEs assessing progress during the Vietnam war, for which McCone was known to be "hawkish" in disputing the effectiveness of a gradualistic approach to bombing of North Vietnam.²³ During USIB debate on one such NIE, McCone told CIA analysts to redraft the estimate after talking to military commanders "who know what is going on."²⁴

A critical example of McCone's support of competition within the strategic NIEs is NIE 11-3-63, regarding the possibility that the Soviets were deploying an ABM system around the so-called Tallin Line. The potentiality of an "ABM gap" was one of the most hotly contested strategic issues in the first half of the 1960s. In 1963, a major division existed between the CIA, supported by the Navy and State Department, and the Army, supported by the Air Force and DIA. The CIA maintained that the observed installations around the Tallin Line did not represent an early ABM system, but rather were relegated to anti-aircraft defense. The opposite view was a more pessimistic or "hard assessment" which viewed the new installations as the beginning of a full-fledged anti-missile system.²⁵ At USIB, McCone was impressed by the Army's line of reasoning.²⁶ After the Army's initial presentation, McCone scheduled another meeting for elaboration. As described in the following section, McCone then assumed an adjudicatory role and officially sided with the Army's view, as the final text of NIE 11-3-63.²⁷ After this, he hired the Army general delivering the presentation, who later became head of the CIA's new DDS&T.

McCone was impatient with debate at USIB that he considered repetitious, once he had made up his mind. For example, in the early 1960s he is said to have been intolerant of the Air Force's views on Soviet ICBM deployment and often cut short debate on NIE 11-8. In 1963, he sided with the CIA's prediction of 300-600 ICBMs by mid-1967 and considered the Air Force's predicted level of 700-800 by that date much too high.²⁸ Albert Wohlstetter documented how, in the succeeding years, the Air Force estimates gradually converged with those of the CIA. "In 1965 and 1966 [convergence] was

complete in the near term and in 1967 it became complete for all years.²⁹ In 1974, Wohlstetter wrote that for the years of his study, 1962 - 1969, the intelligence community had "systematically underestimated" Soviet heavy bomber, ICBM and SLBM deployment.³⁰

Richard Helms

Richard Helms' tenure as DCI was divided in two parts: from 1966 to 1968 he served under President Johnson and from 1969 to 1972 he served under President Nixon. Helms' inclinations were the same in both periods. He believed that drafting strategic NIEs was the job of professional analysts, who should be able to reach agreement prior to USIB. Helms did not enjoy listening to debate on highly technical issues, and argued that USIB was not the proper place to reopen past grievances.³¹ Rather, USIB meetings should lead to timely approval. President Johnson asked that the strategic NIEs be reduced to a one-page executive summary, which does not suggest much encouragement to the expression of competitive views. In his Administration, USIB meetings reportedly were some of the shortest in length hitherto, typically lasting only forty-five minutes.

During the Nixon Administration, competition gradually increased. As the SALT I treaty loomed large, Pentagon dissenters were less willing to relinquish their arguments without a fight, and both the White House and Defense Secretary Laird indirectly encouraged competition by criticizing the strategic NIEs. Helms thus was faced with potentially long and angry USIB meetings. Especially irritating was to be assured that disagreements had been

resolved, only to have them "pop right back at USIB."³³ Helms told this author that he favored enhanced competition within the NIEs, that estimating was a "give and take" process in which it was conceivable that different parties might exaggerate their claims in order to emphasize a point, and that CIA estimators sometimes regarded him as too "hard line."³⁴

However, his handling of competition was simple. He listened to competing argument only long enough to determine that it had not been resolved. Then, he closed the meeting, and typically sent the NIE back to ONE for redrafting. Participants say that he signaled the end of the meeting by removing his glasses.³⁵ After 1970, successive redrafting sessions, followed by USIB meetings, were required. As a consequence, several strategic NIEs were not officially approved until the spring of the following year.³⁶

James Schlesinger

DCI Schlesinger enjoyed competitive debate at USIB and actively participated in it. He considered USIB a place where intelligence chiefs with broad responsibilities and interests could meet in an informal atmosphere. His colleagues describe how he sat back in his chair, puffed on his pipe, and listened. Then, he might initiate a lengthy dialectic with the intelligence chiefs, during which new options might be considered.³⁷

Like McCone, Schlesinger was impatient with assertions but respected stimulating and documentable analysis. As described earlier, one of his major concerns was to keep competition in manageable proportions. For example, he layered the strategic estimating process by making some issues, such as Soviet civil

defense, the subject of IIMs, then summarized in the NIEs. Much discussion concerned how to best present major alternative positions, and stylistically control the complexity of the strategic NIEs. During Schelsinger's tenure, raw data was contained mostly in appendices.

William Colby

William Colby utilized USIB as a court of last resort, where appeals to the draft NIE from the Pentagon could be heard. Colby considered himself primarily a manager of competitive debate. In the words of one aide, he preferred open, group discussion at USIB as a means of hearing dissent, rather than private meetings, and believed that USIB was a place where all could actively participate in endorsing the draft.³⁸

During Colby's tenure, different Pentagon officials challenged the CIA's basic assumptions about Soviet behavior within the strategic NIEs. Notably under attack was the CIA's premise, summarized in a paragraph of the executive summary, that the USSR was not seeking strategic superiority, or a first strike capability, vis-a-vis the United States. For example, General Daniel Graham as head of DIA called this "the pabulum statement" and, as noted earlier, began footnoting "the basic tone" of the NIEs.^{38a} Objections also were offered to the CIA's format for handling dissent. For example, as head of Air Force Intelligence, General George Keegan objected to placing some dissent in footnotes rather than in the main text, the presentation of supporting evidence in appendices, the exclusion of critical dissents from the executive summary, and the elimination of pivotal issues, such as Soviet defense spending, from NIEs.³⁹

At USIB, Colby listened to several hours of debate on one section of an NIE, and scheduled other meetings to continue. To follow-up meetings, Colby invited the Pentagon intelligence chiefs to bring along staff and written documentation. General George Keegan now came to USIB meetings armed with new Air Force translations of Soviet strategic writings in order to demonstrate that CIA estimators had misinterpreted evidence about Soviet intentions.⁴⁰ To support his claims that the Soviets rapidly were deploying new missiles and undertaking a massive civil defense effort, Keegan brought along satellite photos, engineering reports and Air Force estimates of Soviet defense costs. They were passed around the table. According to General Graham, Colby gave Keegan, "who tends to round things off to the nearest million," every opportunity to present his case.⁴¹ For each major argument, this never took less than one-half hour. Then, Colby often authorized marginal changes at USIB. For example, Keegan was permitted to take additional footnotes, rewrite existing footnotes, present new evidence in an appendix, or substitute wording in the text.⁴²

By 1975, Pentagon criticism of the CIA draft NIE 11-3-8 had reached such a pitch that the DCI took an unprecedented step. Prior to the scheduled USIB meeting, Colby held a special conference of all intelligence agency heads and staff "to ensure that they were informed of all difference of opinion" prior to reviewing the draft itself.^{42a} This meeting was the first, acknowledged concession to military officials who complained that it was difficult to comprehensively express their divergences from the CIA draft,

while at the same time having to "chop up, edit and revise" the text.⁴³ This meeting reportedly lasted over six hours, and the DCI was present the entire time.

Admiral Stansfield Turner

Admiral Turner's attitude about competitive debate at NFIB is similar to that of Richard Helms, although unlike Helms, he spends considerable time on competitive issues at the draft stage. In the words of one aide, Admiral Turner prefers to "work text" in his office rather than subjecting the draft to lengthy oral debate.⁴⁴ Turner believes that most issues of dissent successfully can be resolved during the drafting process. At NFIB, the heads of the intelligence agencies then should be in a position to discuss and work over the NIEs' conclusions, rather than the entire text. Reportedly, NFIB meetings for both strategic and non-strategic NIEs now take place approximately once a month, and last from one to one-and-a-half hours. After the meetings, Turner is said to spend more time than past DCIs in reviewing, editing and polishing the final documents.⁴⁵

C. Final Adjudication of Views

The extent to which DCIs have inserted their personal judgments in the final strategic NIEs now has become a subject of controversy. For example, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence chose several cases to investigate regarding DCI Richard Helms' alleged role in altering final NIEs, to illustrate what it labels

"the constant tension...between the DCI...and the agencies."⁴⁶

Presently, Admiral Turner's critics maintain that he "tinkers" with the estimates and "has been more demanding and more pre-emptive than any Director of Central Intelligence in recent times."⁴⁷

The author regards as "adjudicatory," decisions made at the time of USIB which involve a choice between existing options and, consequently, alter what the draft NIE says. For example, a DCI may arbitrate between competing views by deciding that a new one should dominate or existing one be eliminated; or, a DCI may find all views insufficient and draw up a new solution reflecting his personal judgements. The author does not regard as adjudicatory, actions in which a DCI permits additional footnotes, inserts his own view separately in the final NIEs, or assists all parties in reaching a conclusion by offering his personal opinions. Likewise, upholding the CIA's position is not considered here as adjudicatory, unless there is evidence that the DCI judged all alternatives equally and impartially, and/or modified the CIA text.

An adjudicatory role for the DCI was implied in the original concept of the NIEs and USIB's predecessor body. The IAC, and then USIB, has been called the "Supreme Court" or "Board of Directors" of the intelligence community, although there was never any formal vote-taking.⁴⁸ As Chairman, the DCI was more equal than the other members in his right to participate. General Bedell Smith made it clear that, as part of the DCI's role in coordinating and approving the NIEs, he was free to select or eliminate views, or present his own judgements in the final NIEs. No President explicitly ruled out this role for the DCI although, as described earlier in the

Nixon Administration, Henry Kissinger implied that he himself should act as chief intelligence advisor and coordinator in adjudicating competing claims.

Nonetheless, most DCIs since General Smith have approached this role for the strategic NIEs with caution and exercised it on rare occasions. As seen, it ran against DCI Dulles' personal and political inclinations to act aggressively as a public advocate for one or another view. Further, he did not separate himself from the CIA as an institution on strategic matters and defended it as necessary.* Of the five subsequent DCIs examined here, one, William Colby, argues that adjudication is not an appropriate role for the DCI to play. As indicated in Chart B, three DCIs--John McCone, Richard Helms and Stansfield Turner--on occasion made adjudicatory decisions, but their approach has varied.** Moreover, Richard Helms told this author that he did not consider himself an adjudicator and, in describing Admiral Turner's role, one aide said that "he would not call himself that."⁴⁹ Below, occasional differences in approach to the non-strategic NIEs are noted.

John McCone

Initially, DCI John McCone did not believe that the DCI's role should be adjudicative, but regarded the NIEs as a product of good staff work. In the case of the 1962 Cuban missile estimate,

*As noted earlier, Allen Dulles was more aggressive in presenting his personal views in the non-strategic NIEs.

**Because of Schlesinger's brief tenure as DCI, it is impossible to determine whether he played an adjudicative role at USIB. The reader should bear in mind that Admiral Turner's adjudicatory decisions primarily are made prior to NFIB meetings.

he criticized and conjoled estimators to no avail and then permitted the NIE to go forward as it was. However, in this case, McCone's personal relationship and accessibility to President Kennedy were secure and he expressed his personal views directly to the President.⁵⁰

When McCone did play an adjudicatory role, he was careful to exercise it within the context of USIB. Adjudication is precisely what occurred in 1963 during the USIB debate on potential Soviet ABM capability. McCone listened intently to each side's views on the question of whether the Tallin Line installations represented the beginnings of an anti-missile or anti-aircraft system. He called for an elaboration of the Army's view of the former possibility, and eventually sided with it. The text of NIE 11-3-63 then was rewritten to present the Army's predictions that the Soviet intent was to deploy an ABM system around the Tallin Line. Since there was no provision for the CIA to take footnotes to an NIE, CIA analysts say that, in this instance, "the specificity of their view was lost."⁵¹ The less pessimistic assessment, which regarded the new installations for bomber defense, was represented in footnotes taken by the Navy and State Department.

This case is the most clear-cut example of adjudication at USIB that this author could find. It is interesting that, at the time, McCone's action was not challenged by CIA estimators on the grounds of being inappropriate or heavy-handed. One can speculate that this is because McCone's USIB decision was highly visible and seemingly deliberative. In retrospect, for the time frame of NIE 11-3-63, McCone's view proved inaccurate.⁵² In the following year,

CIA convinced him that he had been wrong and its position in the "ABM gap" debate once again assumed the text of NIE 11-3. McCone's 1963 decision opened Pandora's box, however, and subsequently "some of the technical panels serving the USIB felt so deeply that the CIA was dangerously underestimating the ABM danger that they took their views directly to the White House."⁵³

Richard Helms

DCI Helms is described by his contemporaries as acting as a strong adjudicator at USIB. For example, in discussing Helms' handling of the non-strategic NIEs, William Colby said that it was typical for Helms to listen and then say: "'I disagree; I think we should say this....'"⁵⁴ Then, the NIE would be sent back to ONE for rewriting to incorporate the DCI's opinion. Richard Helms once said of an NIE on Cambodia: "...in the end, I want a good paper on the subject even if I have to make the controversial judgments myself."⁵⁵ To others, Richard Helms had judicial qualities. For example, one aide said that he was the last DCI for whom all USIB members rose to their feet when he entered the room or closed the meeting.⁵⁶ He gave the appearance of being beyond the fray and, above all, decisive. One author describes Helms' handling of the Vietnam NIEs in this manner: "Throughout the paper wars, Helms was a bureaucratic general."⁵⁷

On the other hand, Helms rarely was involved in substantive debate on strategic matters, and this author could find no instances in which Helms overruled the CIA at USIB on strategic matters. On the contrary, if he ascertained that USIB debate was inconclusive,


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he typically sent the NIE back to ONE for redrafting to incorporate a Pentagon view. He was reluctant to redraft himself and did not permit any Pentagon participant to do so. The best example of this is his handling of NIE 11-8-68. Following USIB approval in June 1969, Dr. Kissinger "asked that [the NIE] be rewritten to provide more evidence supporting the DCI's judgement" that the Soviet MIRVing of the SS-9 was not imminent, a conclusion with which Kissinger was known to disagree.⁵⁸ The Board of Estimates rewrote the NIE, providing additional argument that the "triplet" under discussion was not a MIRV. In investigating this case history, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded that Helms had not attempted to influence the outcome.⁵⁹

However, this author concludes that Helms did act, at times, in an adjudicatory capacity, which differed from the approach of either DCIs McCone or Turner. Helms' adjudicatory role was management-oriented, exemplified by decisiveness and brevity in handling the strategic NIEs, and motivated by an interest to produce the NIEs on time. If the DCI determined that the discussion was going to be protracted and ultimately irresolvable by more ONE redrafting, he "approved" the existing version and sent it to the White House. This led to complaints of arbitrary behavior. For example, one Pentagon official said that the status of dissents "was left hanging in the air" and that he was uncertain about the content of NIEs until receiving the final, printed version.⁶⁰

Another official complained that Helms sometimes resolved debate by eliminating a heatedly contested point from the NIE altogether, i.e., overruling a dissent.⁶¹ For example, General

Keegan was not allowed to include his views on Soviet civil defense measures in the summary of NIE 11-3 until the early 1970s.⁶² In 1970, DIA completed a study, presented at USIB, of a new approach to estimating the size of the Soviet defense budget. Reportedly, this study was aimed at demonstrating the CIA was grossly underestimating the size of the Soviet commitment to new strategic weapons. At USIB, the DCI agreed that the report was interesting and worthwhile, but asked DIA to publish its views outside the current NIE.⁶³

James Schlesinger

Because of Schlesinger's brief tenure, it was impossible for this author to determine whether he played an adjudicatory role, as indicated in Chart B. If he had remained as DCI, it is highly probable that he would have so intervened. This speculation flows from his heavy substantive involvement in drafting, encouragement of debate at USIB, open mind about the credibility of CIA work, and impetus to keep competition within reasonable bounds in order to present a stylistically coherent document to the policymaker. Adjudication usually is considered the strongest role a DCI might play in producing the strategic NIEs. In this author's view, DCI Schlesinger would have found this role intellectually challenging and necessary to resolve issues of sustained competition in the strategic NIEs.

William Colby

William Colby told this author that it was not the DCI's job to arbitrate between conflicting views in the strategic NIEs.⁶⁴ Two convictions seem to underlie this concept: first, that the

DCI's main role is to open competitive debate at USIB, which during Colby's tenure reached its highest pitch; second, that the subject matter was technically too complex for the DCI to effectively intervene, without appearing to be arbitrarily choosing sides. As one observer noted, Colby's political instincts were on the "humanist left" but he did not impose these on USIB members.⁶⁵

That is not to say that Colby was passive during USIB deliberations. As documented earlier, he often requested that additional evidence be presented to shed light on a difficult issue. After listening to extensive debate, Colby sometimes summed up the discussion by offering broad, even philosophical observations of his own, without dictating their inclusion in the NIE. For example, Colby believed that conventional "theater balance" considerations tended to be lost in the shuffle of complex Soviet strategic programs, and that Soviet technological gains might have a political impact on less developed countries.⁶⁶ Colby's willingness to marshall diverse evidence at USIB gave the appearance of impartiality in weighing arguments, even if the draft NIE remained unchanged. For example, in the case of the "Particle X" debate, Colby heard extensive argument before siding with the prevailing scientific (and CIA) viewpoint, after which General Keegan was permitted to take a footnote.⁶⁷ Unlike Helms, Colby did not refer all redrafting back to the CIA. Also, he did not redraft himself. As described earlier, Colby typically resolved debate by authorizing marginal changes or additions to the draft NIE at USIB, such as a new footnote, which then was written by the dissenting member.

DCI Colby behaved more aggressively during USIB debate on the non-strategic NIEs, for which he sometimes held views distinct from the CIA's or a Pentagon agency. In such cases, Colby represented these separately in the text of the NIE, following USIB deliberations. That is, he added his own opinion in a separate sentence or paragraph, rather than redrafting the NIE to reflect this. For example, in one NIE on Latin America, Colby took one position, CIA and the State Department's INR another, and DIA and one military service a third.⁶⁸ During Colby's tenure, the Deputy Director of CIA, General Vernon Walters, also employed this option in instances when he sided with the Pentagon. For example, in one NIE on Italy, the DDCI sided with DIA during USIB debate. Colby sent the estimate back to his NIO for drafting to incorporate a joint DDCI-DIA alternative.⁶⁹

Stansfield Turner

This author credits Admiral Turner with having played the strongest adjudicatory role of any DCI. The difference between DCI Turner and other DCIs is a matter of degree and timing. As the New York Times reported, "what has changed, it appears, is Admiral Turner's involvement in what he describes as restructuring and redrafting" prior to NFIB meetings.⁷⁰ Turner says: "'I am not bashful about that. I end up telling them this section has to be redrafted. You won't find many sentences I personally penned. Mostly it is because they didn't bring out two views strongly. Another way, I look at the outline, the concept at the beginning, and I restructure that, saying, You are asking the question wrong.'"⁷¹

One intelligence official describes DCI Turner's adjudicatory role as highly "personalized."⁷² After reviewing successive drafts, Turner may make one of four decisions about what an NIE says. First, he may "support" the CIA's view by rejecting an alternative proposed by a Pentagon agency, eventually eliminating it from the draft. As documented earlier, this happened in a recent NIE 11-4. Second, Turner may "overrule" the CIA by agreeing that a Pentagon alternative is of sufficient merit to warrant equal status to that of the CIA's, for example, in the case of the Soviet Backfire bomber already described.

Third, Admiral Turner may reject all options and draw up a new one. For example, the above-mentioned New York Times article reported that this happened in a 1977 NIE on the balance of strength between North and South Korea following withdrawal of US troops in the South. "Admiral Turner concluded, contrary to the original estimate, that withdrawal would substantially diminish the deterrent balance on the peninsula."⁷³ Fourth, Turner may insert his personal view separately, or alongside of other, within the NIEs.⁷⁴

Admiral Turner has been criticized for not using the joint, high-level forum of NFIB for final deliberations. Because he prefers dealing with Pentagon officials individually throughout the draft stage, his role is less visible than that of DCIs McCone or Colby and critics advance charges of political motivation. As one intelligence community official complains: "Turner has 'asked the community to redo the estimates or has rewritten them and sent them on without further reference to the National Foreign Intelligence Board, or he has sent them back to convince, cajole or bully the other participants into alternative estimates.'"⁷⁵

VI. THE DCI'S ROLE IN PROMOTING
INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Independent review of the final strategic NIEs is discussed here for three reasons. First, outside review of the NIEs originally was considered a wholesome ingredient of the process. Second, some DCIs actively promoted such review. Third, the independent, parallel analysis of the outside "B Team" to the inside "A Team's" NIE 11-3-8-76 reportedly had a sizeable impact on that and subsequent strategic NIEs, as described below.

By "independent" review, this author means review by any group which does not play an official part in drafting the NIEs and is not employed directly by the CIA. Review of the strategic NIEs may occur at the draft stage, or just before or after USIB endorsement. It may be systematic, e.g., each year's NIE 11-3-8, or periodic. As indicated in Chart B, only two DCIs--Allen Dulles and James Schlesinger--are regarded by this author as having encouraged independent review of the strategic NIEs. William Colby is a borderline example since, with reservations, he agreed to the concept of competitive review before leaving the office. However, it was DCI George Bush who guided the 1976 A-B Team experiment, with initial enthusiasm, to conclusion. In contrast, DCIs John McCone, Richard Helms, and Stansfield Turner demonstrated little interest in establishing ongoing mechanisms for independent review.

A. Allen Dulles, the Princeton Consultants and Strategic Advisory Panel

Almost from day one of the NIEs under General Bedell Smith, a group of distinguished outsiders known as the Princeton consultants met near Princeton University to examine the estimates. Originally,

the panel was self-supporting and composed largely of men with wide, practical experience in public affairs "as a corrective to what [the DDCI] regarded as the disproportionate number of academics on the Board [of Estimates]."¹ The consultants first met at the home of the DDCI, William Jackson, and then other locations around Princeton. Throughout the 1950s, they gathered regularly for two full days, four times a year. An additional half day prior to formal meetings was spent at Princeton reading the NIEs. Typically, the consultants reviewed NIEs just prior to IAC or USIB meetings, although earlier drafts sometimes were examined.

The primary way in which Allen Dulles promoted the involvement of the Princeton consultants was by his presence. As DDCI in 1952, Dulles attended every meeting of the panel and was instrumental in proposing new members. Throughout his tenure as DCI, Dulles continued this practice, often leaving busy meetings at the CIA to fly up to Princeton.² Dulles was accompanied by several Board of Estimates members and ONE staff. The discussion was lively and intense, and Dulles is described by one panel member as being "keenly interested and always eager to learn."³ Face-to-face contact between CIA officials and outside experts was considered natural and invaluable during the 1950s and, since the Princeton consultants issued no formal reports, constituted its chief means of communicating with the CIA.

Although the Princeton consultants spent the majority of time on non-strategic NIEs, they contributed to the strategic NIEs as well. Panel members were useful in devising precise language by which to communicate the Soviet threat. Individuals occasionally took it upon themselves to examine Pentagon numerical

predictions in depth. For example, one member said that he looked into figures on Soviet coastal artillery which had appeared consistently in each NIE, and discovered that they were the same ones utilized during WWII.⁴ Nonetheless, by the second half of the decade, questions about Soviet technology became so complex that other mechanisms were devised to review these NIEs.

In the late 1950s, Allen Dulles established the Strategic Advisory Panel "as a device for resolving some of the competing claims on Soviet missile activity."⁵ Composed of ten members, the panel included CIA consultants and recognized aerospace technology experts, and was regarded as independent of the CIA. It met twice a year for several days, after having been briefed on the strategic NIEs by experts involved in drafting, usually just before the NIEs were issued. The panel then formed its own judgements, which it presented separately to the DCI and the President's security advisers. During "the 'missile gap' days the panel's expertise had been found useful in sorting out a lot of technical arguments and removing much of the excess speculation."⁶

B. The 1960s

Neither DCIs John McCone nor Richard Helms actively promoted independent review of the strategic NIEs. During the early 1960s, the Princeton consultants and the Strategic Advisory Panel fell into disuse. In both cases, insiders contended that their own growing expertise in the technical aspects of strategic estimating

*The Strategic Advisory Panel originally was known as the Hyland Panel for its first chairman, a Vice President of Hughes Aircraft.

made the contribution of outsiders less insightful. In the beginning of McCone's tenure, the Princeton consultants met twice a year at a retreat in Virginia, but the DCI was not present and work centered primarily on the non-strategic NIEs.⁷ Eventually, the group dissolved. CIA analysts came to believe that the Strategic Advisory Panel had become too "hawkish" and its intervention "irritating."⁸ It was disbanded in the early 1960s, and its re-constitution in 1967 was ignored by Helms and intelligence professionals.

During most of the 1960s, review of the strategic NIEs was conducted entirely by those persons who wrote them. For example, from time to time individual Board of Estimates members initiated post-mortems on critical NIEs or groups of NIEs, for internal circulation.⁹ Growth took place in the influence and competency of USIB's many subcommittees, which some observers consider the real, working-level heart of the USIB process.¹⁰ Of the fifteen subcommittees eventually created, at least half concerned themselves exclusively with strategic matters, such as the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee and the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation. Composed of CIA and Pentagon specialists, they contributed substantively to drafting of the strategic NIEs. One Pentagon official complained that both DCIs McCone and Helms "stacked the deck" in appointing CIA officials to chair these subcommittees.¹¹

During the Nixon Administration, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger utilized the NSC to review the strategic NIEs. After registering dissatisfaction with the conclusions reached in NIE 11-8-68 predicting delays in the Soviet MIRVing program, Kissinger created a "MIRV Panel" under the NSC to study the question in depth. Conducted

in the spring of 1969, this interagency review included CIA and Pentagon DDR&E officials, who soon became the chief combatants. It involved "a stream of intensely focussed studies" on Soviet MIRV capabilities, "reached no conclusions, but exhaustively laid out data and identified areas of disagreements."¹² Subsequently, Kissinger created an NSC "Verification Panel" to study issues related to SALT verification, which immediately expanded beyond a focus on the strategic NIEs. When Kissinger became Secretary of State in 1973, the NSC's review of specific NIEs ceased.

C. James Schlesinger and the Intelligence Community Staff

DCI Schlesinger's contribution to an independent review involved the Intelligence Community (IC) Staff, which now serves the DCI. Since the IC Staff is funded out of a budget separate from the CIA's, it qualifies in this author's definition of "independent" even though personnel are drawn from the CIA and Pentagon. Since 1971, the IC Staff assisted the DCI in administrative housekeeping tasks related to his role as coordinator of the intelligence community. In late 1972, a Product Review Division (PRD) was created. The PRD was supposed to regularly appraise intelligence studies and estimates, "testing them for objectivity, balance, and responsiveness."¹³

Schlesinger was the first DCI to provide the IC Staff with muscle, by emphasizing its responsibility for community-wide budgeting, authorized by President Nixon in 1971. In encouraging the PRD's independent work, "Schlesinger altered the composition of the IC Staff by increasing the number of non-Agency personnel. In this way, he hoped to facilitate the Staff's contacts with the other components of the community."¹⁴ The PRD commenced in-depth, case studies of past NIEs, choosing several recent "crisis prediction"

NIEs for special emphasis--e.g., NIEs on the 1973 Middle East war, the Cyprus crisis of 1974, the Indian nuclear detonation, and the Mayaguez incident. Its conclusions had implications for the intensifying strategic debate. For example, one study contended that, in 1973, the "intelligence community was disposed to believe that the Arabs were unlikely to resort to war against Israel because to do so would be 'irrational,' in light of relative Arab-Israeli military capability."¹⁵ In evaluating the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the PRD argued that CIA analysts again were prey to "the perhaps subconscious conviction (and hope) that, ultimately, reason and rationality will prevail, that apparently irrational moves (the Arab attack, the Greek-sponsored coup) will not be made by essentially rational men."¹⁶ Precisely this complaint was echoed by individuals charging CIA analysts with a "bias of systematic optimism."¹⁷

D. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the 1976 A-B Team Experiment

Among its several functions, PFIAB historically has demonstrated a strong interest in the strategic NIEs. Chief among its assets as an outside, independent reviewer has been the prestige and experience of its members, and its inclination to look at issues from what has been termed the "grass roots level."¹⁸ Up to the time it was abolished in 1977, PFIAB frequently called intelligence professionals, including DDP personnel, junior analysts and dissident officials, to testify before it. PFIAB also solicited raw intelligence reports and drafts of finished products to evaluate. Although PFIAB had no staff of its own, it assembled special panels of members and consultants to examine selected issues, reporting directly to the President.

The 1976 A-B Team "experiment in competitive analysis stemmed from PFIAB's opinion that the NIEs had been underestimating the process of Soviet strategic weapons."¹⁹ Individual PFIAB members gradually had arrived at this conclusion after examining strategic NIEs of the past decade and listening to the testimony of dissenting Pentagon officials, such as Generals Daniel Graham and George Keegan. In early 1975, several PFIAB members complained to DCI Colby about the suggestion, in NIE 11-3-8-74, that the Soviets were seeking only "rough parity" with the US. They presented Colby with their own draft statement of Soviet policy and asked him to initiate an outside review.²⁰ Colby listened, but defended the NIE on the grounds that it represented the best combined judgement of the intelligence community, and appeared reluctant to go further.²¹ At the same time, President Ford requested PFIAB to ascertain why the strategic NIEs presented such a disturbing number of dissents.

In mid-1975, General Keegan was invited to the White House to make his case, before President Ford and PFIAB, concerning the significance of Soviet civil defense measures and new guided missiles.²² Other Pentagon officials also testified at this meeting. In August 1975, PFIAB's Chairman proposed that the President authorize the NSC to implement a "competitive analysis."²³ DCI Colby responded with a proposal that the PFIAB first examine an "applicable NIE then underway and thereafter determine what specific course of action to take. The PFIAB found weaknesses in that NIE and, after having made further investigations of its own, again proposed [in April 1976] an experiment in 'competitive analysis.'"²⁴ In June 1976, President Ford asked DCI George Bush to carry out the experiment. Bush is described as being initially "enthusiastic" and considered an effective review one of his main tasks as DCI.²⁵

Two teams were set up to prepare separate versions of NIE 11-3-8-76. The A Team was composed of the regular CIA analysts, and additional consultants. The B Team consisted of seven outside experts and past government officials, headed by Dr. Richard Pipes of Harvard University. It was chosen by the DCI and the President's deputy assistant for national security. A CIA analyst was designated by Bush to provide the B Team with the same raw material utilized by the CIA in preparing the NIEs.

According to the New York Times, both teams were assigned three topics for intense study: the accuracy of Soviet guided missiles; the penetrability of Soviet air defense by low-level bombers; and overall Soviet strategic objectives.²⁶ On security grounds, the Navy eliminated a fourth topic from consideration. As related by members of both teams, this story contended that there was a "stand-off" on Soviet missile accuracy, and "both teams influenced each other" regarding Soviet air defense.²⁷ Greatest dispute arose over the assessment of Soviet strategic aims, with the B Team challenging the CIA's view that the Soviets were not seeking strategic superiority over the US. The discussions were described by one participant as being "absolutely bloody" with the B Team accusing the CIA of dealing in "faulty assumptions, faulty use of intelligence and faulty exploitation of available intelligence."²⁸

The final version of NIE 11-3-8-76 presented to President-elect Carter reportedly was influenced by the pessimism of the B Team. According to the same New York Times story, DCI George Bush spoke of "changed perceptions" within the CIA regarding Soviet behavior as a result of the parallel analysis, and said the "worrisome signs included newly-developed guided missiles, a vast program of

underground shelters, and a continuing build-up of air defenses."²⁹ CIA participants referred to the NIE as being "'more somber.'"³⁰ A high-level Pentagon official described the estimate as being "'more than somber--it was very grim. It flatly states the judgement that the Soviet Union is seeking superiority over United States forces. The flat judgement that that is the aim of the Soviet Union is a majority view in the estimate. The questions begin on when they will achieve it.'"³¹ The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence immediately investigated the experiment, after which one member, Senator Daniel Moynihan, wrote that the B Team's notion "that the Soviets intend to surpass the United States in strategic arms and are in the process of doing so, has gone from heresy to respectability, if not orthodoxy."³²

In early 1977, PFIAB proposed that the entire estimative procedure be revised and that outsiders, like themselves, be brought into the process once again.³³ As the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded, the concept of the review of NIEs by outside experts was a "legitimate one." However, its value in this case had been undercut by three factors: first, the B Team "reflected the views of only one segment of the spectrum of opinion;" second, it "spent much of its effort on criticizing much earlier NIEs rather than...producing alternative estimates;" third, "details concerning these highly classified questions leaked to the press, where these appeared in garbled and one-sided form."³⁴ DCI George Bush, who favored the experiment at the outset, concluded that "never again" should an outside review be attempted in the same manner.³⁵

By the end of 1977, President Carter had abolished PFIAB and, under DCI Stansfield Turner, independent review of the NIEs has not been sustained. Rather, Admiral Turner has encouraged increased input by consultants to the drafting of the strategic NIEs. For example, one consultant to the NIO for Strategic Intelligence is known to have views described as hard-line.³⁶ Admiral Turner also became the first DCI to release some NIEs, primarily those dealing with energy issues, to the public domain. Admiral Turner's three-man Senior Review Panel now assists him in reviewing the NIEs. However, this group is employed full-time by the CIA and is not meant to be "independent" by this author's definition.

VII. ASSESSMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE OF DCIs

If this study has demonstrated nothing else, it is that DCIs have been inconsistent in their approach to producing the strategic NIEs. Some have emphasized some roles, and others neglected them. Then, what kind of DCI should a President choose if he desires changes in the strategic intelligence estimative process? Which functions are "ideal?" Can a DCI appropriately be both "manager and prophet?" What tasks have not been performed?

Below, the performance of seven DCIs in producing the strategic NIEs is assessed. In addition to the six DCIs selected by this author for extensive study, General Bedell Smith is included because of his strong role in the estimative process, even though the modern strategic NIE did not emerge until the mid-1950s.* The author summarizes the roles exercised by DCIs according to two criteria: their individual background, interest, and concept of the DCI's job; and historical trends. Then, separate functions are examined to determine which are mutually supporting and which are potentially conflicting, or biasing. Finally, the author presents her conclusions about roles underemphasized by DCIs.

A. Summary of Roles Played by DCIs

Seven isolated roles of the DCI in producing the strategic estimates have been described in this study. Three pertain to the NIE drafting process: (1) management direction to CIA production; (2) management attention to Pentagon coordination; and (3) personal,

*The role of General W. Bedell Smith (1950-1952) is discussed in Chapter II. The other DCIs include: Allen W. Dulles (1953-1961); John A. McCone (1961-1965); Richard Helms (1966-1972); James R. Schlesinger (1973); William E. Colby (1973-1975); and Admiral Stansfield Turner (1977 to present).

substantive input. Three involve leadership at the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), now called the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB): (4) support of the CIA's position; (5) encouragement of competitive debate; and (6) final adjudication of views. The last role is: (7) promotion of independent review of the strategic NIEs.

Personal Background and Concepts

Looking at these roles as a function of a DCI's personal background and interests, the following observations are made.*

(1) Management direction to the CIA estimates team was exerted by five DCIs with diverse backgrounds--General Bedell Smith, John McCone, James Schlesinger, William Colby and Admiral Stansfield Turner. After General Smith created the Board of Estimates and ONE within CIA in late 1950, no charges were initiated in this set-up for 23 years and two DCIs (Dulles and Helms) with a combined tenure of 15 years devoted little attention to management. The first director to consider management reform and leadership the DCI's primary role was William Colby in 1973, an "inside" director who was familiar with a range of CIA programs. Since 1973, the National Intelligence Officer (NIOs) who draft the NIEs are personally selected by the DCI.

*The "military" directors include four-star General Bedell Smith and four-star Admiral Stansfield Turner. The "inside" directors are William Colby and Richard Helms, both of whom had risen up through the ranks of the clandestine, or DDP, side of the CIA. In addition, Colby had served briefly as Executive Director-Comptroller of CIA and as DDP. "Outside" DCIs include John McCone and James Schlesinger, both of whom had previous government careers including Chairman of the AEC, and the first was a successful private businessman and the second had been a strategic scholar at the RAND Corporation. For lack of a better term, Allen Dulles is called an "inside-outside" DCI, since he was an OSS veteran and served briefly as DDP and as DDCI, but had an independent professional and political base. Not examined here is Admiral William Raborn (mid-1965 to mid-1966), a "military" DCI, and George Bush (1976), an "outside" DCI.

(2) Management attention to coordinating the draft strategic NIEs with Pentagon intelligence agencies, such as DIA and Army, Air Force and Naval Intelligence, was a focus of only three DCIs--General Smith, William Colby and Admiral Turner. Two are "military" directors with previous, high-ranking careers, who both designed a new format for Pentagon interaction and raised estimative issues directly with individual Pentagon officials. In comparison, William Colby created a new mechanism for increased Pentagon input but, while responsive, did not take initiative in seeking Pentagon comments at the draft stage. To the author, this suggests that, for good or ill, "military" DCIs are more aggressive in eliciting direct Pentagon interaction.

In contrast, Dulles considered it inappropriate for the DCI to dictate coordinating procedures to the Pentagon, and Helms was passive except when issues were raised by the White House or Defense Secretary. Throughout McCone's tenure, Defense Secretary McNamara supported ongoing CIA mechanisms for drafting the strategic NIEs.

(3) Four DCIs made personal, substantive input to the draft strategic NIEs, by assisting the CIA team in designing and answering strategic questions and/or presenting their personal opinions in the draft. All four--General Smith, John McCone, James Schlesinger and Admiral Turner--had previous professional training, technical familiarity and jobs in complex strategic issues. In contrast, Allen Dulles and two "inside" directors (Helms and Colby) had most experience in the DPP or clandestine side of the CIA and, admittedly in Colby's case, little technical competency in strategic matters.

Instead, these three made substantive input to the non-strategic NIEs. This suggests that, if he prefers a DCI who can make substantive contribution to the draft strategic NIEs, the President choose a person with the technical background to do so.*

(4) At USIB, now NFIB, the leadership concepts of DCIs varied greatly. Only one DCI, Allen Dulles, considered his primary role to support the CIA's view in the strategic NIEs. This resulted from Dulles' decision in the mid-1950s to permit the CIA to prepare an independent, institutional position within the draft strategic estimates, which then became the main text of the NIE. His decision was made within an historical context of encouraging competition to the Pentagon's intelligence estimates. At USIB, Dulles did not aggressively advocate the CIA's views, but rather presided over final deliberations in a manner which reinforced earlier decisions made in the draft.

(5) All other DCIs have assumed other roles at USIB. Four DCIs with diverse backgrounds--General Smith, John McCone, James Schlesinger and William Colby--actively encouraged competitive debate at USIB, or the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) in Smith's case. Under these four, debate was lively and intense, and USIB was considered an appropriate, higher level forum for the reopening of old dissents or presentation of new ideas. In the case of the "military" director (General Smith), debate was viewed as a means of promoting Pentagon involvement in the NIE process. The two "outside" DCIs (McCone and Schlesinger) were interested in hearing a multiplicity of opinion. However, competitive debate at USIB was

*There has never been an "inside" DCI selected from the CIA's DDS&T or DDI directorates.

encouraged, most consistently and at length on strategic issues, by William Colby, who argued that his primary role at USIB was to manage competition. This suggests that an "inside" DCI can rise above internal CIA demands and politics to assume a higher, coordinate role at USIB.

In contrast, two very different DCIs--Richard Helms and Admiral Turner--did not promote competitive debate at USIB, or NFIB in Turner's case. Neither enjoyed lengthy discussion or found it useful. They believed that issues of dissent should be ironed out beforehand. Consequently, final deliberations were short. However, the similarity ends here. The "inside" DCI (Helms) did not personally intervene at most levels of the draft stage. The "military" director (Admiral Turner) is heavily involved in drafting, and encourages competition by attempting to increase coordination with the Pentagon throughout the drafting process.

(6) Four DCIs of diverse backgrounds--General Smith, John McCone, Richard Helms, and Admiral Turner--acted as final adjudicators of conflicting views and a fifth--James Schlesinger--probably would have if he had remained longer in office. According to this author's definition, adjudication implies a final choice between competing positions which results in a new position gaining dominance, or some views being eliminated. Primarily, this occurs when a DCI represents his own opinion as the final text, overrules the CIA's view in favor of a Pentagon view, or eliminates a Pentagon dissent from the NIE. This author found instances, albeit rare, of each.

With the exception of Helms, the other four DCIs (if Schlesinger is included) appear to have considered adjudication a natural means to resolve conflict. All four previously had devoted management attention to drafting procedures and made substantive input to

draft NIEs. Three, with the exception of Turner, made adjudicatory decisions after hearing extensive debate at USIB. In contrast, Turner's adjudicatory role is exercised primarily at the draft stage just prior to NFIB meetings.

This suggests a natural flow, or escalating pattern, to the DCI's involvement in producing the strategic NIEs. If a DCI makes management decisions regarding drafting procedures, and has the technical background to make substantive input to the draft, he also may encourage competition and end up making final, intelligence judgements in the NIEs. That is, some resolution of conflict is sought.

That DCI Colby did not make adjudicatory decisions on strategic matters at USIB, but rather resolved conflict through compromise by adding footnoted dissents to the NIE, bears out this hypothesis. Colby, an "inside" DCI without strategic background, was mainly a manager and not substantively involved in drafting. Richard Helms is an exception. Helms occasionally made adjudicatory decisions at USIB, partly in hopes of keeping the strategic NIEs on a timely schedule, without previously having been involved in management or substance. Moreover, Helms' single role is difficult to explain, since he typically is described by observers as being a strong, thoroughly professional leader of the CIA bureaucracy. This suggests that for strategic matters, Helms tried to adhere to a philosophy of allowing the professional analysts to argue out their differences.

Finally, this author found no evidence that either "inside" director (Helms or Colby) or the "inside-outside" director (Dulles) ever overruled the CIA, whereas there is evidence that one "outside" DCI (McCone) and one "military" DCI (Admiral Turner) did so. This

suggests that, bureaucratically, it is easier for a non-insider to make adjudicatory decisions against the CIA, at least on strategic issues.*

(7) The last role, promoting independent review of the strategic NIEs, was performed by only three DCIs examined--General Smith, Allen Dulles and James Schlesinger. Essentially, there was no independent review of the strategic NIEs by outside experts not employed by the CIA from 1961-1973, and 1977 to the present. If one includes an "outside" director not studied here, DCI George Bush, who guided the 1976 A-B Team experiment in competitive analysis to conclusion, it appears that "non-inside" directors are most enthusiastic about the notion of independent review.

These observations are summarized in Chart D on the following page. In addition, Chart D outlines the functions of DCIs in producing strategic NIEs according to concepts of the three broad jobs authorized for the DCI: manager of the CIA; coordinator of intelligence community affairs; and chief intelligence advisor to the President. This chart is based on an assumption that separate NIE production roles, e.g., encouraging competitive debate, can be readily classified as demonstrating emphasis on one of three overall assignments of the DCI, e.g., coordinator of the intelligence community. As Chart D indicates, a majority of DCIs emphasized at least two broad roles of the DCI in producing specific NIEs. Four DCIs--General Bedell Smith, John McCone, James Schlesinger and Admiral Stansfield Turner--played all three roles.

*As documented in this study, Dulles, Helms and Colby were more aggressive in criticizing CIA work in the non-strategic NIEs.

BROAD ROLES EMPHASIZED BY SEVEN DCIS FOR STRATEGIC NIES

| <u>OVERALL ROLE AS DCI</u> | <u>SEPARATE PRODUCTION ROLES*</u> | <u>7 DCIS</u> | <u>BACKGROUND**</u> |
|--|--|---|---|
| A. Manager of CIA | 1. Management Direction to CIA Drafting | Smith, McCone, Schlesinger, Colby & Turner (5) | Diverse (2 military, 2 out- side, 1 inside) |
| | 4. Support of CIA Position at USIB | Dulles (1) | One DCI ("inside-outside") |
| B. Coordinator of Intelligence Community | 2. Management Attention to DOD Coordination in Drafting | Smith, Colby & Turner (3) | Mainly Military (1 military, & 1 inside) |
| | 5. Encouragement of Competitive Debate at USIB | Smith, McCone, Schlesinger, & Colby (4) | Diverse 1 military, 2 outside & 1 inside) |
| C. Chief Intelligence Advisor to President | 3. Personal, Substantive Input to Draft | Smith, McCone Schlesinger, & Turner (4) | All with technical background, no inside (2 military, & 2 out- side) |
| | 6. Final Adjudication of views (prior to or at USIB or NFIB) | Smith, McCone, Helms, probably Schlesinger & Turner (4-5) | Same as above (plus 1 inside) |
| 7. Promotion of Independent Review | | Smith, Dulles, and Schlesinger (3) (if include Bush as 8th DCI: (4) | Diverse (if include Bush, mainly outside: 2 out- side, 1 "inside-out- side," & 1 military |

*The seven production roles are numbered according to the order in which they were discussed earlier in this study.

**An "inside" DCI had a previous CIA career; and "outside" DCI had a previous private business, academic, or government career; a "military" DCI is a military officer. Allen Dulles is considered an "inside-outside" DCI.

Historical Trends

The activities of DCIs also may be assessed in light of historical hindsight. As indicated in Chart B earlier, the last three DCIs examined in this study--James Schlesinger, William Colby and Stansfield Turner--have been involved more actively in the strategic NIEs than their predecessors. For example, compared to the long tenures of Allen Dulles and Richard Helms, recent DCIs exercised more control over different phases of production. Compared to John McCone, there has been more theorizing and follow-through of late, concerning the appropriate leadership role of the DCI. This is indicated by the number of "XX" in Chart B, beginning in 1973.

To this author, the recent trend towards increased DCI intervention in the production process is one response to outside criticism of the quality and validity of the strategic NIEs. In 1969, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and Defense Secretary Laird were not the first top-level officials to criticize the strategic NIEs. President Eisenhower himself was known to doubt the accuracy of "gap" predictions in the 1950s. As documented in this study, what is different about the criticism of the first half of the 1970s is that it gathered momentum, supported by dissident Pentagon officials and outside groups such as the Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), and was directed mainly against CIA estimators. It culminated in the A-B Team competitive review in 1976. Richard Helms did not respond by exercising more leadership over different phases of production, although he frequently directed the CIA estimates team to incorporate dissenting views in the strategic NIEs. For

the most part, Helms' tenure as DCI was characterized by passivity towards the strategic estimative process. When he did intervene at the last moment, his decisions sometimes were criticized by individual Pentagon officials as "arbitrary."

Beginning with James Schlesinger in 1973, recent DCIs felt the need to play a stronger role during the drafting stage. The one trait they share is increased management direction over the CIA estimates team. Indeed, they overhauled it completely. In choosing the NIO system for drafting NIEs, they then assumed more direct responsibility for it. In the absence of the collective review and supervisory functions formerly exercised by the Board of Estimates, DCIs now handpick the NIOs, and personally monitor and review their work. In addition, two DCIs examined since 1973--William Colby and Admiral Turner--have devoted more attention to means they believe will improve coordination with the Pentagon intelligence agencies during the drafting stage. They became the first DCIs to do so since General Bedell Smith in 1950.

Here the similarities end. In 1973, William Colby became "the man for his time" by extending competitive debate to the open forum of USIB, considering USIB as a court of last resort and sounding board for dissenting members. In 1977, Admiral Turner reversed this trend. Turner's actions have led to outside criticism that he has "personalized" the decisionmaking process, making adjudicatory decisions in a less open, or more private, atmosphere.

B. Mutually Supporting and Conflicting Roles: Manager versus Prophet

A useful way to approach the question of the "ideal" role or roles of the DCI in producing strategic intelligence estimates is to ask which functions are mutually supporting and which potentially

are conflicting, or biasing. Assuming that a President prefers a DCI who can help resolve conflict in the strategic NIEs, which roles best ensure that a DCI's intervention will not lead to estimates biased by his personal view or one institutional view? Should a DCI be both "manager and prophet?"

In this author's opinion, it is impossible to eliminate potential bias altogether if a DCI is expressly selected on the basis of playing a strong substantive and adjudicatory, or "prophet" role. However, some functions are potentially more biasing than others, some are conceivably mutually supportive, and in both cases it is partly a matter of how decisions appear to others. Mutually supporting roles are those in which the performance of one enhances performance at the next stage, or those in which a balance is struck, for example, between drafting functions and leadership at USIB.

Most questions of personal or institutional bias on the DCI's part are more complex than simply advocating the CIA's institutional viewpoint. Allen Dulles played this role at USIB; but this automatically precluded him from exercising other roles, and all other DCIs avoided this pitfall. Usually, the subject of bias is raised by critics when and if a DCI personally selects the CIA drafters, argues his own views before them, individually reviews and approves their work, and inserts his personal opinions in the draft or makes other adjudicatory decisions. Stated simplistically, how can a DCI both advocate one view in the draft NIE and also act impartially as an adjudicator at USIB? Because of potential conflicts along the way, should a DCI concentrate on designing an "optimal" management structure for writing, coordinating and reviewing the draft NIEs and then adopt a "hands-off" policy until final USIB deliberations?

Two extremes of administrative behavior have been described in this study--that of DCIs Richard Helms and Admiral Turner. On the one hand, Helms contends that the DCI should be little involved in drafting lest this "bias" his final decisions at USIB. If the DCI becomes an advocate too early, this will limit his freedom later. Instead, the CIA should be left alone to do its work, and the DCI intervene only in the final phase as deemed necessary. The difficulty with Helms' approach is that his adjudicatory role at USIB appeared to some ill-informed and accomplished in a substantive vacuum, and often eliminated Pentagon dissents. When Helms did not "adjudicate," he sent the draft NIE back to the CIA drafters to represent more strongly the Pentagon's alternatives. Neither action necessarily resulted in an unbiased resolution of conflict. Critics also complained that, by inaction, Helms allowed the membership quality of the Board of Estimates to deteriorate.

DCI Helms' approach is almost a case of approach-avoidance. This suggests that a DCI's involvement in drafting is supportive of, or consistent with, execution of subsequent roles at NFIB. Drafting the strategic NIEs takes at least six months, while formal USIB or NFIB debate is a matter of hours, or at most days, and under Helms was less. Once a draft is written, it becomes difficult to change. In order to be sufficiently informed about competitive strategic debate at NFIB, a DCI cannot ignore what goes on during the lengthy drafting sessions.

For example, at a minimum, a DCI might review the CIA's organizational set-up for estimative work to ascertain if it is operating as intended, appoint an estimates team with which he can work comfortably, monitor and review successive drafts so that he is

informed about the boundaries of major analytical disputes, and listen to the arguments of dissenting Pentagon representatives about coordinative procedures. This "management" approach to drafting is exemplified by DCI William Colby, who then went on to manage highly technical, argumentative debate at USIB.

On the other hand, Admiral Turner has taken all these steps, and more, and he is criticized for bias in being both personal advocate and final adjudicator. In this author's opinion, these accusations result, partly, from poor timing. Admiral Turner pays too much attention to the drafting of the strategic NIEs compared to leadership at NFIB meetings. Because of an imbalance between his involvement at these two stages, DCI Turner not only opens himself to criticism but also deprives himself of the opportunity of hearing high-level, group debate. That Turner does not fully utilize NFIB is an admission that, while brief, oral discussion at NFIB meetings between diverse intelligence chiefs with their own axes to grind may be a cumbersome and time-consuming way to complete complex analytical work.

Admiral Turner's approach implies that a DCI's decisions might appear less biased, or be less biased, if he reserves his adjudicatory role until after open, competitive debate at NFIB, conducted jointly in the presence of all intelligence agencies. A DCI still might exert management direction over the drafting process and make personal, substantive input beforehand.

For example, a DCI might read and edit successive drafts, reshape the questions asked, offer his personal advice, advance his own opinions alongside others, discuss strategic issues with CIA and Pentagon estimators, and satisfy himself that all views are

incorporated. However, he could stop short of rewriting the NIEs to reflect his final judgements. This approach was executed successfully by DCI John McCone who, after initial hesitation, made substantive input to the draft but was willing to change the NIEs as a result of USIB debate. In essence, McCone was both manager and prophet, and was not criticized at the time for exercising his prerogative to play these roles.

C. Management Steps Not Taken by DCIs

In this author's view, systematic attention to management and coordination at the draft stage of the strategic NIEs is the sine qua non of improved intelligence estimates. Throughout this study, we have been interested primarily in whether a DCI devoted any attention to these issues, as opposed to evaluating reorganizations and other changes actually initiated. Below, the author presents her conclusions about the strategic NIE process, derived from a year of study. These recommendations focus on mechanisms a DCI might devise to elicit a multiplicity of views before final intelligence judgements are made. Three criteria govern their selection: they must be easy to administer; they should reduce the likelihood of institutional or personal bias; and they must not pose, in the DCI's view, a security risk. All proposals build on changes authorized in recent years, rather than sharply reversing them.*

(1) This author applauds the notion that the DCI appoint the CIA estimators, or NIOs. Since the DCI must work closely with them, he should select them and they, in turn, be responsible to him.

*Since reorganization of the estimates function is ongoing in CIA, some of these proposals soon may be moot.

The NIO system now has been in effect for seven years, so that the earlier criticism of inexperience can be laid aside. However, recent DCIs have been negligent in designing additional internal review mechanisms. DCI Colby abolished the Board of Estimates because he believed its collective approval responsibility isolated the DCI from "the true believer." Moreover, a majority of members had been on the Board for many years, and thus the question of stagnation and perpetuating bias was raised by outsiders. Almost immediately, however, the cry went up for some collective review procedure in the CIA.

This author contends that the DCI and NIOs need an ongoing mechanism for internal review of the NIEs, since the present system relies so heavily on the work of a few individuals. Admiral Turner's three-man Senior Review Panel created in 1979 partly answers this demand, and fulfills several preferred qualifications. First, members are selected from outside the CIA, but work in the CIA on a daily basis. Second, membership is broadly based, or diverse. Third, the Panel advises but does not consent or "approve" in the same way that the Board of Estimates did. Fourth, it serves both the NIOs and the DCI. Finally, this author believes that member's terms of office should be fixed, in order to infuse the Panel with new personnel on a systematic basis.

However, observers question whether the newly created Senior Review Panel has sufficient prestige and responsibility to effectively challenge the draft. Consideration might be given to expanding its membership by two or three, including strategic experts. Some individuals might be hired on a part-time basis, so that they could

continue their current outside careers. The Panel might also conduct collective meetings among the NIOs, who now rarely meet together. In this manner, both Panel members and NIOs could benefit by sharing experiences and problems common to estimative work. The Panel might also adopt internally the principles of the 1976 A-B Team experiment in competitive analysis, as described below.

(2) There has been too rigid adherence to the principle that the CIA present a unified opinion in the draft and final NIEs. Individual CIA estimators never were permitted to take footnotes, and even now CIA estimators usually pull together in supporting a major CIA position. The rationale for past practices is inherent in the nature of estimating, and bureaucracy. However, the DCI might authorize periodic competitive or parallel reviews within the CIA, under the auspices of the Senior Review Panel. For example, the Panel might choose several CIA analysts and consultants to assist it in reviewing selected aspects of an ongoing strategic NIE. Such experiments would provide the Panel with additional clout and experience, without necessarily expanded approval authority. Much like the Pentagon's war gaming, internal competitive analysis might ensure that minority views in the CIA were aired along the way.

(3) From time to time, the DCI might sit in on coordinative meetings between CIA and Pentagon drafters. To this author's knowledge, no DCI has ever done so, although DCIs have called in dissident Pentagon officials to hear their complaints. By never observing first-hand, the DCI has lost an opportunity to witness coordinative methods and hear dissent from what has been termed the "bottom up."

(4) This author supports the continuance of a system whereby Pentagon intelligence officials, and sometimes consultants, prepare first drafts of selected chapters. By this time, sufficient expertise in writing should have been accumulated by non-CIA analysts to overcome earlier criticisms on this score. On a periodic basis, the portion assigned to individual agencies, including the CIA, might be rotated. Rotation need not be annual, since such a move would increase the administrative burden on the NIO, who is ultimately responsible. Periodic rotation reflects another internal approach to competitive or parallel drafting. It creates both a precedent and history for mulitple advocacy.

(5) In its day, the footnote system in the strategic NIEs was much abused. Both recent Presidents and DCIs have preferred an NIE format which represents major differences of opinion as alternative positions, or parallel texts. The advantage of this format is that all participants are encouraged to express their objections clearly, advancing only those which reflect a significant, documentable predictive uncertainty. Presently, there is more stylistic clarity and cohesion in the strategic NIEs than in the past. This new format also allows the DCI the option of advancing his personal opinion as an alternative separately, or alongside of, other views in the NIEs. However, exclusive reliance on this format has the disadvantage of eliminating altogether a view strongly held by one individual or a distinct minority, which readers might want to bear in mind. This author believes that the NIOs should permit the use of footnotes in occasional instances. The DCI and NFIB members might overrule footnotes later on a case-by-case basis, if they so chose.

(6) Ongoing independent or outside review of the strategic NIEs is a complex issue. Major difficulties are the administrative burden on the DCI and CIA staff, potential security leaks and, as the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence noted, the possibility that reviewers are biased. However, because of the large impact of the 1976 A-B Team experiment on subsequent perceptions in the strategic NIEs, this author agrees with the former PFIAB's recommendation that external review once again be a part of the NIE process. Because of the immense security risk, external reviews should be authorized only periodically, such as once every three years. Unless otherwise directed by the President, the time, conditions and reviewers should be authorized by the DCI with the assistance of another governmental body, such as the NSC or Presidential study group.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I: OVERVIEW

1. See, Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable," World Politics 31, no. 1 (Oct. 1978), p. 64.
2. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol II: Years of Trial and Hope (NY: Doubleday, 1956), p. 58. DIA was created in 1961, in part, "to provide more objective intelligence than that being produced by the service intelligence components," and flowed from a study group established by President Eisenhower, known as the Kirkpatrick Commission. (See, United States Senate, Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, known as the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Final Report, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence, Book IV, Washington, DC: GPO, April 1976, p. 76, fn. 10).
3. The origin of the term "liberal" appears to have been Henry Kissinger. (See, Lawrence Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977, p. 47). This view also was expressed by James Schlesinger. (See, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Final Report, Foreign and Military Intelligence, Book I, Washington, DC: GPO, April 1976, pp. 76-77).*
4. John Huizenga, former Chairman of the Board of Estimates, in testimony to the SSCI. See, SSCI, Book I, p. 76.
5. Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, known as the Murphy Commission Report, Appendices, Volume 7 (Washington, DC: GPO, June 1975), Appendix U: Intelligence Functions Analysis, p. 11.
6. See, for example, Alexander George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 66 (Sept. 1972).
7. SSCI, Book I, op. cit., p. 272.
8. This term is drawn from Benjamin Schemmer, "The Slow Murder of the American Intelligence Community," Armed Forces Journal International, March 1979, p. 53. See also Schemmer, "The Intelligence Community's Case Against Turner," Washington Post, "Outlook," Sunday, April 8, 1979, p. D-5.

*Henceforth, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is abbreviated by SSCI, and all references are to its Final Report of April 1976 unless otherwise indicated.

CHAPTER II: EVOLUTION OF THE STRATEGIC ESTIMATIVE PROCESS

1. National Security Act of 1947, Section 102(d), subparagraph (3).
2. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 58.
3. SSCI, Final Report, Book I, op. cit., p. 73.
4. National Security Act of 1947, Section 102(d), subparagraph (3).
5. Presidential Directive, January 22, 1946, establishing the National Intelligence Authority, Central Intelligence Group and position of the DCI. See, SSCI, Book IV, "History of the CIA." by Anne Karalekas (henceforth referred to as "History") pp. 113-114.
6. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Paperback Edition, 1966) pp. 64-66. This book was published first in 1949.
7. Ibid., p. 101.
8. SSCI, Book IV, "History," pp. 13 and 24.
9. Military estimates work was done in ORE's Global Survey Division, mainly by three men. They were generalists in the sense of having little Soviet expertise. However, Ludwell Montague, an historian, had been the Army's Executive Secretary of the JCS' Joint Intelligence Committee, and DeForest Van Slyck, a lawyer, had WWII intelligence experience with the Air Force. Interview with DeForest Van Slyck, 5/2/78. See also: SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 13; Ray S. Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars (Washington DC: Acropolis Books Ltd., 1976) p. 105.
10. The Eberstadt Task Force on Military Intelligence, of The Hoover Commission, which reviewed both the Air Force's and CIA's estimates in the spring of 1948. Quoted in The Washington Post, October 11, 1948.
11. SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 13, and interview with DeForest Van Slyck, 5/2/78.
12. Declassified Documents Reference System (Washington, DC: Carrollton Press, 1977 to present), which this author read in its entirety. See, for example, DDRS, #77-261C, ORE #27-48, "Possible Developments in China," Nov. 2, 1948.
13. SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 25.
14. Study on the CIA and National Organization for Intelligence, known as the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Survey, commissioned by the NSC in 1948 and completed in Jan. 1949. See, SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 16.

15. SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 17.
16. Ibid., p. 16.
17. Ibid., p. 11, and interviews with Lawrence Houston (3/22/78) and Walter Phorzheimer (4/13/78). Admiral Hillenkoetter's White House briefings occurred after 1949 and represented a victory for the CIA, since the State Department earlier had challenged its right to channel intelligence directly to the President.
18. Memorandum from CIA General Counsel, Lawrence Houston, to General W. Bedell Smith, August 1959, quoted in SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 18.
19. Congress conducted full-scale hearings of the "surprise" invasions in mid-1951, and agreed that the intelligence data had been available, and circulated. See, for example, Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision," op. cit., p. 63.
20. Admiral Hillenkoetter testified to the Senate Foreign Appropriations Committee on the following day. (Interview with Walter Phorzheimer, 4/6/79, who helped prepare the testimony). The quote is drawn from the Norfolk Ledger Dispatch, May 25, 1951.
21. Washington Evening Star, May 19, 1951, about Admiral Hillenkoetter's testimony to Congress of that day.
22. Washington Post, October 1, 1950, p. 5.
23. Declassified Documents Reference System, op. cit., #77-259C (Memo of June 25, 1948), 77-264D (Memo of June 30, 1948), 77-261C (Memo of Nov. 23, 1949), and 77-259E (Memo of Dec. 10, 1948). The memos included reference to the CIA's grading of agent (source) and information reliability. Hillenkoetter hardly was the last DCI to do this.
24. SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 18 and fn. 11. "Centralization of Authority" was a term used frequently by Hanson Baldwin, who covered intelligence activities for the New York Times. See, for example, Hanson Baldwin, in Armed Forces, October 18, 1947.
25. General Smith reportedly asked President Truman to call Langer, and he and other academics were recruited on the basis of Smith's concern that WWII was "imminent." (Interviews with Jack Maury, 2/9/79, and John Bross, 5/29/79). When Smith arrived, he reportedly found no current, coordinated estimate on military operations in Korea, which precipitated one of his famous battles with Gen. Douglas MacArthur. (See, SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 104).
26. Washington Post, Feb. 25, 1951.
27. Harry T. Rositzhe, The CIA's Secret Operations (NY: Reader's Digest Press, 1977), p. 20. According to Rositzhe, the Pentagon's demands were specific and forcefully stated, and led to several of the ill-fated drops in the Ukraine.

28. Interview with past and current CIA official (B), 5/30/79.
29. For this, see, SSCI, Book IV, "History," pp. 20-23.
30. Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars, op. cit., p. 120. Also interviews with DeForest Van Slyck (5/2/78), Paul Borel (9/1/78), Ray Cline (8/20/78) and John Huizenga (9/13/78). The CIA did not want "professional meeting-goers."
31. SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 19.
32. Interview with past and current CIA official (B), 5/30/79.
33. Cline, Secrets, op. cit., pp. 111 and 121.
34. Interview with John Bross, 5/29/79.
35. Ibid.
36. SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 18.
37. Ibid.
38. Cline, Secrets, op. cit., p. 111.
39. Quoted in Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, op. cit., p. 35.
40. The press reports that: "In the 35 to 40 problems in which the CIA has had to furnish an estimate since General Smith arrived...there have been no dissents...." (See, Providence Bulletin, May 25, 1951). However, this author found a 3 page-long dissent by the Air Force in NIE-12, "Consequences of the Early Employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces in Korea," Dec. 27, 1950 (Secret, Declassified Aug. 2, 1977). John Bross says that Smith's main concern "was to get out the product." (Interview, 5/29/79). Hal Ford reported one instance in which Smith initially overruled a Navy dissent pertaining to the effects of a Naval blockade of China during the Korean war, but reinstated the footnote following a complaint from CINCPAC. (Interview, 12/7/78).
41. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79.
42. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/9/79.
43. Cline, Secrets, op. cit., p. 123.
44. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79.
45. Freedman, op. cit., p. 35.
46. Colin S. Gray, "'Gap' Prediction and America's Defense: Arms and Race Behavior in the Eisenhower Years," Orbis, Vol XVI-1, Spring 1972, p. 263.
47. Ibid., p. 261, and Freedman, op. cit., p. 67.

48. Freedman, op. cit., p. 67.
49. Gray, op. cit., p. 263.
50. Allen W. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (NY: Harper and Row, 1963) p. 149.
51. Gray, op. cit., p. 262.
52. Ibid.
53. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79.
54. Gray, op. cit., p. 262.
55. Stuart Symington, "Where the Missile Gap Went," The Reporter, Feb. 15, 1962, p. 22. Symington earlier had conducted Senate hearings on the bomber and missile gap predictions.
56. Interviews with Richard Bissell (5/26/78), Jack Maury (2/9/79), and John Gross (5/29/79). See also, David Wise and Thomas Ross, The U-2 Affair (NY: Random House, 1964). Gross says that in the early 1950s, the Air Force rejected one plan which would have been implemented under its auspices, allegedly because it was too complicated to put a man in the aircraft. Interviewees agree that, subsequently, only a handful of persons outside of the CIA knew about development plans, approved by President Eisenhower in 1954. Because of the secrecy surrounding its development and use, the CIA provided the administrative framework for all aspects of the U-2. In the late 1950s, coordination with the Air Force was informal, consisting of a small Air Force contingent at CIA.
57. Following review by a formal interagency task force under Dulles, all flights had to be approved by President Eisenhower. Eisenhower gave only one blanket approval, for the first ten days. After that, individual flights were reviewed in a meeting at the White House consisting of the President, the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the JCS, Eisenhower's special advisor Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, the NSC Secretary, and Allen Dulles. Bissell suggests that John Foster Dulles also had a final veto power. (Interview with Richard Bissell, 5/26/78).
58. See, Freedman, op. cit., pp. 32-33 (who cites a figure of 3,000); and Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (NY: Alfred Knopf, 1979) p. 97 (who uses the 1,200 figure). The office is called the National Photographic Interpretation Center and remains a sub-unit of CIA.
59. Freedman, op. cit., p. 67; Gray, op. cit., p. 260; and James C. Dick, "The Strategic Arms Race, 1957-1961: Who Opened a Missile Gap?" Journal of Politics, XXXIV (Nov. 1972), pp. 1067-9.
60. SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 56.
61. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79.

62. An NSC Directive in 1951 had directed the CIA to implement an "agreed activities" arrangement with the Pentagon, whereby the Pentagon would turn over its peacetime covert operations to the CIA. In 1954, the Doolittle Commission concluded that both the CIA and Pentagon were "dragging their feet." See, Declassified Documents Reference System, op. cit., "Report on the Covert Activities of the CIA," The Doolittle Report, Sept. 4, 1954, #78-139C and 140B (Top Secret, Declass. in 1976).
63. SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 60. Dulles consolidated the ERA's four divisions into a Military Economic Branch in 1958, two years after it was proposed. Actually, the OSI continued to expand its work into areas earlier restricted by an agreement with DOD. In 1956, Dulles also created the interagency Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee under IAC, with the agreement of the Defense Secretary, but over the objection of the JCS and services who wanted exclusive control. (See, SSCI, Book IV, p. 61). Thus, some of the criticism is ill-founded.
64. SSCI, Book IV, "History," pp. 62-63.
65. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79.
66. Interview with Gen. George Keegan, 2/10/79. Keegan also said that he was present at a meeting between President Eisenhower and President-elect Kennedy in which Eisenhower said: "You must never let the Pentagon and military intelligence put your party at risk."
67. The personnel figures were cited in an interview with past and current CIA official (B), 5/30/79. Actually, OSR's work has not expanded steadily in some areas. For example, after 1967 OSR commenced work on some "friendly" countries and also Net assessments, which McNamara approved but was opposed by the services. Helms reportedly was embarrassed, and asked OSR to stop. (Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/9/79). At least one author maintains that Colby restricted OSR to current intelligence work. (Paul W. Blackstock, "The Intelligence Community Under the Nixon Administration," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. I, No. 2 Feb. 1975, p. 239).
68. John Huizenga, in testimony to the SSCI, 1/26/76, quoted in SSCI, Book I, p. 76. All testimony of officials to the SSCI remains classified.
69. James Schlesinger, testimony to the SSCI, 2/2/76, quoted in SSCI, Book I, p. 76.
70. Interview with Andrew Marshall, 2/9/79.
71. Albert Wohlstetter originally published his findings in three articles in Foreign Policy, entitled: "Is there a Strategic Arms Race?" (No. 15, Summer 1974); "Rivals, But No Race," (No. 16, Fall 1974); and "How to Confuse Ourselves" (No. 20, Fall 1975). A more extended version was published by the United States Strategic Institute, Legends of the Strategic Arms Race, USSI Report 75-1. Wohlstetter did not use the NIEs for his data, but rather relied on the predictions within the Annual Posture Statements, and Defense Program and Budget Statements, of the Secretary of Defense.

72. See, "Bush, Cline Colby and Helms on the CIA," The Washington Quarterly: A Review of Strategic and International Studies, Vol. 1 No. 4 (Autumn 1978), published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, p. 28.
73. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 2/9/79.

CHAPTER III: THE DCI'S MANAGEMENT OF STRATEGIC NIEs AT THE DRAFT STAGE

1. SSCI, Final Report, Book IV, "History of the CIA," by Anne Karalekas, op. cit., p. 74, fn. 7.
2. Ibid. This official was identified later to the author as Walt Elders, McCone's executive assistant.
3. Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, op. cit., p. 74.
4. Interview with William Hyland, 11/17/78 (on President Johnson); Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 2/9/79 (on President Carter).
5. Interview with Anne Karalekas, 10/13/78.
6. For example, See Ray Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars, op. cit., pp. 140-144. As an ONE staff member, Cline participated in the first Net Assessment at the Pentagon, an undertaking reporting directly to a special NSC subcommittee. Under Kennedy and Johnson, Net Assessments were done in the systems analysis shop under the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Under Nixon, there was a Net Assessment unit on the NSC staff, which later was moved back to OSD.
7. SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 80 and 81 (fn. 14).
8. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 2/9/79, about Dulles' briefings to Congress. Tales about Dulles' refusal to discuss policy implications at NSC, referring the questions to his brother, are legendary.
9. Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets, op. cit., p. 162.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. See, for example, John D. Leacacos, "Kissinger's Apparatus," Foreign Policy 5 (Winter 1970), p. 22. Also: Interview with Andrew Marshall, 2/9/79; and Freedman, op. cit., pp. 46-47.
13. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 2/9/79.
14. Ibid., 5/30/79.
15. Freedman, op. cit., pp. 37-39. However, Sherman Kent told this author that, in the early 1950s, disagreements occasionally were carried forward to IAC. (Interview, 5/2/79).

16. Freedman, op. cit., p. 38.
17. Interview with Richard Helms, 6/7/79.
- 17a. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79.
18. Interview with Andrew Marshall, 2/9/79.
19. Freedman, op. cit., p. 36.
20. For example, interviews with Ray Cline (5/2/78), Robert Amory (9/13/78), John Huizenga (10/26/78), and Williard Matthias (10/25/78). However they agree that there was a qualitative difference in the two DCIs' relationship with the Board. Dulles is described as "enjoying" Board members, whereas McCone "respected" them. Under McCone, the relationship was more formal and sometimes characterized by mutual distance.
21. There is some disagreement about when and if this occurred. Cline wrote that it occurred under McCone, and may have weakened estimative work. (Cline, Secrets, op. cit., p. 200). Later, Cline said that the transfer did not occur until after he left as DDI, and Kent persuaded Helms that the move was a good thing, since Kent might have more independence. (Interview with Ray Cline, 8/20/78). John Huizenga denies that this move ever took place (Interview, 10/26/78).
22. SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 81.
23. Ibid.
24. Interview with past and current CIA official (B), 5/30/79, and confirmed by Gen. Daniel Graham, interview of 12/7/78. The SSCI also concluded that the Pentagon had not always provided the CIA with access to US strategic planning data. (See, SSCI, Final Report, Book I, op. cit., p. 268).
25. For this and the following, interview with R. Jack Smith (the then DDI), 9/20/78. Also, interview with past and current CIA official (C), 12/15/78.
26. Freedman, op. cit., p. 52.
27. SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 86. Also, interviews with Keith Clark (9/19/78) and Jack Smith (9/20/78), and undenied by other Board members. Clark maintains that ONE was not as in-bred as the Board in the early 1970s.
28. Interview with Keith Clark, 9/19/78, regarding the one Board appointee, who was an Admiral. By 1973, there were several vacancies on the Board, in part because Schlesinger's intended reorganization was known.
29. Interview with Keith Clark (9/19/78) and Hal Ford (12/7/78).
30. Interview with Tom Lattimer, 5/10/79.
31. Interview with past and current CIA official (B), 5/30/79.

32. Freedman, op. cit., p. 43. McNamara's requests for work from ONE, OSR and OER (Office of Economic Research, which did bomb damage assessments during the Vietnam war) have been well documented. (See, for example, SSCI, Book IV, "History," pp. 80-81).
33. Freedman, op. cit., p. 36. Also interview with Fritz Ermath, 10/26/78, who later joined OSR, first as a RAND consultant. Ray Cline goes even further, and criticizes the creation of the DDS&T as well. Cline maintains, thereby, "that CIA advocacy of its own scientific collection techniques became mixed up with its objective analysis of all scientific and technical developments. The appearance of objectivity was hard to maintain when analysis and collection were supervised by the same staff." (Cline, Secrets, op. cit., p. 200).
34. Interview with John Huizenga (9/13/78) and Keith Clark (9/19/78). Colby often is regarded as the "executor of Schlesinger's will." However, both interviewees confirmed that Schlesinger had not made up his mind about the precise form of reorganization.
- 34a. Interviews with Keith Clark (11/3/78), John Huizenga (10/26/78), William Hyland (11/17/78) and Hal Ford (12/7/78). Clark said that Schlesinger wanted the NIEs short enough "to make any NSC member ashamed of not having read them." Actually, Schlesinger's approach clashed with that of Henry Kissinger who, in effect, wanted longer NIEs.
35. Office of Management and Budget, "A Review of the Intelligence Community, March 10, 1971, known as the Schlesinger Report, p. 10a. See also, Blackstock, "The Intelligence Community Under the Nixon Administration," op. cit., p. 232.
36. Interview with Daniel Graham, 5/9/79.
37. Interview with William Colby, 5/29/79.
38. William Colby, testimony to SSCI, 12/11/75, cited in SSCI, Book I, p. 75, fn. 17. Earlier, diffusion of responsibility was viewed as an advantage, protecting individuals from outside pressure.
39. Interview with William Colby, 5/29/79.
40. Interviews with John Huizenga (9/13/78) and Sam Hooskinson (11/9/78). As Colby told Keith Clark, "I want to multiply myself by twelve." (Interview with Clark, 9/19/78).
41. SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 86. Admiral Turner has continued the MBO system, although its impact on DDO and DDI interaction remains limited. (Interview, current CIA official (H), 9/25/79).
42. Interview with William Colby (11/17/78) and Jack Maury (8/24/78). See also, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1978) pp. 364-365. Colby believed that Angleton's suspicions about the DDO's Soviet desk sources were inhibiting effective political intelligence gathering.

43. See, "Bush, Cline, Colby and Helms on the CIA," The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1978, op. cit., p. 29.
44. Interview with past and current CIA officials (A) (2/9/78) and (C) (2/15/78). They agree that as the pace of the Senate investigations of the CIA increased, the attention Colby could devote to each NIE declined.
45. U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China-1975 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), p. 54.
46. SSCI, Book I, p. 434.
47. Interviews with Tom Lattimer (5/10/79), Sam Hooskinson (11/9/78) and Richard Betts (5/3/79). Reportedly, one Panel member said that he didn't have enough to do.
48. Interview with current CIA officials (D) and (J), 12/15/78.
49. Interview with Ray Cline, 11/8/78.
50. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79.
51. Freedman, op. cit., p. 37.
52. The Pentagon always has prepared several Soviet strategic estimates relating to different, U.S. joint defense planning parameters. For example, in the 1960s these included the National Intelligence Projections for Planning (NIPP), a ten-year projection, to which McNamara encouraged CIA input. The JCS annually produced several estimates ranging from 2-15 years. Under McNamara, the Pentagon also prepared a separate "worst-case" Soviet estimate, based on his interest in keeping this kind of estimating out of the strategic NIEs. This was called the "Greater Than Expected Threat" estimate. An excellent summary of the problem is provided by Gen. Daniel Graham, "Estimating the Threat: A Soldier's Job," Army, April 1973, pp. 14-18.
53. Several interviews suggested that alliances were more or less "automatic" to provide offsetting predictions. For example, interviews with Helmut Sonnenfeldt (11/30/78), Williard Matthias (10/28/78) and William Hyland (11/17/78).
54. Freedman, op. cit., p. 25.
55. Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, op. cit., p. 52.
56. This was accomplished in McCone's new office, for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation, established in 1963 to improve interaction between components of the intelligence community. See, Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept The Secrets, op. cit., p. 160.
57. Ibid.

58. Patrick J. McGarvey, "DIA: Intelligence to Please," in Morton Halperin and Arnold Kanter, eds., Readings in American Foreign Policy. A Bureaucratic Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), p. 324. See also: Report to the President and Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, known as the Fitzhugh Report (Washington, D.C.: GPO, July, 1973); and Gen. Daniel Graham, "US Intelligence at the Crossroads," United States Strategic Review, 1976, pp. 3-17; and Edgar Ulsamer, "Military Intelligence: Streamlined, Centralized and Civilianized," Air Force, August 1976.
59. Interview with William Hyland, 11/17/78.
60. Freedman, op. cit., p. 38. Gen Graham says this did not begin until the mid-1960s. (Interview, 12/7/78).
61. Daniel Graham, in Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China-1975, op. cit., p. 97.
62. Freedman, op. cit., p. 49. Also, interview with Andrew Marshall, 2/9/79.
63. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham. 12/7/78. Graham says that footnotes to the "tone" of the NIEs also were encouraged by Schlesinger when he became Defense Secretary in mid 1973. John Huizenga said this kind of footnoting occurred when the Pentagon could not document its dissents precisely. (Interview, 9/13/78).
64. Interview with William Hyland, 11/17/78.
65. Interviews with Hal Ford (12/7/78) and Tom Lattimer (5/10/79).
66. Freedman, op. cit., p. 50.
67. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/9/79.
68. Freedman, op. cit., p. 45.
69. Interview with William Hyland, 11/17/78. See also, Laurence E. Lynn, in The Murphy Commission Report, op. cit., Volume 7, Appendix U, p. 47.
70. Interviews with past and current CIA official (A) (2/9/79), Major Gen. George Keegan (10/11/79), and Andrew Marshall (2/9/79). See also, SSCI, Book I, p. 75.
71. Interview with Tom Lattimer, 5/10/79.
72. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 2/9/79.
73. Freedman, op. cit., p. 55.
74. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79.

75. Interview with Andrew Marshall (2/9/79) and Tom Lattimer (5/10/79) who says "DIA's interest goes up and down."
76. Interview with past and current CIA official (A) (2/9/79 and 5/30/79), and Andrew Marshall (2/9/79), who both agree as well that this method helps eliminate "red herrings" and serves as a means to check minor arithmetic errors.
77. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/9/79. Also, Graham, "US Intelligence at the Crossroads," op. cit., p. 11.
78. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79.
79. Ibid. Also, interview with past and current CIA official (C), 12/15/78.
80. This paragraph is derived from interview with current CIA official (E), 9/25/79.

CHAPTER IV: SUBSTANTIVE INPUT OF DCIs TO THE DRAFT STRATEGIC NIEs*

1. SSCI, Final Report, Book I, op. cit., p. 258.
2. For example, interviews with Ray Cline, 5/1/78 and 11/8/78. Although DCI's review was considered part of the process, Cline also said that it worried Sherman Kent, lest this link the NIEs too closely to policy considerations.
3. Interview with Bromley Smith, 9/12/78. Also, interview with Robert Amory, 9/13/78, who as Dulles' DDI was a member of the NSC's Planning Board.
4. Interview with John Bross, 5/29/79, who was quoting Ernie May, later a member of The Murphy Commission.
5. While interviewees agree on this point, they vary in describing how much of the NIE Dulles might read at this time. To this author, this suggests inconsistent attention to different NIEs by the DCI. For example, one interviewee said that Dulles "flipped through the pages" (Jack Smith, 9/20/78); but Sherman Kent said that "he knew what was in every estimate. The important ones he studied very carefully. He never talked about one which he hadn't read." (Interview 5/2/78). Stories of how Dulles kept Kent waiting into the early evening and, then, sometimes became distracted during the NIE discussions, are legendary.

The following analysis is derived from multiple interviewees. Unless there is a difference of opinion, only the principal source or sources is cited.

6. Interviews with Ray Cline (5/1/78), and Keith Clark (9/19/78 and 11/3/78). Cline said that, in his heart, Dulles preferred using his own words in the NIEs and, at this time, might dictate a new sentence or paragraph to Kent. If there was quibbling among Board members over words, Dulles might say: "I'm the boss" and insist on his own wording. Clark said that Dulles believed that the NIEs should offer firm predictions and/or give odds on the likelihood of occurrence. "You're paid to estimate," he once told the Board.
7. Interviews with Ray Cline (5/1/78), Paul Borel (9/1/78) and Sherman Kent (5/2/78). Kent said that Dulles could be "genially bull-headed" about a non-strategic NIE and, on occasion, insisted that his judgment be represented. Cline concurs. Borel said that once Dulles rewrote an entire SNIE and the Board dissented from it.
8. Interview with Deforest Van Slyck, 5/2/78.
9. Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars, op. cit., p. 143.
10. Hanson Baldwin, New York Times, May 6, 1970.
11. Interview with Ray Cline, 11/8/78. Cline says that McCone did not want to say: "This is my estimate." He believed that "the NIE system was bigger than he was," and would have preferred to take a footnote himself.
12. Interviews with Gen. Daniel Graham (12/7/78) and William Hyland (11/17/78). Graham says that McCone once told General LeMay at a cocktail party: "'Air Force Intelligence is the laughing stock of Washington.'" As AEC Chairman, McCone had been on the low side of the missile gap predictions, basing this on the AEC's estimate of Soviet fissionable material.
13. Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, op. cit., pp. 75-77. Since the CIA's estimates kept changing in different drafts during this period, these figures merely provide one indication of downward revision.
14. Ibid., p. 101.
15. Interview with John Bross, 5/29/79.
16. Cline, Secrets, op. cit., p. 192.
17. Interview with John Bross, 5/29/79. Interviewees disagree on McCone's level of involvement, which to this author indicates inconsistent attention to different NIEs, and McCone's preference for keeping his personal views out of the draft. Most interviewees indicated a high degree of serious interest on McCone's part. However, three said that McCone's policy was "not to get involved" (Sam Hooskinson, 11/9/78), that he "never interfered with the process," (Williard Matthias, 10/25/78, and that "he was not very interested" (William Hyland, 11/17/78).
18. Cline, Secrets, op. cit., pp. 192-193.

19. Interview with Keith Clark, 11/3/78.
20. Interview with John Bross, 5/29/79.
21. Interview with Jack Maury, 2/9/79. Oleg Penkovsky's intelligence suggested that the Soviets were having trouble with their ICBMs. Maury said Penkovsky once observed: "'They couldn't hit a bull in the ass with a balalaika.'"
22. Klaus Knorr, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles," World Politics XVI (April 1964), quoting the Stennis Report investigating the Cuban military build-up.
23. Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), p. 798.
24. Interview with John Bross, 5/29/79. McCone made this statement at Bross' home.
25. Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept The Secrets, op. cit., p. 162. Also, interview with Ray Cline, 11/8/78.
26. Interview with Richard Helms, 6/7/79.
27. Richard Helms, testimony to the SSCI, 1/10/76, cited in SSCI, Book I, p. 79.
28. Interview with Richard Helms, 6/7/79; and Freedman, op. cit., p. 139.
29. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/9/79. This view was confirmed in interviews with John Huizenga (9/13/78), Ray Cline (11/8/78), Hal Ford (12/7/78) and CIA official (I) (9/25/79). They agree that Helms felt ambiguous about the strategic NIEs, in part because he believed that they were not that influential and he didn't have that much to contribute.
30. Interview with Richard Helms, 6/7/79.
31. Interview with William Colby (5/29/79) and John Bross (5/29/79).
32. Draft NIE 11-8-69, approved by the Board of Estimates prior to the USIB meeting of 8/28/69, cited in SSCI, Book I, p. 78. The SSCI investigated Helms' role in deleting this paragraph from the NIE.
33. Freedman, op cit., p. 133. According to John Bross (5/29/79) and John Huizenga (10/26/78), the Helms-Laird battle was not cut-and-dry. They say Helms called Laird first, invited him to send representatives to the USIB meeting to discuss the paragraph, and subsequently modified the wording. Laird told Helms that he was concerned with the implications of the paragraph, should the Soviet get wind of it.
34. The possibility of CIA bias was implied in the Schlesinger Report, op. cit., 1971, pp. 10-11. According to Gen. Daniel Graham, Schlesinger had made several remarks about CIA bias privately, before assuming office. However, Schlesinger's more famous comments were made after he left as DCI, in testimony to the SSCI in 1976.

35. Interview with Sam Hooskinson, 11/9/78, who was present.
36. SSCI, Book IV, "History," op. cit., p. 85.
37. Interview with William Colby (5/29/79) and Sam Hooskinson (11/9/78). Hooskinson also called Schlesinger a "redrafter."
38. Interview with William Colby, 5/29/79.
39. Ibid.
40. Interview with past and current CIA official (C), 12/15/78.
41. Interview with William Colby, 5/29/79. One interviewee said that Colby believed that the NIOs were there "to advise him on his views" (Sam Hooskinson, 11/9/78).
42. David Binder, quoting a Pentagon intelligence official, in "CIA Head Accused of Tailoring Estimates to Policy; He Denies It," New York Times, Monday, November 6, 1978. Binder said that he based this article on interviews with five CIA officials and the DCI. (Interview 2/9/79).
43. Binder, NYT, Nov. 6, 1978, quoting Admiral Turner.
44. Interview with current CIA official (E), 9/25/79.
45. This paragraph is derived entirely from interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79.
46. Ibid.

CHAPTER V: THE DCI'S LEADERSHIP ROLES AT USIB OR NFIB.

1. SSCI, Final Report, op. cit., p. 76.
2. Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, op. cit., p. 40.
3. Ibid., p. 39.
4. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79.
5. Freedman, op. cit., pp. 66-67.
6. Stuart Symington, "Where the Missile Gap Went," The Reporter, Feb. 15, 1962, p. 25.
7. Daniel Graham, "The Intelligence Mythology of Washington, Strategic Review, op. cit. p. 61.
8. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/7/79. Graham said that Army Intelligence wanted to target U-2 flights on medium-range missile sites but the CIA kept searching for ICBM sites. He said this was true in the case of the ill-fated Gary Powers flight of May 1, 1960 about which the Army had argued: "You won't find anything." See also, Everett Allen, "Lack of Information led US to Overestimate Missile Lag," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 27, 1965.

9. Dulles' posture at USIB was described in interviews with John Huizenga (9/13/78 and 10/26/78), Jack Smith (9/20/78), Gen. Daniel Graham (12/7/78), Ray Cline (8/20/78), Hal Ford (12/7/78) and past and current CIA official (C) (12/15/78). Interviews agree that Dulles listened to lengthy debate but sometimes grew impatient towards the end. They agree that Dulles' "heart was in favor of an unspoken compromise" and he defended the CIA view only as necessary. However, on non-strategic NIEs he occasionally was impatient with the CIA as well, and sometimes encouraged the Pentagon to express its views. For example, this happened in the case of a SNIE during the 1956 Suez crisis. (Interview with John Bross, 4/14/78).
10. The Joint Study Group Report on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government, known as the Kirkpatrick Report, December 15, 1960, p. 14. See, Declassified Documents Reference System, op. cit., #77-27OD. The report also asserts that Pentagon members on USIB were not permitted to appeal its decisions without the approval of the Defense Secretary.
11. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/9/79.
12. Freedman, op. cit., p. 70.
13. Interview with Bromley Smith, 9/12/78, who was quoting General Andrew Goodpaster, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff.
14. Colin Gray, "'Gap' Predictions and America's Defense," Orbis, op. cit. p. 269.
15. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79. This was confirmed in an interview with Charles V. Murphy, who also said that during the campaign Nixon was "upset" and asked Dulles for his views.
16. Graham, "Estimating the Threat," Army, op. cit., p. 15. Several interviewees said that, subsequently, CIA officials blamed the Air Force for influencing the CIA's positions during the missile gap period. See, for example, Allen Dulles, Harper's Magazine, April 1963, in which he writes that the CIA responded to "great pressure" from the Defense Department. See also, Edgar M. Bottome, The Missile Gap: A Study of the Formulation of Military and Political Policy (New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1971).
17. Quoted in SSCI, Final Report, Book IV, "History," op. cit., p. 62. The time and original source of Eisenhower's comment is unclear.
18. Letter from President John F. Kennedy to John McCone, Jan. 16, 1962, quoted in SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 73.
19. Freedman, op. cit., pp. 22-23.
20. Interviews with Gen. Daniel Graham (12/7/78), Gen. George Keegan (2/10/79), and John Huizenga (9/13/78). McNamara privately criticized McCone for interfering in internal DOD matters, and resented his requests for help.
21. Freedman, op. cit., p. 23.

22. Ibid., p. 17.
23. Interview with Hal Ford (12/7/78) and William Hyland (11/17/78).
24. Interview with Williard Matthias, 12/25/78. This dispute concerned a 1963 NIE on "Prospects in South Vietnam."
25. Freedman, op. cit., pp. 90-94. The question of whether the Tallin Line installations could be "upgraded" into an ABM system reopened in the late 1960s.
26. Interviews with past and current CIA official (A) (2/9/79 and 5/30/79) and Gen. Daniel Graham (5/9/79).
27. Ibid. The Army general was Carl Duckett.
28. Interview with Gen. George Keegan, 2/10/78. The numbers are drawn from Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1964, Feb. 1963, p. 29.
29. Freedman, op. cit., p. 108. See Albert Wohlstetter, "How to Confuse Ourselves," Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 185-187. Wohlstetter explains this by the "power of consensus" and "pressure for conformity."
30. Wohlstetter, "Is There A Strategic Arms Race," Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 5. The major focus of Wohlstetter's work was long-range ICBM projections. He explains that, in the short term, official ICBM projections merely tried to keep up with and "finally touched reality," but in the long-term "forecasts got worse and not better. To say 'there was no systematic learning' puts it mildly." (See, "How to Confuse Ourselves," op. cit., p. 180.)
31. Interviews with Hal Ford (12/7/78), John Huizenga (10/26/78), Ray Cline (11/8/78), and current CIA official (I) (9/25/79).
32. Vincent Marchetti and John Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (NY: Alfred Knopf, 1974), p. 86.
33. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/7/79, regarding DIA's attempt to coordinate the services' estimates. Helms sometimes cut short debate by banging the gavel. (Interviews with Hal Ford, 12/7/78, and CIA official (I), 9/25/79).
34. Interview with Richard Helms, 6/7/79.
35. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/9/79.
36. Interview with Gen. George Keegan, 10/11/79. Delays in obtaining USIB approval also affected DCI Colby following his 1973 NIO reorganization. Interviewees say this partly resulted from stylistic difficulties in writing the NIEs.
37. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/9/79.
38. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79.

- 38a. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 12/7/78.
39. Interview with Gen. George Keegan, 2/10/79 and 10/11/79. Keegan then considered Schlesinger's reforms "non-competitive."
40. Ibid. See also, William T. Lee, Understanding the Soviet Military Threat: How CIA Estimates Went Astray (NY: National Strategy Information Center, Agenda Paper Nov. 6, 1977) p. 36. Lee says that in the early 1970s Air Force Intelligence translated nine basic books on Soviet military and strategic doctrine. Previously, the only translated Soviet book on this subject was that of the late Marshal Sokolovskiy, Military Strategy. In the mid-1960s, Keegan had challenged McNamara's reliance on one translation of this book (by Thomas Wolfe of the RAND Corporation), claiming that it was full of inaccuracies. (Interview, 2/10/79).
41. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/9/79.
42. Interview with Gen. George Keegan, 2/10/79. Neither Colby nor Keegan were particularly satisfied with this method of resolving dissent. One interviewee said that Colby worried about excessive footnoting. (Sam Hooskinson, 11/9/78).
- 42a. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. SSCI, Book I, p. 79.
47. David Binder, quoting a Pentagon intelligence official, NYT, Nov. 6, 1978.
48. See, Blackstock, "The Intelligence Community Under the Nixon Administration," op. cit., p. 236, and The Murphy Commission Report, op. cit., Volume 7, Appendix U, pp. 11 and 44. Although the DCI carries more weight than the other USIB members, one author concludes here that "the DCI's chief tool is persuasion, and the normal outcome when disputes occur is often no more than a partially satisfactory compromise." (William J. Barnds, p. 12).
49. Interview with Richard Helms (6/7/79) and past and current CIA official (A) (5/30/79).
50. There is some dispute about whether McCone presented his views to Kennedy from Europe. Ray Cline says that McCone told Kent that he would write a memo to Kennedy, but never did so. Rather, McCone's DDCI went to see Kennedy. (Interview, 11/8/78). Another interviewee said that McCone "went to the White House more than once with his own views" on other NIEs. (William Hyland, 11/17/78).
51. Interview with past and current CIA official (A), 5/30/79. He also said that McCone "felt strongly" about the Soviet's ABM potential and "sharply modified" the CIA text. (Interview, 2/9/79).

52. For example, see Freedman, op. cit., p. 93.
53. Ibid.
54. Interview with William Colby, 5/29/79. However, on other matters Colby wrote: "Helms had far too exquisite a sense of political realities to get into a fight he knew he couldn't win, and which could hurt both CIA and himself." (See, Colby, Honorable Men, op. cit., p. 330).
55. SSCI, Book I, p. 80, fn. 29.
56. Interview with CIA official (I), 9/25/79.
57. Powers, The Man Who Kept The Secrets, op. cit., p. 177.
58. See, for example, SSCI, Book I, p. 77 and Laurence Lynn in The Murphy Commission Report, op. cit., Volume 7, Appendix U, p. 48.
59. SSCI, Book I, p. 78 and fn. 25.
60. Interview with Gen. George Keegan, 10/11/79.
61. Interview with Hal Ford, 12/7/78, pertaining to the National Security Agency.
62. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham (5/9/79) and Dick Anderson (5/10/79).
63. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/9/79.
64. Interview with William Colby, 5/29/79.
65. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham (5/9/79) and John Bross (5/29/79).
66. Interview with William Colby (5/29/79) and Gen. Daniel Graham (5/9/79).
67. Interview with William Colby, 5/29/79.
68. Ibid.
69. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/9/79.
70. David Binder, NYT, Nov. 6, 1978.
71. Ibid., in an interview with Admiral Turner.
72. Binder, draft of NYT article (provided to the author), prepared Oct. 12, 1978.
73. Binder, NYT, Nov. 6, 1978.
74. Interviews with current CIA official (E) (9/25/79) and past and current CIA official (A) (5/30/79).
75. Ibid.

CHAPTER VI. THE DCI'S ROLE IN PROMOTING INDEPENDENT REVIEW

1. SSCI, Final Report, Book IV, "History," op. cit., p. 19.
2. Interviews with Klaus Knorr (5/30/79), Hal Ford (12/7/78), Paul Borel (9/1/78) and Gen. Daniel Graham (12/7/79).
3. Interview with Klaus Knorr, 5/30/79.
4. Ibid.
5. Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, op. cit., p. 40.
6. Ibid.
7. Interview with Klaus Knorr (5/30/79) and Ray Cline (5/2/78).
8. Freedman, op. cit., p. 40.
9. SSCI, Book I, testimony of Ed Proctor (former DDI) of 3/1/76, p. 276, fn. 46. These studies were self-initiated and remain classified. Also, interviews with Ray Cline (8/20/78) and current CIA official (K) 5/30/79.
10. See, for example, Blackstock, "The Intelligence Community Under the Nixon Administration," op. cit., p. 241.
11. Interview with George Keegan, 10/11/79. Other subcommittee chairman are automatically appointed by the Defense Secretary, such as for GMIC's successor.
12. Freedman, op. cit., p. 50. See also, John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973).
13. SSCI, Book I, p. 276.
14. SSCI, Book IV, "History," p. 85.
15. SSCI, Book I, p. 271.
16. Ibid.
17. Lee, Understanding The Soviet Military Threat, op. cit., in a Foreword by Eugene V. Rostow, p. 1. This is also referred to as "mirror imaging."
18. Interview with anonymous past CIA official, 4/5/79. See also, The Murphy Commission Report, op. cit., Vol. 7, Appendix U, p. 75, and interview with William Casey (PFIAB member in late 1976), 5/7/79.
19. SSCI, Subcommittee on Collection, Production, and Quality, The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode Concerning Soviet Strategic Capability and Objectives (Washington, DC: GPO, Feb. 16, 1978), p. 2.
20. Interview with William Colby, 5/29/79.

21. Interview with Gen. Daniel Graham, 5/7/79. Graham said that, throughout 1975, PFIAB asked Colby several times to authorize an outside review, but Colby hesitated on security grounds.
22. Interview with Gen. George Keegan, 2/10/79.
23. SSCI, The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode, op. cit., p. 2.
24. Ibid.
25. Interview with William Colby (5/29/79 and Fritz Ermath (10/26/79). However, the experiment soon became an administrative nightmare and the effort to preserve secrecy failed. William Casey described Bush's attitude at the end of the year as "not too positive." Interview, 5/7/79.
26. David Binder, "New CIA Estimate Finds Soviet Seeks Superiority in Arms," NYT, Dec. 26, 1976. The article is reproduced in Lee, Understanding the Soviet Military Threat, op. cit., p. 63-69. Apparently, it is this article which later caused controversy.
27. David Binder, draft of NYT article (provided to the author), prepared Dec. 23, 1976. Binder based his story on interviews with Bush and other participants.
28. Ibid. (draft).
29. Binder, NYT, Dec. 26, 1976.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. SSCI, The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode, op. cit., "Separate Views of Senator Daniel P. Moynihan," p. 9.
33. Binder, NYT, Dec. 26, 1976.
34. SSCI, The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode, op. cit., p. 2. The Senate also reported that the press account of the experiment's results "appeared in garbled and one-sided form." (p. 2.).
35. Interview with Keith Clark, 11/3/78. Also, interviews with William Casey (5/7/79) and Gen. Daniel Graham (5/9/79).
36. Interview with current CIA official (F), 9/25/79.

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES*

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| Robert Amory | Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI), CIA, 1951-1961 (9/13/78) |
| Richard Anderson | Staff, Office of Strategic Research, CIA, 1974-1977; Staff, House Committee on Intelligence, 1978-present (5/10/79) |
| William Bader | Task Force Leader, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1974-1977; Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1978; Staff Director, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1979-present (12/5/78) |
| Richard Betts | Staff, National Security Council and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1975-1977 (9/29/78, 11/9/78, and 5/3/79) |
| David Binder | Editor, <u>New York Times</u> , Washington office, writer on Soviet bloc and strategic affairs (2/9/79 and 5/29/79) |
| Richard Bissell | Special Assistant to the DCI, 1953-1954; Director, Development Projects Office, CIA, (for the U-2), 1954-1958; Deputy Director for Plans (DDP), 1958 to early 1962 (5/26/78) |
| Paul Borel | Office of Research and Evaluation, CIA, 1947-1950; Director of Administration, Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1950-1962; Assistant to the Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA, 1962-1966 (9/1/78) |
| James Billington | Staff, Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1954-1957 (10/13/78) |
| John Bross | Eastern Europe Division, Directorate for Plans, CIA, 1950s; Comptroller, CIA, 1962-1964; Deputy to the DCI for intelligence community coordination (head of National Intelligence Programs Evaluation), 1964-1971 (2/14/78 and 5/29/79) |
| William Bundy | Staff, Office of National Estimates and National Security Council liaison, CIA, 1950-1961 (10/11/78) |
| William Casey | Under-Secretary of State, 1973-1974; Member, Murphy Commission, 1974-1975; Member, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 1976-1977 (5/7/79) |
| Bruce Clark | Staff, Basic Intelligence Division of the Office of Research and Reports, CIA, 1950s; Chief, Military Intelligence Branch, Office of Current Intelligence, and Military Intelligence Division, CIA, 1960-1967; Director, Office of Strategic Research, CIA, 1967- 1973; Director, National Foreign Assessment Center (D/NFA), CIA, late 1979 to present |

*The author lists mainly former positions held relevant to the strategic NIE process. Date(s) of interview is provided for all interviewees except current CIA officials. For them, dates are cited in the footnotes and on a separate page.

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| Keith Clark | Staff, Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1950-1963; Member, Board of Estimates, CIA, 1963-1973; National Intelligence Officer (Western Europe), CIA, 1973-1978 (9/19/78 and 11/3/78) |
| Ray Cline | Staff Director and other assignments in the Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1950s; Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA, 1962-1966; Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department, 1969-1973 (5/1/78, 8/20/78 and 11/8/78) |
| William Colby | Station Chief, Deputy Director of Pacification, Director of Phoenix Program, in Vietnam, CIA, 1959-1972; Executive Director-Comptroller of CIA, 1972; Deputy Director for Plans (DDP), early 1973; Director of CIA, officially from September 4, 1973 to January 30, 1976 (11/17/78 and 5/29/79) |
| John DesPres | National Intelligence Officer (Nuclear Proliferation), CIA, at present |
| Fritz Ermath | RAND Consultant and Staff, Office of Strategic Research, CIA, 1973-1976; Intelligence Community Staff and B Team liaison, 1976-1977; Staff, National Security Council, 1978 to present (10/26/78) |
| Hal Ford | Staff, Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1950-1973; Senior Staff, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1973 to present (12/7/78) |
| Alan Goodman | Special Assistant to the Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center, CIA, 1977-1979; Assistant to the DCI, at present |
| Lieut. Gen. Daniel Graham | Army intelligence officer, 1950s; Staff, Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1963-1965; Director, Defense Estimates, Defense Intelligence Agency, 1970-1973; Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence, 1973; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, 1973-1978 (12/7/78 and 5/9/79) |
| Richard Helms | Chief of Operations, Directorate for Plans (DDP), CIA, 1952-1961; Deputy Director for Plans (DDP), 1962-1965; Deputy Director of CIA, mid-1965 to mid-1966; Director of CIA, officially from June 30, 1966 to February 2, 1973 (6/7/79) |
| Sam Hooskinson | National Intelligence Officer (Middle East) CIA, 1974-1977; Director, Intelligence Subcommittee, National Security Council, 1978-1979 (11/9/78) |
| Lawrence Houston | General Counsel of CIA (and its predecessor body), 1945-1973 (3/22/78) |

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| John Huizenga | Staff, Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1952-1964; Member, Board of Estimates, 1964-1966; Deputy Chairman, Board of Estimates, 1967-1971; Chairman, Board of Estimates, 1971-1973 (9/13/78 and 10/26/78) |
| Art Hulnick | Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, at present |
| William Hyland | Staff, Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1960-1968; Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, White House, 1969-1973; Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 1973-1978 (11/17/78) State Dept. |
| Anne Karalekas | Staff, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1974-1977 (10/13/78) |
| Maj. Gen. George Keegan | Air Force Intelligence officer, 1950s and 1960s; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Air Force, 1972-1977. (2/10/79 and telephone conversation 10/11/79) |
| Sherman Kent | Deputy Chairman, Board of Estimates, CIA, 1950-1951; Chairman, Board of Estimates, CIA, 1952-1967 (5/2/78) |
| James King | Assistant to the Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center (for academic liaison), CIA, 1977 to present |
| Klaus Knorr | Member, Princeton Consultants, 1950-early 1960s; Member, Senior Review Panel, National Foreign Assessment Center, CIA, 1979 to present |
| Thomas Lattimer | Staff, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, 1958-1970 Staff, National Security Council, 1970-1975; Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of Intelligence (and head of DIA), Department of Defense, 1975-1977; Staff Director, House Intelligence Committee, 1977 to present (5/10/79) |
| Richard Leyman | Intelligence staff, CIA, since 1950; Director, Office of Current Intelligence in 1970s and deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence, 1976-1977; presently, deputy to the Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center, and National Intelligence Officer (for Warning), CIA |
| Andrew Marshall | National Security Council staff and head of NSC Net Assessment, 1969-1973; Director, Office of Net Assessment, Office of Secretary of Defense, 1973 to present (2/9/79) |
| Williard Matthias | Staff, Office of Research and Evaluation, CIA, 1947-1950; Staff, Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1950-1963, Member, Board of Estimates, 1963-1973 (10/25/78) |

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| Jack Maury | Staff, Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1950-1951; Chief, Soviet Division, Directorate for Plans, CIA, 1954-1962; Assistant to the Defense Secretary, and the Navy Secretary, 1974-present (8/24/78 and 2/9/79) |
| Charles Murphy | Former Air Force Intelligence officer, journalist and author on strategic affairs (5/3/78) |
| William Parmeutter | National Intelligence Officer (Africa), CIA, 1973 to present |
| Walter Phorzheimer | Legislative Counsel, CIA (and its predecessor body) 1945-1956; Curator, Historical Intelligence (CIA) Collection, 1956-1974 (4/14/78 and 4/16/79). The author gratefully acknowledges the use of Walter Phorzheimer's personal clipping files in preparing this study |
| Vincent Puritano | Assistant to the Deputy Director of CIA, at present |
| Helmut Sonnenfeldt | Defense and State Department analyst, 1960s; Staff National Security Council, 1969-1977 (10/25/78 and 11/30/78) |
| Huntington Sheldon | Director, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, 1953-1961 (8/8/78) |
| Bromley Smith | National Security Council staff, 1954-1956, and Executive Secretary, Operations Coordinating Board, 1957-1961; Executive Secretary, National Security Council, 1961-1968 (3/9/78 and 9/12/78) |
| R. Jack Smith | Staff, Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1950-1959; Member, Board of Estimates, 1959-1962; Director, Office of Current Intelligence, 1962-1966; Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA, 1966-1972 (9/20/78) |
| Howard Stoertz | Staff, Office of National Estimates, CIA, 1952-1965; Chief, Photo Interpretation Section, the Office of Strategic Research, SALT delegation representative and special assistant to the DCI on SALT verification, CIA, 1965-1973; National Intelligence Officer (Strategic Intelligence), CIA, 1973-present |
| DeForest Van Slyck | Staff, Office of Research and Evaluation, CIA, 1947-1950; Member, Board of Estimates, CIA, 1950-1960 (5/2/78) |

CODE TO CURRENT CIA OFFICIALS INTERVIEWED

- A - Howard Stoertz, 2/9/79 and 5/30/79**
- B - Bruce Clark, 5/30/79**
- C - Richard Leyman, 12/15/78**
- D - Arnold Horelick, 12/15/78 (brief interview)**
- E - Alan Goodman, 9/25/79**
- F - James King, 5/30/79 (and other conversations)**
- G - Klaus Knorr, 5/30/79**
- H - Vincent Puritano, 9/25/79**
- I - John DesPres, 9/25/79 (brief interview)**
- J - William Parmeutter, 12/15/78**
- K - Art Hulnick, 9/25/79**